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Missed Opportunities: Louisiana's Version of the Rules of
Professional Conduct
N. GregorySmith*

I. INTRODUCTION

We are entering a period of potentially significant changes in the rules that
govern the conduct of lawyers. The American Law Institute has just published its
new Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers.' It contains a number of
provisions that significantly depart from conventional codes oflawyer conduct.2 An
American Bar Association commission, called the Ethics 2000 Commission, has
just completed an extensive review ofone of the ABA's own products-the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct.' The Commission's report calls for significant

Copyright 2000, by LOTISIANA LAW REVIEW.
Associate Professor, Louisiana State University Law Center. Many thanks to my colleagues
James W. Bowers, Christopher L. Blakesley, Saul Litvinoff, Lucy S. McGough, Warren L Mengis, and
Katherine S. Spaht, for their comments on prior drafts, or portions of prior drafts, of this article; to
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., for his insights on the ABA's comments to Rule 8.4 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct; to Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., Chief Justice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, for
permission to use documents generated by the Louisiana Supreme Court; to Wallace D. Riley, former
President of the American Bar Association, and the American Bar Association, for permission to use
documents generated by the American Bar Association; to John C. Combe, Jr., and Robert E. Leake,
Jr. for background information about the work ofthe Louisiana State Bar's Task Force to Evaluate the
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct; to Charles B. Plattsmier, Chief Disciplinary Counsel for
the State of Louisiana, for access to background papers on the development of the Louisiana Rules of
Professional Conduct; to John Kelly and the Special Collections Department of the Earl K. Long Library
at the University ofNew Orleans for access to papers of John A. Dixon, Jr., former ChiefJustice ofthe
Louisiana Supreme Court; to Loretta L. Topey, Executive Director of the Louisiana State Bar
Association, for permission to use documents generated by officers and committees of the Louisiana
State Bar Association; and to Lori L. Ruello, of the Louisiana State Bar Association, for access to
records of the House of Delegates and the Board of Governors of the Louisiana State Bar Association.
1. See 16 ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 444 (2000); seealso Ritchenya
A. Shepherd, Law of Lawyering: New Al Restatement for Attorneys Could Affect Malpractice
Liability,ABA Model EthicsCode,A.B.A.J., July 1998, at 30; ALICompletes Restatementon Lawyers,
Gives FinalApprovalto All Sections, 14 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 211
(1998).
2. Of course, the text of the Restatement speaks for itself,but the Foreward to its first volume
says:
The Restatement draws heavily on decisional law, while the ethics codes in almost all
jurisdictions have the form and force of statutes, or at least administrative regulation. Of
course, on subjects addressed in the ethics codes the Restatement began with the statutory
language and usually tracked it literally, or at least without material change. In many
instances, however, the Restatement significantly departs from the code formulations.
I Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers XXI-XXII (2000).
3. See Ethics 2000 Commission Releases its Report with Recommended Changes to Model
Rules, 16 ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 672 (2000). The Commission was
established to consider changes because of concerns that the Rules of Professional Conduct were
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changes in the rules.4 Other efforts are underway that could result in changes to
existing ethics rules.' These developments at the national level will eventually
encourage Louisiana and other states to re-evaluate their own rules on lawyer
conduct. They will create a climate for change.
Something like this happened not too long ago. In 1983, the American Bar
Association promulgated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.' Those rules
were substantially different from the Model Code of Professional Responsibility,"
which Louisiana, and most other states, had used as a model for their own rules on
lawyer conduct.' Most states eventually followed the lead of the American Bar
9
Association, and patterned their lawyer codes on the Model Rules. Louisiana was

inadequate to deal with some problems facing the profession. See Debra Baker, Ethics2000Marches
On,A.B.A.J., Apr. 1999, at 85.
4. See Ethics 2000 Commission Releases its Report with Recommended Changes to Model
Rules, 16 ABA/BNA Lawyer's Manual on Professional Conduct 672 (2000). Recommendations ofthe
Commission would, among other things, permit lawyers to reveal confidential information about clients
to prevent financial harm to others, prohibit lawyer solicitation ofsubstantial gifts from clients, amend
the rule on communication with clients, prohibit sex with clients unless the personal relationship
predated the lawyer-client relationship, prohibit lawyer solicitation of clients in Internet "chat rooms,"
require lawyers who receive inadvertently-sent documents to notify the lawyer who sent them, and
rework several rules dealing with conflicts of interest.
The ABA has recently approved a new rule, Model Rule 7.6, that limits
5. Some examples: (1)
lawyer "pay to play" activities. See James Podgers, ANew Ethics No-No, A.B.A.J., April 2000, at 96;
Task Force Urges ABA to Ban "Pay to Play" Practices, 14 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on
Professonal Conduct365 (1998). "Pay to play" refers to the practice ofmaking (or soliciting) campaign
contributions in order to obtain favorable consideration from government officials in the allocation of
government legal work. (2)The United States Judicial Conference has been considering whether to
standardize the rules ofconduct for lawyers practicing infederal courts. See FederalJudgesStudy New
Option for Uniform Rule on Attorney Conduct., 16 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professonal
Conduct 155 (2000); FederalJudges Weigh Proposalto IssueUniformEthics Rules, 66 U.S.LW. 2549
(1998). (3)The ABA has established a Commission on Multijurisdictional Practice to examine ethical
and legal constraints on multijurisdictional practice. See ABA Names PanelMembers Who Will Study
Issues Raised By Multiurisdictional Practice, 16 ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional
Conduct 471 (2000).
6. Model Rules of Professional Conduct (1983). Unless otherwise indicated, by reference to a
date other than 1983, or by some other indication in the text ofthis article, all references to the Model
Rules of Professional Conduct will be to the original 1983 version adopted by the American Bar
Association.
7. Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility (1969). Unless otherwise indicated, byreference
to a date other than 1969, or by some other indication in the text of this article, all references to the
Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility will be to the original 1969 version adopted by the American
Bar Association.
8. Eventually, every jurisdiction but California followed the model ofthe Model Code, though
not all states adopted all ofits parts. And the Model Code had a strong influence in California as well.
See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 2.6.3, at 56-57 (1986).
9. To date, forty-four jurisdictions, including Louisiana, have based their legal ethics rules on
the Model Rules. See ModelRules: GeorgiaAdopts EthicsCode PatternedonABA ModelRules, 16
ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct 445 (2000) ; see also I ABA/BNA Lawyers'
Manual on Professional Conduct 3(1998) (lists jurisdictions that have adopted new legal ethics rules
since the ABA approved the Model Rules in 1983).
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no exception. It adopted the new Rules of Professional Conduct in 1986.10 But
Louisiana did not entirely follow the ABA's lead. While it adopted most of the
ABA's black-letter rules," it did not adopt some significant elements inthe ABA's
model. In particular, Louisiana did not adopt the Preamble, Scope, and
Terminology sections that appeared at the front of the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. Nor did Louisiana adopt the comments that followed each
of the ABA-drafted rules. In omitting these materials, Louisiana missed some
opportunities.
The climate of change will provide Louisiana with an opportunity to rethink
some ofthe decisions that were made in 1986-decisions regarding what was and
what was not included in the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. This article
focuses mainly on the materials in the ABA's model that were not included. It calls
them "omitted materials." Not all of the omitted materials should have been
adopted in Louisiana, but most of them should have been. Some of the omitted
materials could help Louisiana lawyers understand the rules that are used to define

lawyer misconduct. Others reach beyond standards of discipline and articulate
higher ideals for the legal profession. Some of the omitted materials contain
important substantive rules relating to lawyer conduct. And some of them provide
useful instruction about the nature of legal ethics. In short, the omitted materials
contain much that is good. Louisiana missed the opportunity to take full advantage
of them in 1986. It ought to take advantage ofthem now.

II. How WE GOT TO THIS POINT
A. Emergence ofthe Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct
We should begin with a brief discussion of the ABA model and how it came
to be. In particular, it will be helpful to know some basic things about the nature
and structure ofthe Model Rules of Professional Conduct and how the Model Rules

differ from earlier codes oflegal ethics. This will provide a useful background for
a discussion ofLouisiana's 1986 adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct.
1. The Model Rules Contrastedwith EarlierABA Codes ofEthics
The Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct were adopted by the American Bar
Association in 1983." It was the ABA's third code of legal ethics, 3 and it was
10. The Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted in 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987. See
Louisiana Rules ofProfessional Conduct, in La. R.S. 37, Ch. 4 App. (1988 and Supp. 2000). Unless
otherwise indicated, by reference to a date other than 1986, or by some other indication in the text of
this article, all references to the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct will be to the version of the
rules adopted in 1986.
11. Inmost cases, Louisiana adopted the ABA black-letter rules as they were written. But a
number of the rules were changed, a few substantially so.
12. See Center For Professional Responsibility, American Bar Association, Annotated Model
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significantly different from'the first two. The ABA hoped that the Model Rules
would eliminate some of the problems that had arisen with the earlier codes,
and that states would see fit to base their own lawyer codes on the new

model.

14

a. The Canons of Professional Ethics
The first ABA code, the Canons of Professional Ethics, was adopted on
August 27, 1908. 5 These Canons of Ethics covered a number of matters,
including conflicts of interest, fixing fees, punctuality, advertising, contact with
6
parties represented by counsel, and a lawyer's duty to the courts.' However, the
Preamble to the Canons indicated that they were intended more to be
statements of principle than to be a codified collection of disciplinary rules.'"
Indeed, the Canons had a pronounced inspirational or hortatory thrust.
For example, the Canons stated that lawyers should have a"respectful attitude"
toward the courts;'" that it was "indecent" for a lawyer during trial to
9
mention the "personal peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of counsel"; and that
the lawyer "should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain
the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but the
administration of justice."2 ° The Canons stated that "a lawyer will find his
highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private trust and to
public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal citizen."' The
Canons expressed many ideals, but they did not express many standards for
lawyer discipline.

Rules of Professional Conduct vii (3d ed. 1995).
13. The earlier codes were the Canons of Professional Ethics, adopted in 1908, and the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted in 1969. See Center For Professional Responsibility,
American Bar Association, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct vii (3d ed. 1995). All of
the ABA codes have been "model" codes. The ABA does not enforce its codes; instead, it offers them
as models for state adoption. Ifa state follows the ABA's lead, and adopts a code based on an ABA
model, the state can then use the code as a basis of lawyer discipline.
14. See Robert J. Kutak, ModelRules ofProfessionalConduct: Why Do We Need Them?, 36
Okla. L. Rev. 311 (1983).
15. American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics (1908). See Center ForProfessional
Responsibility, American Bar Association, Annotated Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct vii (3d ed.

1995).
16. See Canons ofProfessional Ethics, supra note 15, Canons 1,6,9, 12, 21 and 27.
17. The Preamble stated:
The following canons of ethics were adopted by the American Bar Association as a general
guide, yet the enumeration of particular duties should not be construed as a denial of the
existence of others equally imperative, though not specifically mentioned.
Id. Preamble.
18. See id. Canon 1.
19. See id. Canon 17.
20. See id.Canon 29.
Canon 32.
21. See id.
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5

b. The Model Code ofProfessionalResponsibility
The Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility was adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1969 to deal with that deficiency.' The Model Code was more
complicated than the Canons. It was prefaced by a Preamble and Preliminary
Statement. It included sections called "Canons," "Ethical Considerations" and
"Disciplinary Rules." These three things, according to the Preliminary Statement,
"define the type of ethical conduct that the public has a right to expect. ' But they
were very different. The Canons were described as "statements of axiomatic
norms."'" They expressed standards ofconduct in very general terms. The Ethical
Considerations were much more specific, but were aspirational in character. They
were said to "represent the objectives toward which every member ofthe profession
should strive."" The Disciplinary Rules, in contrast, were "mandatory in
character."'26 They set forth "the minimum level ofconduct below which no lawyer
can fall without being subject to disciplinary action."2"
Some examples will illustrate the differences. Canon 7 of the Model Code
articulated a general principle about lawyer advocacy. It stated in its entirety: "A
Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law."2 A
number ofdetailed Ethical Considerations immediately followed the Canon. One
ofthose, EC 7-38, mentioned some aspirational ideals concerning conduct toward
opposing counsel:
A lawyer should be courteous to opposing counsel and should accede to
reasonable requests regarding court proceedings, settings, continuances,
waiver of procedural formalities, and similar matters which do not
prejudice the rights of his client. He should follow local customs of
courtesy or practice, unless he gives timely notice to opposing counsel of
his intention not to do so. A lawyer should be punctual in fulfilling all
professional commitmnents.29
After the Ethical Considerations came the Disciplinary Rules. One ofthose, DR 7105, set a disciplinary standard regarding lawyer threats of criminal prosecution.
It said: "A lawyer shall not present, participate in presenting, or threaten to present
criminal charges solely to obtain an advantage in a civil matter."3

22. See Center For Professional Responsibility, American Bar Association, Annotated Model
Rules of Professional Conduct vii (3d ed. 1995).
23. See Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility Preliminary Statement (1969).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id.
28. See Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility Canon 7 (1969).
29. See id. EC 7-38.
30. See id.
DR 7-105.
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inmost respects, the Model Code represented asignificant improvement over
the 1908 Canons. But there were problems with the Model Code. Some of the
Disciplinary Rules were incomplete and some were ambiguous." In some instances
courts began to reach beyond the minimum standards ofthe Disciplinary Rules and
2
to treat the Canons and Ethical Considerations as enforceable rules. 3 Other
problems were identified, some even before the Model Code was adopted.
c. The Model Rules ofProfessionalConduct
Problems with the Model Code prompted the American Bar Association to
establish aCommission on Evaluation of Professional Standards in the summer of
34
'
1977. In 1981, the "Kutak Commission," as it came to be known, proposed anew
set of rules in a restatement format that featured black-letter rules and
accompanying comments. After two years ofdebate and amendment, the House of
Delegates approved the Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct on August 2, 1983.
The Model Rules were much different than the Model Code. Gone were the
Canons. Gone were the Ethical Considerations. The Model Rules included
"comments," but these were intended, as in arestatement, to explain and illustrate
3
"the meaning and purpose of the Rule." Additional help regarding the meaning
of the rules was offered by a new section, called "Terminology" that featured
definitions of several important terms that appeared in the rules. The overall
emphasis was clearly on standards of discipline--on the rules themselves.
Compared to the Canons of Professional Ethics and the Code of Professional
Responsibility, there was very little in the Model Rules of an aspirational
dimension. The very nature of the Model Rules drew the attention of areader to
minimum standards of conduct.
Still,the Model Rules didmanage to reachbeyond mere disciplinary standards.
A preamble, entitled "Preamble: A Lawyer's Responsibilities," incorporated
several aspirational ideals, reminiscent of some ofthe Ethical Considerations from
the Model Code. For example, one of the sentences of the Preamble read: "A
lawyer should strive to attain the highest level of skill, to improve the law and the
36
legal profession and to exemplify the legal profession's ideals ofpublic service."
Another preliminary sectionentitled "Scope," defined some ofthe parameters
for ensuing rules of conduct and referred to the relationship between the rules and
other sources of law that regulate lawyers. For example, the Scope explained: "The
Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyers' role. That context

31. See Stephen Gillers, Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics 5 (5th ed. 1998).
32. See Robert J.Kutak, How the New Ethics Code WillAffect Your Law Practice,Barrister, Fall
198 1, at 5; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., LegalEthics: LegalRules andProfessionalAspirations,30 Clev.
St. L Rev. 571, 572 (1982).
33. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 2.6.4, at 60 (1986).
34. The Commission was chaired by Robert J.Kutak until his death in 1983.
35. See Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Scope (1983).
36. See id. Preamble.
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includes court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining
'
specific obligations oflawyers and substantive and procedural laws in general." 37
Further, the Scope contemplated the existence of"moral and ethical considerations"
that were beyond the Rules themselves, and explained that those considerations
should also "inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely
defined by legal rules."3
B. The Emergence ofLouisiana'sRules ofProfessionalConduct
Louisiana has generally followed the lead of the American Bar Association
with respect to codes of legal ethics. Thus, at different times, Louisiana lawyers
have been subject to Louisiana's versions ofthe Canons ofProfessional Ethics, the
Code ofProfessional Responsibility, and the Rules ofProfessional Conduct. 9 This
section of the article discusses the history of Louisiana's adoption ofthe Rules of
Professional Conduct.
1. The Task Forceand its Charge
After the American Bar Association adopted the Model Rules ofProfessional
Conduct, ChiefJustice John A. Dixon, Jr. ofthe Louisiana Supreme Court asked the
Louisiana State Bar Association to evaluate the ABA's new product.' Louis D.
Smith, the President of the Louisiana State Bar from 1983-1994, and Charles W.
Salley, the 1984-1985 president, jointly appointed a five-member task force (the
"Task Force") to study the rules and to make a report to the House ofDelegates and
the Board ofGovernors. 4 '

37. See id. Scope.
38. See id.
39. The Canons of Professional Ethics were adopted in 1910. See Louisiana Bar Association,
1910 Annual Report (1910). The Code of Professional Responsibility was adopted in 1970. See A.
Leon Hebert, ProfessionalResponsibility, 19 La. BJ. 199 (197 1). The Rules of Professional Conduct
were adopted in 1986,.effective Jan. 1, 1987. SeeLouisiana Rules ofProfessional Conduct, in La. R.S.
37, Ch. 4 App. (1988 and Supp. 2000). Unless otherwise indicated, by referenceto a date other than
1986, or by some other indication in the text of this article, all references to the Louisiana Rules of
Professional Conduct will be to the version of the rules adopted in 1986.
40. See Task Force Report: Report to House of Delegates, infranote 42.
41. See id. I have been unable to determine the exact date or dates when members of the Task
Force were actually appointed, but I think the members were appointed in March of 1984. There is a
March 28, 1984 letter from Thomas 0. Collins, Jr., Executive Counsel to the Louisiana State Bar
Association, addressed to the members ofthe Task Force that confirms their appointment and suggests
that the Task Force have its first meeting after the bar association's April 25-27, 1984 annual meeting.
See Letter from Thomas 0. Collins, Jr., Executive Counsel ofthe Louisiana State Bar Association, to
John C. Combe, Jr., Robert E. Leake, Jr., Wood Brown, A. Russell Roberts, and John B. Scofield (Mar.
28, 1984) (original in Special Collections, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans). In
addition, some minutes of an April 27, 1984 meeting of the Louisiana State Bar Association Board of
Governors state:
Mr. Salley specifically noted the recentjoint appointment by Louis Smith and himself ofthe
committee to study interest on lawyers' trust accounts and the Model Code ofProfessional
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There are indications that the members of the Task Force believed that they
were expected to do more than evaluate the ABA's new model. For example, the
first sentence of a November 23, 1985 report by the Task Force (the "Task Force
Report") states: "This task force was created by then President, Louis D. Smith for
the stated purpose of evaluating and proposing for adoption the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct promulgated by the American Bar Association."'

2

This is an

interesting sentence. One might have expected such a sentence to say that Mr.
Smith created the Task Force to evaluate the Model Rules and to make a
recommendation about their adoption. But this sentence suggests that, from the
beginning, the Task Force was expected to propose adoption of the Model Rules.
This observation may place too much stress on the literal words used in the
opening sentence of the report. But there are other statements in the Task Force
Report that indicate that the Task Force may have been expected to recommend
adoption of the Model Rules. For example, the second sentence of the report says
that the appointment of the Task Force itself "was brought about as a result of
pressure from the America4 Bar Association and, also, at the suggestion of the
'
Louisiana Supreme Court."43

Responsibility, as adopted by the American Bar Association.
See Minutes ofthe Louisiana State Bar Association Board ofGovernors Meeting, in Biloxi, Mississippi,
Apr. 26, 1984, at 3. The reference in the minutes to the "Model Code," rather than the "Model Rules,"
appears to have been an error.
42. See Report and Reconmdation of the Task Force to Evaluate the American Bar
Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Nov. 23, 1985. The Task Force Report has three
parts. The first part consists of four recitals about what the Task Force had done and two additional
paragraphs of recommendations. I will cite to this part as "Task Force Report: Report and
Recommendations." The second part, separately entitled "Report to the Members of the House of
Delegates by the LSBA Task Force to Evaluate the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct,"
includes some information about the history of the work of the Task Force, some observations about
the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, a suggestion
about parts of the Model Rules that were omitted from the Task Force proposals, and some comments
about differences between the ABAmodel and the version ofthe rules recommended by the Task Force.
I will cite to this part as "Task Force Report: Report to House of Delegates." The third part ofthe Task
Force Report is entitled "Proposed Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct of the Louisiana State Bar
Association." This part ofthe Task Force Report includes all ofthe rules that the Task Force proposed
for adoption (some of which were changed from the ABA's model) and some comments that tell
whether a proposed rule tracks its ABA counterpart, or, if not, how it differs. I will cite to this part of
the Task Force Report as "Task Force Report: Proposed Rules."
43. See Task Force Report: Report to the House of Delegates, sulra note 42. John C. Combe,
Jr., one of the co-chairmen ofthe Task Force, told me that the impetus for the work of the Task Force
came from the American Bar Association, which had initiated a campaign to interest the states in
adopting its new Model Rules. The Louisiana Supreme Court became interested. Mr. Combe recalled
that Chief Justice Dixon, was "strong on ethics," and was the person who "moved the effort" to adopt
the new ABA rules. Interview with John C. Combe, Jr. (June 15,1999) (notes ofinterview on file with
author). I have discovered aSeptember 27, 1983 letter from Chief Justice Dixon, addressed to Louis
D. Smith, the then-president of the Louisiana State Bar Association that states:
Yesterday I was reminded of a letter Ireceived from the American Bar Association about
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The president of the ABA has offered that
institution's assistance when the Louisiana Bar Associatioti decides to entrust to a
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The members of the Task Force did not regard the then-existing Code of
Professional Responsibility as badly in need of replacement. Indeed, the Task
Force Report said that, as work began, there was "some sentiment" that no change

to the existing ethics code was warranted or that some changes might be made
"within the framework of the existing code." The Task Force Report also
offered some mild praise. for the then-existing code: "Although there are a few
areas in the existing Code of Professional Responsibility which are somewhat
difficult of interpretation and even more difficult of application, by and
large, it has served its purpose fairly well."45 Nonetheless, "after further
consideration," and in light of the "pressures" mentioned above, the Task Force

committee the study and review ofthe Model Rules.
You have probably already taken the appropriate steps toward the adoption of the new
standards for professional conduct. At any rate, I would like to recommend that we
communicate with the ABA Center for Professional Responsibility and let them know that
we would welcome assistance while we have the Model Rules under consideration.
See Letter from John A. Dixon, Jr. ChiefJustice of the Louisiana Supreme Court, to Louis D. Smith,
President ofthe Louisiana State Bar Association (Sept. 27, 1983) (original in Special Collections, Earl
K. Long Library, University of New Orleans) (copy on file with author). The apparent purpose ofthe
letter was to let the State Bar Association know about the ABA's offer ofhelp. But the main purpose
was probably to nudge the State Bar Association toward approval of the Model Rules. That seems to
be the message of the first sentence in the second quoted paragraph above. And it appears to be
confirmed by something else. The letter that Chief Justice Dixon received from the ABA president
shows that copies of it were also sent to Louis D. Smith, President of the Louisiana State Bar
Association; Charles W. Salley, President-elect; and Thomas 0. Collins, Executive Counsel to the bar
association. In addition, ChiefJustice Dixon received a copy of a separate letter from the ABA to Louis
D. Smith that had the same content as the letter that had been addressed to ChiefJustice Dixon himself.
The reality is that Mr. Smith would already have known of the ABA's offer for help, and Chief Justice
Dixon should have known that he knew. ChiefJustice Dixon's letter thus appears to have had apurpose
other than to simply inform the State Bar Association of something that it already knew. See Letter
from Wallace D. Riley, President ofthe American Bar Association, to ChiefJustice John A. Dixon, Jr.
(Aug. 26, 1983) (original in Special Collections, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans)
(copy on file with author); Letter from Wallace D. Riley, President of the American Bar Association,
to Louis D. Smith, President ofthe Louisiana State Bar Association (Aug. 26, 1983) (original in Special
Collections, Earl K. Long Library, University of New Orleans) (copy on file with author).
John C. Combe, a co-chairman of the Task Force, told me that, with respect to the need to adopt the
new ABA model: "The handwriting was on the wall." Interview with John C. Combe (June 15, 1999)..
See also the discussion above regarding Chief Justice Dixon's letter of September 27, 1983.
One of the things that the ABA did to encourage adoption ofthe new Model Rules was to establish
a Special Committee on Implementation of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The committee
distributed information about the Model Rules, including periodic reports of how many jurisdictions
had adopted them. See, e.g., Status Report on the A.B.A. Model Rules of Professional Conduct, July
4, 1985 (reports that Montana had adopted the Model Rules, that three other states had completed their
revjew processes, and that five additional states were nearing completion oftheir review ofthe Model

Rules).
44. See Task Force Report: Report to the House of Delegates, supranote 42. John C. Combe,
a co-chairman ofthe Task Force, told me that some members of the Task Force at first wondered "what
are we doing?" They had the impression that "the old code isn't broken." Interview with John C.
Combe, Jr. (June 15, 1999) (notes ofinterview on file with author).
45. Interview with John C. Combe, Jr. (June 15, 1999) (notes ofinterview on file with author).
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moved ahead with an analysis of the ABA's Model Rules and a proposal for
Louisiana adoption.'
Ultimately, the Task Force Report does not reflect much enthusiasm about the
final product of its labors. For example, consider this rather neutral endorsement
of the proposed new rules: "Submitted, herewith, is the task force's draft of
proposed Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct for Louisiana Lawyers, which the
task force believes are workable should the House see fit to adopt them. " 47 Further,
although the Task Force recommended adoption of the Model Rules, it also
recommended that they not be adopted. The Task Force suggested the following
to the House of Delegates and the Board ofGovernors:
WHEREAS, the task force has concluded its study and evaluation, it
now files its report attached hereto with the following alternative
suggested courses of action.
1. If it be the desire of the House of Delegates and the Board of
Governors of the Louisiana State Bar Association that it adopt and
recommend approval to the Louisiana Supreme Court of the Model Rules
ofProfessional Conduct, that they adopt and recommend the Model Rules
in the form and content proposed in this report and not as originally
adopted by the American Bar Association, or
2. If it be the desire of the House of Delegates and the Board of
Governors of the Louisiana State Bar Association that its present Code of
Professional Responsibility be retained, that it so act and report its action
to the Louisiana Supreme Court.48
The Task Force also commented on the ABA model:
No member of the task force was completely satisfied with the ABA
version. As will be set out hereinafter, a number of changes were made.
One complete section was deleted entirely because it was felt to be
inapplicable to the practice of law in Louisiana. Other sections were
"renovated" to make them conform to the practice of law in the State of
Louisiana and to practices with respect to ethics in Louisiana which are,
apparently, somewhat different from those contemplated by the redactors
of the ABA Code.49
There is certainly no suggestion in this language that the Task Force thought that
Louisiana notions of ethics were inferior to the notions of the American Bar
Association. Indeed, the reverse appears to be true. The ABA's ideas were the
ones in need of renovation.5"

46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
criticism.

Id.
See Task Force Report: Report and Recommendation, supranote 42.
See id.
Task Force Report: Report to the House of Delegates, supranote 42.
This, of course, is not the only time that the Model Rules have been subjected to some
find the Model
See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Understanding Lawyers' Ethics 5(1990) ("l
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2. The Omitted Materials
The version of the rules that the Task Force submitted with its November 23,
1985 report departed from the ABA's model in several respects. As indicated
above, the Task Force did not propose adoption ofevery rule in the ABA's model,
and it proposed to modify others. The Task Force draft also did not incorporate
several prominent features in the ABA model. It omitted the Preamble, Scope, and
Terminology sections that were included at the front of the ABA version. Even
more significantly, the Task Force draft did not include the comments that followed
the black-letter rules in the ABA's model. But the Task Force offered the following
suggestion about the materials it had omitted:
In considering that which follows, it is the suggestion ofthe task force that
the introductory comments in the ABA code, the "comments" under each
of the Model Rules, and other materials in the ABA document would be
considered as precatory to any interpretation or application of the
Louisiana version of the Model Rules, except to the extent that they are
inconsistent with the verbiage in the rules adopted by the House of
Delegates."
"Precatory" is a word that lawyers sometimes use that most normal people do not.
Black'sLaw Dictionarydefines it as follows: "Having the nature ofprayer, request,

Rules overall to be less satisfactory than the Model Code."); Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About
When We Talked About Ethics: A CriticalView of the Model Rules, 46 Ohio State L.J. 243 (1985).
Professor Gillers wrote in that article:
The lawyers who approved the Rules looked after their own. They have given us an
astonishingly parochial, self-aggrandizing document, which favors lawyers over clients,
other persons, and the administration of justice in almost every line, paragraph, and
provision that permits significant choice. It is internally inconsistent to the bar's benefit.
It continues the practice of using the language ofethics to mask controls on the availability
of legal services that in turn artificially inflate the cost of legal services. True, the Rules
read better than the Code and fill some critical gaps. Here and there, they require or forbid
conduct for which they deserve commendation. But the big issues are almost consistently
resolved in favor of lawyers. As finally adopted, the Rules seem guided by the view that
what's good for lawyers is good for the public. Look at any part and that conclusion may
not suggest itself; look at the whole and it is inescapable.
Id. at 245-46 (footnotes omitted). Of course, people also criticized the prior Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 32, at 571 ("The point, very simply, is that
comprehensive revision is required because the structure of the present Code has turned out to be
disasterous [sic]"); Robert J. Kutak, The Law ofLawyering, 22 Washburn L.J. 413, 416 (1983) ("In
analyzing the 1969 Code's two-level approach to standards of professional conduct, our Commission
discerned at least one fundamental problem. The structure created inherent internal inconsistencies.
One level ofrules might exhort the lawyer to conduct purportedly consistent with the highest aspirations
of the profession, while a different level of rules might characterize the same conduct as
unacceptable.").
51. See Task Force Report: Report to the House of Delegates, supranote 42.
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or entreaty; conveying or embodying a recommendation or advice or the expression
of a wish, but not a positive command or direction." 2
So, the Task Force saw some role for the omitted materials, but the role was a
limited one. The Task Force suggested that the omitted materials be considered
when it came to interpreting or applying the rules, but merely at the level of
recommendation, advice, or expression of wish. The omitted materials would not
have the force of positive command or direction.
Why did the Task Force decline to recommend adoption of the omitted
materials? There appear to have been at least three reasons. The first was
simplicity. There was apparently some feeling on the Task Force that ultimate
adoption of the new rules would be facilitated if the Task Force submitted a
relatively short, bare bones version of the rules for ultimate consideration by the
Louisiana Supremie Court."3 There would be less to read, less to understand, and
less to disagree with.' In this connection, one ofthe co-chairmen ofthe Task Force
recently recalled that there had been substantial controversy within the American
Bar Association concerning some ofthe black-letter rules, especially the rules about
confidentiality,55 and that there had been a perception among members ofthe Task
Force that the controversy had spilled over into the omitted materials, especially
into the comments to the Model Rules. Rather than getting bogged down in
disputes over language or concepts in the omitted materials, and to avoid the
possibility that the Task Force might generate majority and minority reports, the
members of the Task Force apparently thought it would be better to focus their
energies on reaching consensus on the black-letter rules alone.'
A second reason for non-adoption ofthe omitted materials related to changes
the Task Force recommended in the black-letter rules themselves. The Task Force
proposed some changes that it thought would represent improvements to the ABA's
rules; it proposed other changes because it thought particular ABA rules were at
odds with Louisiana practice.57 Regardless ofthe reasons for change, any departure
from the ABA black-letter rules gave rise to the prospect ofinconsistency between

52. Black's Law Dictionary 1176 (6th ed. 1990). The same dictionary also defines "precatoTy
words." They are:
Words of entreaty, request, desire, wish, or recommendation, employed in wills, as
distinguished from direct and imperative terms. Mere precatory words or expressions in a
trust or will are ineffective to dispose ofproperty. There must be a command or order as to
the disposition ofproperty.

Id.
53. Telephone Interview with Robert E. Leake, Jr., Co-Chairman of the Task Force, (June 4,
1999) (notes of interview on file with author).
54. See id.
55. The Task Force Report had observed, with respect to Rule 1.6, on confidentiality: "The
membership may recall the extreme amount of controversy engendered by the initial Kutak Proposal.
The principle ofconfidentiality is expanded, in large measure, by the current proposal." SeeTask Force
Report: Proposed Rules, supra note 42, Rule 1.6 cmt.
56. Telephone Interview with John C. Combe, Jr., Co-Chairman of the Task Force (May 18,
1999) (notes of interview on file with author).
57. Id.
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the affected Louisiana rule and the related comments of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct. One way to avoid such inconsistency would have been to
make conforming changes in the ABA's comments. However, this would have
entailed considerable effort, and there appears to have been no enthusiasm among
the members of the Task Force for the endeavor. Another way to avoid conflicts
would have been to refuse adoption of the ABA's comments as a whole. This was
what the Task Force elected to propose."8
Finally, the Task Force knew that it did nothave to adopt the omitted materials
in order to preserve them.59 They had already been issued by the ABA. Anybody
who wanted to look at the omitted materials could do so, even if they were not made
a part of the Louisiana Rules ofProfessional Conduct.' Indeed, as we have seen,
the Task Force Report recommended that the comments and other preliminary
materials to the ABA Model Rules be considered as precatory to any interpretation
or application of the Louisiana version of the rules.
The Task Force actually did append some comments to the rules when it issued
its recommendations to the Louisiana State Bar Association, but the Task Force
comments were not at all like the comments that had been generated by the ABA.
For the most part, the Task Force comments merely reported whether the proposed
version of a rule departed from the ABA's model. If there was no change from the
ABA Model, the comment typically stated: "No change proposed to the ABA
rule." Ifthere was a change, the Task Force comment typically described what the
change was and why it was made. 2 These comments were, ofcourse, intended only

58. Some undated handwritten notes by John C. Combe, Jr., regarding Task Force deliberations,
state:
Declined to adopt comments although in some instances they may shed light of [sic probably should read "or'] offer guidance. But in other instances notes are wrong &/or
misleading in view of amendments suggested by the committee.
(copy on file with author). Interestingly, these same notes say: "adopt preamble." Ultimately"the Task
Force did not recommend adoption of the Preamble to the Model Rules.
59. Telephone Interview with Robert E. Leake,'Jr., Co-Chairman ofthe Task Force (June 4,1999)
(notes of interview on file with author).
60. Id.
61. There were some exceptions. One was made in the case ofRule 1.6, the confidentiality rule.
There, the Task Force offered the following comment:
COMMENT: No change is proposed by the task force to the ABA proposal. It is suggested
thatthe code comparison, contained on page 8of the ABA materials be read carefully. The
membership may recall the extreme amount of controversy engendered by the initial Kutak
Proposal. The principle of confidentiality is expanded, in large measure, by the current
proposal.
See Task Force Report: Proposed Rules, supra note 42, Rule 1.6 cmt.
Another exception was made for Rule 1.15, on safekeeping ofproperty. The Task Force said: "(No
change proposed to the ABA Rule, however, pending IOLTA Legislation may impact this rule.)" Id.
Rule 1.15 cmt.
62. See, e.g., this comment that followed the Task Force version of Rule 1.7, on conflicts of
interest:
COMMENT: No change is made from the ABA proposal with the exception that the
prefatory sentence 'loyalty isan essential element of the lawyer's relationship to the client.
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to facilitate consideration of the work of the Task Force. They were not intended
to be included in the final version of newly approved rules.
3. Completion ofthe Task
On November 23, 1985, the House of Delegates and the Board ofGovernors
approved the adoption of the Task Force draft of the Rules of Professional
Conduct.' On December 12, 1985, Eldon E. Fallon, the President ofthe Louisiana
State Bar Association, forwarded the draft rules to the Louisiana Supreme Court
with a recommendation that they be adopted effective July 1, 1986." The justices
considered the proposed rules, giving particular attention to the rules that departed
from the ABA's version.6 ' The court thereafter asked to meet with the members of
the Task Force to discuss some concerns.' The meeting took place on January 23,
1986; thereafter, the court took the proposed rules under advisement. On April
15, 1986, Chief Justice Dixon wrote to the co-chairmen of the Task Force and
explained that the court had reached "the tentative conclusion that it should approve
the rules" subject to six exceptions." Each of the exceptions that Justice Dixon
listed went in the direction of making the Louisiana version of the affected rule
more like its ABA counterpart.69 Justice Dixon's letter did not say anything about

Therefore:" was lifted from the initial sentence in the comment. The task force felt that this
was important enough that it ought to be in the "black letter" statement of the law.
See Task Force Report: Proposed Rules, supra note 42, Rule 1.7 cmt.
63. See Letter from Thomas 0. Collins, Jr., executive counsel to the Louisiana State Bar
Association, to the justices ofthe Louisiana Supreme Court (Nov. 25, 1986) (copy on file with author).
64. See Letter from Eldon E. Fallon, President of the Louisiana State Bar Association, to the
Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Louisiana Supreme Court (Dec. 12, 1985) (original on file
with Special Archives, Earl K. Long Library, University ofNew Orleans) (copy on file with author).
65. See Letter from Chief Justice John A. Dixon, Jr., to John C. Combe, Jr.and Robert E. Leake,
Jr., Co-Chairmen of the Task Force (Apr. 15, 1986) (copy on file with author).
66. See Letter from Thomas 0. Collins, Jr., Executive Counsel to the Louisiana State Bar
Association, to New Orleans attorney Barry W. Ashe, (July 2, 1986) (copy on file with author)
(According to Mr. Collins' letter, Mr. Ashe had requested some information regarding the history and
status of Louisiana's efforts to evaluate and adopt the Model Rules.).

67. See id.
68. See letter from Chief Justice John A.Dixon, Jr., to John C. Combe, Jr. and Robert E. Leake,
Jr., Co-Chairmen of the Task Force (Apr. 15, 1986) (copy on file with author). Five of the exceptions
related to changes that the court wished to see in the following rules: Rule 1.4(b), on communicating
with clients; Rule 1.8(c), which limits the lawyer's ability to prepare an instrument for a client that gives
the lawyer a substantial gift; Rule 1.8(eX2), on lawyer financial assistance to clients; Rule 3.9, on the
lawyer's obligation to disclose his or her representative capacity in nonadjudicative proceedings; and
Rule'5.6, on restricting the right to practice. The last exception called for the inclusion of the "Public
Service" component of the Model Rules (Rules 6.1 through 6.4), which the Task Force had not wanted
to adopt.
69. See id. The court's recommendation concerning Rule 1.8(e) warrants some discussion. The
ABA version of the rule generally prohibits lawyers from giving financial assistance to clients in
connection with litigation, subject to exceptions for court costs and litigation expenses "the repayment
ofwhich may be contingent on the outcome ofthe matter," and court costs and litigation expenses paid
on behalf of indigent clients.
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the omission of the Preamble, Scope, Terminology, or Comment sections of the
ABA's Model Rules. Nor did it say anything about the suggestion by the Task
Force that these materials be considered "precatory" with respect to rule
interpretation or application.
The members of the Task Force questioned the advisability of some of the'
changes that the supreme court wanted to make and requested a meeting to discuss
them." On May 29, 1986, the members of the Task Force again met with the
justices of the supreme court to review the desired changes. On June 2, 1986,
Justice Dixon sent another letter to the Task Force expressing the view ofthe court
with respect to needed changes in the Task Force draft.7 1 The letter reaffirmed the
court's position with respect to five of the six changes that it had previously asked
the Task Force to make.72 But the letter indicated that the court was now willing to
relent on the other proposed change.73
The Task Force responded by generating a revised draft of the proposed
rules,74 styled a "Supplemental Report and Recommendation," and readied it
The Task Force proposal had not changed thelanguage ofthe ABA rule, as such, but had renumbered
it as 1.8(d), because the Task Force had also recommended deletion ofABA Rule 1.8(c), limiting the
lawyer's ability toprepare an instrument giving the lawyer a substantial gift.,The supreme court wanted
Rule 1.8(c) to go back in, and it also asked the Task Force to return to the original ABA numbering for
Rule 1.8. But there was something else that the court directed the Task Force to do. Itturns out that
the literal language ofthe ABA rule is more generous, with respect to providing financial assistance to
clients, than was the existing Louisiana practice. To deal with this, the court said that "in the comment
to the rule it should be noted that it is the intention of the court not to change the current law as
expressed in LSBA v. Edwins, 329 So. 2d 437 (La. 1976)."
The court was referring to the Task Force's comment to Rule 1.8. The Task Force comment had not
mentioned any tension between the text of the rule and the rule of the Edwins case. The Louisiana
Supreme Court wanted to mention the tension, apparently to alert the House ofDelegates and the Board
of Governors to the position of the Louisiana Supreme Court on financial assistance to clients.
This is a bit strange. From a drafting standpoint, it would have been better if the court had either
directed a change in the language of the rule to make it consistent with Louisiana practice, or left the
language of the rule alone but said, in a comment, that the new rule represented a change. The court
did neither. Perhaps the best that can be said about the court's handling of Rule 1.8(e) was that it was
untidy.
70. See Letter from John C. Combe, Jr. and Robert E. Leake, Jr., Co-Chairmen ofthe Task Force,
to ChiefJustice John A. Dixon, Jr. (Apr. 28, 1986) (original on file with Special Archives, Earl K.Long
Library, University of New Orleans) (copy on file with author).
71. See Letter from ChiefJustice John A. Dixon, Jr. to John C. Combe, Jr. and Robert E. Leake,
Jr., Co-Chairmen ofthe Task Force (June 2, 1986) (original on file with Special Archives, Earl K. Long
Library, University of New Orleans) (copy on file with author).
72. See id.
73. The Task Force had recommended a change to the ABA Model Rule 1.4(b) on the lawyer's
duty to communicate with the client. The resulting Louisiana rule is discussed infra in Part III(AXI).
74. See Letter from John C. Combe, Jr., Co-Chairman of the Task Force, to Chief Justice John
A. Dixon, Jr. (June 6, 1986) (original on file in Special Archives, Earl K. Long Library, University of
New Orleans) (copy on file with author).
75. The actual name was longer: "Supplemental Report and Recommendation by the Task Force
to Evaluate the American Bar Association's Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Proposing that the
Attached Louisiana State Bar Association's Rules of Professional Conduct Replace as Article XVI of
the Articles of Incorporation of the Louisiana State Bar Association the Present Code of Professional
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for presentation to the House of Delegates and the Board of Governors on
November 22, 1986. However, on November 17, 1986, the supreme court issued
another letter directing a change to Rule 1.1, the "competence" rule. It
directed the addition of a new part (b) to Rule 1.1 that mandated compliance
'with continuing legal education requirements. 6 The letter explained that, on
that same day, the court had "preliminarily adopted" some new rules for continuing
legal education."
The House ofDelegates adopted all ofthe changes the supreme court desired,
and also approved one additional change. The State Bar Committee on Professional
Responsibility had recommended modifications to Rule 7.3, concerning direct
contact with prospective clients, to bring it into closer conformity with decisions of
the United States Supreme Court and other federal courts on the constitutionality
ofrestrictions on lawyer advertising and solicitation." The Board of Governors and
the House of Delegates approved the change. On November 25, 1986, Thomas 0.
Collins, Jr., Executive Counsel of the Louisiana State Bar, forwarded the revised
rules to the supreme court and included a form of order that the court could use to
approve them7 Mr. Collins' letter included a recommendation that the effective
date ofthe new rules be January 1, 1987 o
On December 18, 1986, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued an order adopting
the Rules ofProfessional Conduct, effective January 1, 1987.1 The form ofthe
Responsibility." The proposed rules themselves were attached as Exhibit "A" to the Supplemental
Report.
76. See Letter from ChiefJustice John A.Dixon, Jr. to John C.Combe, Jr., Robert E. Leake, Jr.,
Co-Chairmen of the Task Force, LeDoux L Provosty, Jr., President of the Louisiana State Bar
Association, and Eldon E. Fallon, Immediate Past-President of the Louisiana State Bar Association
(Nov. 17, 1986) (copyon file with author). Letter from Thomas 0. Collins, Jr., Executive Counsel of
the State Bar Association, to the Chief Justice and Associate Justices ofthe Louisiana Supreme Court
(Nov. 25, 1986) (original on file with Special Collections, Earl K. Long Library, University of New
Orleans) [hereinafter "Collins Letter"].
77. See Letter from Chief Justice John A.Dixon, Jr. to John C. Combe, Jr., Robert E. Leake, Jr.,
Co-Chairmen of the Task Force, LeDoux R. Provosty, Jr., President of the Louisiana State Bar
Association, and Eldon E. Fallon, Immediate Past-President of the Louisiana State Bar Association
(Nov. 17, 1986) (copy on file with author). About a month later, on December 23, 1986, the supreme
court gave final approval to new Louisiana Rules for Continuing Legal Education. See 8 La. Sup. Ct.
R. 30 (1991).
78. See Collins Letter, supra note 76. According to a November 22, 1986 resolution of the
committee, the concern was that the original draft ofRule 7.3, ifadopted, might unconstitutionally limit
targeted direct-mail solicitation and inappropriately require advance approval of written
communications. The committee proposed that, instead of prohibiting direct mail solicitations, or
imposing prior restraints upon them, Rule 7.3 ought to be modified to require such communications to
be identified as advertising material and to provide for the monitoring of such communications for
compliance with otherwise enforceable ethical requirements. See Proposed Amendment to Rule 7.3,
in Collins Letter, supranote 76, Exhibit B.
79. See Collins Letter, supra note 76.
80. See id.
81. See Order ofDec. 18, 1986. The order approved aversion oftheModel Rules ofProfessional
Conduct that was attached as "Exhibit A." The order also authorized the President or President-Elect
of the Louisiana State Bar to execute the documents that would be needed to amend the Articles of
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rules adopted by the court contained no preliminary materials or comments of any
sort. It included only the black-letter rules themselves.

III. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE OMITED MATERIALS
At this point, we should take a closer look at the omitted materials. If, as I
argue, Louisiana missed some opportunities in connection with its adoption ofthe
Rules ofProfessional Conduct, the evidence should appear in the parts ofthe ABA
model that Louisiana did not adopt: the Preamble, Scope, and Terminology
sections ofthe Model Rules, and the comments included in the ABA version ofthe
rules. We should also consider whether there are any negative consequences of
their omission.
In our examination, we should be mindful of a matter of timing. The Model
Rules of Professional Conduct have been amended several times since they were
promulgated in 1983.2 The Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct have been
amended on several occasions as well. 3 For some purposes, it could be useful to
compare the most current version ofthe Model Rules with the most current version
ofthe Louisiana Rules ofProfessional Conduct." But that will notbe the principal
focus of our comparative efforts here. My theme is that some important
opportunities were missed at the time Louisiana adopted its version of the
Rules of Professional Conduct. A discussion of that theme requires that we
devote most of our comparative analysis to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct and the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct as of December 18,
1986-the date when the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the Rules of
Professional Conduct.sS

Incorporation of the State Bar Association to incorporate the new rules. See id.
82. A list of amendments made between 1983 and 1986 is found in Center for Professional
Responsibility, American Bar Association, Annotated Model Rules of Professional Conduct 579-582
(3d ed. 1996). More current and detailed information on amendments to the Model Rules maybe found
in Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Regulation of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards (1998) (see
individual rules) and John S. Dzienkowski, Professional Responsibility Standards, Rules & Statutes
(1999) (see individual rules).
83. Amendments to the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct are reflected in "Historical and
Statutory Notes" in the Louisiana Revised Statutes Annotated volume that includes the rules. See La.
R.S. 37, Ch. 4 App. (1998 and Supp. 2000).
84. See, e.g., the discussion infra at Appendix.

85. Inany event, the amendments that have been made to both codes in the years since adoption
do not undermine my principal point aboutmissed opportunities. Because Louisiana has never adopted
the introductory portions ofthe Model Rules or the comments to those rules, any opportunities that were
missed by omitting them in 1986 continue to be missed.
Unless otherwise indicated, references to the ABA Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct refer to the
rules as adopted in 1983, and references to the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct refer to the
rules as adopted in 1986. In most instances, the current rules are the same as the ones that were
originally adopted. In some instances, however, it could be confusing not to acknowledge some postadoption changes in either the ABA's Model Rules or the Louisiana Rules of Prfessional Conduct.
I will mention some of them as we proceed.
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The next three sections of this article will look at the omitted materials from
three perspectives. In Part III(A) we look at the omitted materials from a
perspective of"inclusion." It turns out that not all ofwhat we have been calling the
omitted materials was, strictly speaking, omitted. In some instances, expressions
in otherwise omitted materials made their way into the text of the Louisiana blackletter rules.
In Part III(B),we look at parts ofthe omitted materials that could not have been
adopted in Louisiana, or at least could not have been adopted without creating
inconsistencies between those materials and the text of the rules themselves. As
indicated in Part II(B), the Task Force that was charged with evaluating the ABA's
Model Rules was not particularly awed by the ABA's product. It proposed a
number of departures from the Model Rules. Some of those departures created
inconsistencies between the Louisiana black-letter rules and the comments to the
corresponding ABA rules.
Finally, in Part III(C), we look at the consequences of omission and consider
whether the exclusion of the omitted materials matters.
A. Inclusionof Omitted Materials
Although the Task Force apparently considered adoption of comments to the
Model Rules too controversial or too burdensome to undertake, it did find a few
things in the comments that were meritorious enough and free enough from
controversy to include in its recommendations to the Louisiana State Bar
Association. In several instances, the Task Force proposed to modify the text of the
ABA black-letter rules by incorporating language from the comments. All of these
inclusionary proposals were accepted by the Louisiana Supreme Court. This
section of the article identifies the inclusions.
1. Rule 1.4: ProvidingInformationto Clients
The first example ofthis type of change appears in Louisiana Rule 1.4, which
concerns the lawyer's duty to keep the client informed. The Louisiana version of
the rule substitutes some language from the ABA comment to Model Rule 1.4 for
a portion of the text of the rule itself. Thus, ABA Model Rule 1.4(b) states: "A
lawyer shall explain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client
to make informed decisions regarding the representation.""6 But Louisiana Rule
1.4(b) states: "The lawyer shall give the client sufficient information to participate
intelligently in decisions concerning the objectives of the representation and the
means by which they are to be pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able
to do so.""' The substituted language is taken directly from the first sentence of the

86.
87.

See Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.4(b) (1983).
See Louisiana Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.4(b) (1986).
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ABA comment to the rule but has been slightly modified to articulate a duty on the
part ofthe lawyer."8
Why did the Task Force propose this change in the text ofthe rule? The Task
Force Report stated that some clients were incapable ofunderstanding the type of
explanation that the ABA rule seemed to contemplate, and that the Task Force "felt
the lawyer's duty was somewhat deeper than merely offering an explanation." 9
The Louisiana modification seems to provide helpful guidance to lawyers about
how much information they should provide to clients. But one might quarrel a bit
with the movement away from the word "explain." Giving information is not the
same as explaining. An explanation goes beyond transmitting information and
attempts to interpret information, to make sense out of it, and to help someone else
understand it."° The Louisiana version ofthe rule can be read to require something
less, even though the Task Force indicated it wanted to require more.
2. Rule 1.7: Loyalty and ConflictsofInterest

A second instance ofborrowing language from the ABA comments shows up
in Louisiana Rule 1.7, which is the basic rule on conflicts of interest. This is one
of the more difficult rules to understand and apply. It describes both direct and
indirect conflicts ofinterest, it covers representation of multiple clients, and it sets
forth conditions that, ifsatisfied, allow a lawyer to take on otherwise impermissible
representation. Louisiana's version of the rule does not subtract words from the
ABA version, nor does it substitute new words for the words in the ABA model.
Instead, it takes the first sentence from the ABA comment to the rule and makes it
the first sentence in the Louisiana black-letter rule. The sentence reads: "Loyalty
is an essential element in the lawyer's relationship to a client." 9'
88. The actual language of the comment states:
The client should have sufficient information to participate intelligently in decisions
concerning the objectives of the representation and the means by which they are to be
pursued, to the extent the client is willing and able to do so.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.4 cmt. (1983).
89. See Task Force Report: Proposed Rules, supra note 42, Rule 1.4 cmt. The Louisiana
Supreme Court initially objected to the change. See Letter from ChiefJustice John A. Dixon, Jr., to
John C. Combe, Jr. and Robert E. Leake, Jr., Co-Chairmen of the Task Force (Apr. 15, 1986) (copy on
file with author). Chief Justice Dixon's April 15, 1986 letter to the co-chairmen of the Task Force
stated that "Rule 1.4(b) should be eliminated and for it the ABA Model Rule 1.4(b) should be
substituted." Id. In the end, however, the court agreed to permit a departure from the ABA model with
respect to the rule. See Letter from Chief Justice John A.Dixon, Jr.to John C.Combe, Jr. and Robert
E. Leake, Jr., Co-Chairmen of the Task Force (June 2, 1986) (original on file with Special Archives,
Earl K.Long Library, University ofNew Orleans) (copy on file with author). The only change that was
made in part (b)from the original Task Force draft was to take out the initial words of that draft, which
said: "The client should be given sufficient information ... ,"and to substitute the words: "The lawyer
shall give the client sufficient information .. " See Louisiana Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.4
(1986).
90. A dictionary definition of the word "explain" is "to make clear, plain, or understandable."
See Webster's New World Dictionary 479 (3d College Edition) (Victoria Neufeldt ed., Press 1988).
91. Louisiana Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.7 (1986). See Model Rules ofProfessional
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This is a positive change. Lawyers faced with conflict of interest problems
might get so bogged down in analytical details that they could lose sight of the
underlying principle of client loyalty. Lawyers who practice in states where the
comments are part of the rules will be reminded ofthe principle, ifthey remember
to look at the comments; lawyers who practice in Louisiana can hardly avoid the
reminder, if they look at the rule at all.
3. Rule 1.8: Transactionswith Clients
Rule 1.8 is a specialized conflict of interest rule. It identifies a number of
activities that are prohibited, including: undertaking business transactions with
clients; using client information to a client's disadvantage; and acquiring a
proprietary interest in the subject matter oflitigation. 92 As is the case with Rule 1.7,

Conduct Rule 1.7 cmt
92. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8:
Rule 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions
(a)A lawyershall notenter into abusiness transaction with aclient or knowingly acquire
an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1) the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in
a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent
counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
(b)A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the
disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or aperson related to the
lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a
testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.
(d)Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or
negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account
based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.
(e)A lawyer shall not provide financial assistanceto aclient in connection with pending
or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of
which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expense of
litigation on behalf of the client.
(f)A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing aclient from one other than
the client unless:
(1)the client consents after consultation;
(2)there is no interference with the lawyer's independence ofprofessional judgment
or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3)information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule
1.6.
(g)A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in 'a criminal case an
aggregated agreement as to guiltyor nolo contendere pleas, unless each client consents after
consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas
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Louisiana Rule 1.8 includes some preliminary words that were taken from the
ABA's comment to the corresponding model rule.
The preliminary words to Louisiana Rule 1.8 are:
As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should
be fair and reasonable to the client. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit
his representation of a client or information relating to the representation
to the client's disadvantage. Examples ofviolations include, but are not
limited to, the following:93
The first two sentences in the quoted language were taken from the comment to
Model Rule 1.8."
Unfortunately, the change to Rule 1.8 was not quite as clean as the change
mentioned above to Rule 1.7. Here, the added language, by its terms, renders all
of the subparts ofRule 1.8 examples ofrule violations.9" What then is the general

involved and ofthe participation ofeach person in the settlement.
(h)A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to
a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented
in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or
former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation
is appropriate in connection therewith.
(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse shall not
represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is
represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after consultation
regarding the relationship.
(j)A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause ofaction or subject matter
of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawer may:
(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
93. Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8 (1986).
94. The first sentence is exactly the same as the first sentence of the comment. The second
sentence is a modified version of the third sentence from the comment. The unmodified version of that
sentence from the comment says: "Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit information relating to the
representation to the client's disadvantage." See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8 cmt.
(1983).
95. Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8 (1986):
Rule 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions
As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and
reasonable to the client. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploit his representation ofa client
or information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. Examples of
violations include but are not limited to the following:
(a) Alawyer shall not enter into a business transaction with a client or knowingly acquire
an ownership, possessory,1security or other pecuniary interest adverse to a client unless:
(1)the transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and transmitted in writing to the client in
a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) the client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent
counsel in the transaction; and
(3) the client consents in writing thereto.
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the
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disciplinary standard that the subparts exemplify? The first ofthe three preliminary
sentences does not offer much help. It simply articulates a "general principle"
about fairness. And the use of the word "should," instead of "shall," in that
sentence appears to confirm that discipline ought not to be based on the general
principle mentioned in that sentence."

disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer shall not prepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the
lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a
testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or
negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account
based in substantial part on information relating to the representation.
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending
or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) a lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of
which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) a lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expense of
litigation o behalf ofthe client.
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than
the client unless:
(1) The client consents after consultation, or the compensation is provided by contract
with a third persons such as an insurance contract or a prepaid legal service plan.
(2) There is no interference with the lawyer's independent or professional judgment
or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) Information relating to representation of a client is protected as required by Rule
1.6.
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an
aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client consents after
consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas
involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability to
a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently represented
in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an unrepresented client or
former client without first advising that person in writing that independent representation
is appropriate in connection therewith.
(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse shall not
represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is
represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after consultation
regarding the relationship.
(j) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause ofaction or subject matter
of litigation the lawyer is conducting for a client, except that the lawyer may:
(1) acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and
(2) contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
96. In this respect, it is helpful to consider the following statement from the Scope section of the
Model Rules:
Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the terms "shall" or "shall not." These define
proper conduct for purposes ofprofessional discipline. Others; generally cast in the term
"may," are permissive and define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has professional
discretion. No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or
Many of the Comments use the term
acts within the bounds of such discretion ....
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The second sentence--"a lawyer may not exploit his representation of a client
or information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage"-sounds
more like a standard for discipline since it contains a broad prohibition against
exploitation of clients. But this prohibition does not seem broad enough to
comfortably subsume all ofthe specific subparts ofRule 1.8. For example, subpart
(i) restricts a lawyer's ability to take on a client when the representation will be
directly adverse to a party represented by the lawyer's own parent, child, sibling,
or spouse. While such a situation presents a potential conflict of interest, it seems
a bit of a stretch to characterize it as one that involves exploitation of a client. A
similar observation could be made about part (e) ofthe rule, which limits a lawyer's
ability to provide financial assistance to clients. That subpart appears to focus on
preventing exploitation of the lawyer rather than the client.
On the other hand, this general anti-exploitation rule might
have utility beyond
the specific prohibitions set forth in Rule 1.8. It does not seem too unreasonable,
for example, to suggest that a lawyer who demands sexual relations with a client as
a condition to representation, or as payment of a "fee," has engaged in the
exploitation ofa client. Some jurisdictions, in fact, have adopted specific rules that
are hostile to lawyers having sex with clients.' The anti-exploitation language of
Louisiana Rule 1.8 would tend to diminish the need for such a rule in this state. 9s
There is another positive aspect ofthe change to Louisiana Rule 1.8 that should
be mentioned. There is some virtue in articulating general statements of principle
in a body of ethics rules. They can be found in early lawyer ethics codes and, to
some extent, in the introductory materials and the comments to the ABA Model
Rules. Louisiana's version of the rules, which omitted these materials, is not as
strong in articulating general principles. But one of the general principles was
preserved in Rule 1.8, and that seems to be a good thing.
4. Rule 4.3: Communications with UnrepresentedPersons
Louisiana Rule 4.3, which governs how a lawyer should interact with
unrepresented persons in legal matters, is quite different from its ABA counterpart.
The ABA version of the rule prohibits a lawyer who communicates with an
unrepresented person from stating or implying that the lawyer is disinterested. It
also requires the lawyer to make reasonable efforts to correct misunderstandings
that an unrepresented person has about the lawyer's role." The rule is intended to

"should." Comments do not add obligations to the Rules but provide guidance for
practicing in compliance with the Rules.
Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Scope.
97. See, e.g., Rules of Professional Conduct of the State BarofCaliforia Rule 3-120 Annotated
Calif. C6de Vol. 23, Part 3 (West 1996 and Supp. 2000).
98. Cf. In re Ashy, 721 So. 2d 859 (La. 1998) (Louisiana attorney suspended from practice
based, in part, on his having made unwanted sexual advances towards a client; court did not rely on the
exploitation language from Rule 1.8).
99. The text ofthe rule is:
In dealing on behalf of a client with a person who is not represented by counsel, a lawyer
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prohibit lawyer overreaching.
The Louisiana version ofthe rule is more stringent than the ABA's model. In
the first place, the Louisiana rule requires the lawyer to "assume that an
unrepresented person does not understand the lawyer's role in a matter.""Ir It also
requires the lawyer to "carefully explain to the unrepresented person the lawyer's
role in the matter."'' Neither of these changes was based on language from the
ABA's comment to Model Rule 4.3.
The second paragraph of Louisiana Rule 4.3, however, was based on the
ABA's comment. It states: "During the course of a lawyer's representation of a
client, the lawyer should not give advice to a non-represented person other than the
advice to obtain counsel."' 2 In this instance, Louisiana moved a comment with
perceived substantive content to the text of the rule without significant change.
Further change might have been appropriate. The problem lies in the word
"should." That word is weaker than "shall," suggesting that the lawyer's obligation
is more discretionary than mandatory. "Should" is a comfortable word for a
comment but not for a rule.'0 3
It might be thought that the Task Force, which had recommended this change,
did not intend the borrowed language from the comment to be mandatory. Maybe
it simply incorporated the language for the helpful guidance of Louisiana lawyers.
But ifthe Task Force had been interested in providing practice guidance in the case
of Rule 4.3, why was it not interested in doing so with respect to other rules? In
fact, Rule 4.3 is an easy rule to understand and apply. Many other rules, especially
those relating to confidentiality and conflicts ofinterest, are much more difficult.
The Task Force might have attempted to provide guidance with respect to such
rules by incorporating relevant Scope and Comment offerings ofthe ABA Model
Rules, with appropriate adaptations. But the Task Force did not. The use of
"should" in Louisiana Rule 4.3 appears to have been an error.
B. Some OmittedMaterialsCould Not Have Been Included
We have seen that a few sentences from the omitted materials were actually
incorporated into the text of the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct. This
indicates that the Task Force did pay some attention to the materials that it omitted,
even though it ultimately decided not to incorporate most ofthem into the Louisiana
rules. Later we will see that there are other parts of the omitted materials that
shall not state or imply that the lawyer is disinterested. When the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know that the unrepresented person misunderstands the lawyer's role in
the matter, the lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to correct the misunderstanding.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.3 (1983).
100. Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.3 (1986).

101.

Id.

102. Id. The only change from the corresponding sentence in the ABA's comment is that
Louisiana uses the term "non-represented" instead of"unrepresented." See Model Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 4.3 cmt.
103. See the discussion of "shall' and "should," supra note 96.
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should have been included. But this section of the article considers something else.
It identifies parts of the omitted materials that could not have been included in
Louisiana's version of the rules, even if the Task Force had been more aggressive
about such inclusions in general. This is so because some changes that were made
to the Louisiana rules were inconsistent with statements in the omitted materials.
Some examples will illustrate the point.
1. Rule 1.869: Compensationfrom ThirdParty

Rule 1.8(f) is a specialized conflict of interest rule that limits the
lawyer's ability to represent clients while receiving compensation from a third
party. The ABA version of the rule prohibits a lawyer from accepting
compensation from someone other than the client unless the client consents, after
consultation, and unless additional requirements have been satisfied.' Consistent
with the language of the rule, the ABA comment states that "Rule 1.8(f) requires
disclosure of the fact that the lawyer's services are being paid for by a third
party."'

This language from the comment would not have been a good fit in

Louisiana's version of the rules because ofa change to the text of Louisiana Rule
1.8(0.
InLouisiana, the black-letter rule was changed to omit the disclosure and
consent requirements in cases where payment comes from an insurance company
or a prepaid legal services plan. " The change seems sensible because a client who
has paid for liability insurance or a legal services plan would certainly hope that
legal fees would be paid by a third party when the legal matter at issue is covered
by the policy or the plan. But the change was at odds with the language ofthe ABA
comment, quoted above, referring to third-party payments. Because of the two
exceptions set forth in the Louisiana rule, the Task Force would have had to modify
the Model Rules comment; without modification, the Model Rules comment simply
would not have fit.
2. Rule 3.1: ImproperClaims and Defenses

Rule 3.1 deals with meritorious claims and defenses. The ABA version of the
rule prohibits a lawyer from bringing or defending a "proceeding" or from taking
a position with respect to an issue in a proceeding, "unless there is a basis for doing
so that is not frivolous."" °7 "Frivolous" is a word in want of definition, and the

104. See Model Rule 1.8(0. The other requirements are: (1)that there be no interference with the
lawyer's independentjudgment or with the lawyer-client relationship and (2) that information otherwise
subject to Rule 1.6 confidentiality protection be kept confidential according to Rule 1.6.
105. Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.8 cmt. (1983).
106. Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8(f(i) (1986).The Task Force Report had.
recommended the change "to recognize the reality ofliability insurance or prepaid legal service plans."
Task Force Report: Proposed Rules, supra note 42, Rule 1.8 cmt.
107. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (1983).
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comment to the ABA rule does not disappoint. An entire paragraph ofthe comment
to Rule 3.1 is devoted to the purpose." 8
This paragraph of the comment would not have applied with equal relevance
to the Louisiana version ofthe rule, however, because the Louisiana rule substitutes
a "good faith" requirement for the ABA's requirement that claims and defenses be
"not frivolous."'" Thus, the text of the Louisiana rule provides, in pertinent part:
"A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an issue
therein, unless there is a basis for doing so in good faith, which includes a good
faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law."'" The
Task Force recommended the change because it thought that the "not frivolous"
standard was vague, and because it thought that there would be "relatively little
question among the Bench and Bar about the meaning of good faith."' Of
course, the vagueness problem would have been resolved, to some extent, if
Louisiana had adopted the definitional portion of the rule's comment. But the
change in the text of the rule created a barrier to comment adoption. Even if
Louisiana had generally incorporated the ABA's comments into its version of the
rules, a comment on good faith would have been appropriate under Rule 3.1, but not
a comment on what "frivolous" means.
3. Rule 3.3: Lawyer CandorTowardthe Tribunal
Rule 3.3 concerns candor toward the tribunal. Both the ABA and the Louisiana
versions of the rule are hostile to false statements, false evidence, and inappropriate
non-disclosures to the court." 2 Both versions of the rule require the lawyer to take
some action ifone ofthe prohibitions is violated. But the Louisiana version of the
rule differs from the ABA model with respect to the temporal length of the
lawyer's remedial obligations. The ABA model provides that the remedial duties

108. See id. cmt.
109. Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.1 (1986).
110. Id.
Ill. Task Force Report: Proposed Rules, supra note 42, Rule 3.1 cmt.
112. Both the Louisiana and the ABA versions oftherule include a list of four prohibitions. Three
of the prohibitions are the same. They prohibit lawyers from (1)making false statements ofmaterial
fact or law; (2) failing to disclose legal authority in the controlling jurisdiction that is known by the
lawyer to be directly adverse to the position of the client, when that authority has not been disclosed by
opposing counsel; and (3) offering evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. See Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(aX1), (3)and (4) (1983); Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule
3.3 (a)(l), (3) and (4) (1986).
Louisiana departed from the ABA model with respect to prohibited factual omissions. ABA Model
Rule 3.3(aX2) prohibits the lawyer from failing to disclose a material fact when disclosure is necessary
to avoid assisting a client's criminal or fraudulent act. Louisiana Rule 3.3(a)(2), in contrast, prohibits
the lawyer from concealing or knowingly failing to disclose "that which he is required by law to reveal."
It also provides that ifthe lawyer discovers that the client has perpetrated "a fraud on the tribunal," the
lawyer must call on the client to rectify it. Ifthe client does not, the rule requires the lawyer to reveal
the fraud to the affected person or tribunal.
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"continue to the conclusion of the proceeding.""' 3 Consistent with this provision,
the comment to the ABA rule states: "A practical time limit on the obligation to
rectify the presentation of false evidence has to be established. The conclusion of
the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for termination of the
obligation.... ", 4
The ABA commentwould not have worked in connection with Louisiana's
version ofthe rule. The Louisiana Supreme Court approved a change to part (b)of
Rule 3.3 and created two temporal standards regarding the lawyer's duty to take

remedial measures; one change, in fact, was not a "practical time limit" at all. In
general, duties relating to client fraud and the offering of false evidence are
subjected to an unlimited time period for rectification. A shorter time frame,
namely, the end of a proceeding, applies to the rectification of false statements by
the lawyer or the lawyer's failure to disclose legal authority." 5 The relevant portion
of Louisiana Rule 3.3(b) provides: "The duties stated in paragraph (a)(1) and (3)
continue to the end of the hearing or proceeding. The duties stated in paragraph
(a)(2) and (4) are unlimited in time."' "6 The Task Force Report did not explain this
double standard. Perhaps the Task Force thought it was worse to have the tribunal
tainted by false statements (or omissions) by the cliefit than by false statements (or

113. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(b) (1983).
114. Id. cmt.
115. See Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 (1986).
116. Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(b) (1986). As originally adopted,
Louisiana Rule 3.3(b) also provided that "[t]he duties stated in paragraph (aX2) and (4) are unlimited
in time and are subject to the provisions of Rule 1.6." This formulation suggested that Rule 1.6, the
confidentiality rule, trumped Rule 3.3. This was exactly the opposite of the ABA's own formulation.
The text ofABA Model Rule 3.3 made it clear that the disclosure duties under Model Rule 3.3 "apply
even ifcompliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6." Model Rules
of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(b) (1983).
After the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct had been adopted, an "ethics professor"
apparently pointed the problem out to Wood Brown I, who was one ofthe members of the Task Force.
Mr. Brown agreed that there was a problem and wrote to other members of the Task Force as follows:
What we have done, therefore, is to take our strong provision in Rule 3.3(aX2) and make it
subject to the confidentiality rule set up in Rule 1.6. Idon't think we meant to do that. I
think we meant to make the disclosure of a client's perpetration of a fraud on the Court
mandatory and under all circumstances. At least, that's what Iintended to do.
See Letter from Wood Brown II, Task Force Member, to the other members of the Task Force (June
26, 1987) (copy on file with author). Several proposals for fixing the rule were suggested. See id.;
Letter from Robert E. Leake, Jr., Co-Chairman of the Task Force, to Wood Brown IIl, Task Force
Member (August 4, 1987) (copy on file with author). Inthe end, the proposal that prevailed was one
referenced in a letter by Thomas 0. Collins, Jr., Executive Counsel to the bar association. He
recommended that Louisiana Rule 3.3(b) incorporate the language from ABA Model Rule 3.3(b)
concerning the priority ofRule 3.3 over Rule 1.6. See Letter from Thomas 0. Collins, Jr., Executive
Counsel to the bar association, to Wood Brown III, Task Force Member (July 10, 1987) (copy on file
with the author). On January 12, 1988, Louisiana Rule 3.3(b) was amended to provide:
The duties stated in Paragraph (a)(1) and (3) continue to the end of the hearing or
proceeding. The duties stated in Paragraph (a)(2) and (4) are unlimited in time and apply,
even if compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(b) (2000).
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omissions) by the lawyer. Ifthat is what the Task Force thought, it probably should
have thought further about the matter. In any event, the discussion of a "practical
time limit" in the ABA comment would not have cast much illumination on the
Louisiana rule.
4.

Rule 7.2: Giving Things of Valuefor Recommendinga Lawyer's
Services

The Louisiana version ofRule 7.2, which is about lawyer advertising, has been
substantially modified since its initial adoption, most recently in 1996."7 As a
result of these modifications, the discussion in this part of the article is mostly of
historical significance, but the discussion is still relevant to the theme that changes
in Louisiana's version of the black-letter rules would have made it inappropriate to
adopt all of the comments to the ABA's Model Rules.
One of the provisions ofRule 7.2 concerns the giving ofvalue to persons for
recommending a lawyer's services. The ABA version of this provision, found in
Model Rule 7.2(c), states:
A lawyer shall not give anything of value to a person for recommending
the lawyer's services, except that a lawyer may pay the reasonable cost of
advertising or written communication permitted by this Rule and may pay
the usual charges ofa not-for-profit lawyer referral service or other legal
service organization."'
A comment to the Model Rule elaborates a bit more on this. It expressly affirms the
lawyer's ability "to pay for advertising permitted by this Rule" and "to pay the usual
fees" charged by not-for-profit referral programs." 9 This comment would not have
worked in Louisiana because Louisiana deleted all of the words after "services" in
the above-quoted language from the text of Model Rule 7.2. The Task Force said
this about the change: "Theproposal of the task force as phrased is absolute. The
ABA version was qualified by a number ofmatters which the task force do [sic] not
deem appropriate." °
It is not entirely clear what the Task Force found wanting in the ABA version
ofthe rule. One possibility is that the Task Force thought that the listed exceptions

were unnecessary because they do not amount to the giving of value for
recommending a lawyer's services. But this explanation seems weak, given the
somewhat harsh tone of the Task Force's statement regarding the appropriateness
of the qualifications to the ABA's rule, and given the fact that lawyer
referral fees, at least, seem to involve giving value for recommending lawyer
services. An alternative possibility is that the Task Force objected to the

117. Amendments to the Louisiana Rules are reflected in "Historical and Statutory Notes"
accompanying the text ofthe rules in La. R.S. 37, Ch. 4 App. (1998 & 2000 Supp.).
118. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.2(c) (1983).
119. Id. Rule 7.2 cmt.
120. Task Force Report: Proposed Rules, supra note 42, Rule 7.2 cmt.
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qualifications on the merits. The Task Force might have wanted it to be unethical

for a lawyer to pay for otherwise permissible advertising or otherwise permissible
participation in lawyer referral services. However, such a result would, as a
practical matter, have foreclosed lawyer advertising and participation in lawyer
referral services and otherwise undercut the balance of the rule. That would have
been strange.

As noted above, however, this is mostly of historical relevance. The current
version of the Louisiana Rule states:
A lawyer shall not give anything ofvalue to a person for recommending
the lawyer's services; provided, however, that a lawyer may pay the
of an advertisement or comunication not
reasonable and customary costs
2
in violation ofthese rules.1 '
Of course, even this rule does not expressly approve fees for lawyer referral
services. The parallel portion ofthe ABA comment would still appear to be at odds
with the Louisiana rule.
5. Rule 7.3: Limits on Direct Contacts with Prospective Clients
A further instance in which the Louisiana drafters could not comfortably have
adopted a comment to a rule emerges in connection with Rule 7.3. In the ABA
version and in the original Louisiana version, Rule 7.3 was about direct contact with
prospective clients. Both versions have changed in the intervening years.
Louisiana's rule has changed more substantially, and what we note here is, again,
largely of historical relevance.
At the time the Task Force was doing its work, the ABA version of Rule 7.3
articulated a broad ban on lawyer solicitation of prospective clients, at least when
a significant motive for the solicitation was the lawyer's pecuniary gain. The ban
did not apply to people with whom the lawyer had a prior family or professional
relationship. But it did apply to all direct contacts--"by mail, in-person, or
otherwise."'" A comment to the ABA rule spoke of the "dangers" of direct
solicitation and about how"[d]irect mail solicitation cannot be effectively regulated
by means less drastic than outright prohibition."'
This comment could not have been adopted in Louisiana because, subject to
some qualifications, the initial Louisiana version ofthe rule permitted lawyers to
send direct solicitation letters to individuals who were known to be in need of
It was written that way to avoid constitutional
particular legal services."

121. Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.2(d) (2000).
122. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 (1983).
123. Id. Rule 7.3 cnt.
124. Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 (1986). The qualifications were that the
letter had to be identified as advertising material and that the lawyer had to submit a copy of the letter
to the Louisiana Bar Association. See id.
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problems. 25 In the intervening years, the ABA has modified its rule and the
comment to take constitutional considerations into account. The current version of
the ABA rule permits targeted solicitation letters. 6 Louisiana's rule has also
changed over the years. Indeed, the changes have been substantial enough that the
Louisiana rule that covers direct contact with prospective clients is now Rule 7.2
rather than 7.3.
6. Rule 8.3: ReportingProfessionalMisconduct
A final example of a comment that could not have been adopted in Louisiana
appears in connection with Rule 8.3, which concerns reporting professional
misconduct. The ABA rule requires lawyers to report known violations of the Rules
of Professional Conduct to disciplinary authorities, but only when those violations
raise "asubstantial question as to [a] lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as
a lawyer in other respects."' 27
The ABA comment to the rule describes the standards for determining whether
a violation is serious enough to be reported. It states in part:
If a lawyer were obliged to report every violation of the Rules, the
failure to report any violation would itself be a professional offense.
Such a requirement existed in many jurisdictions but proved to be
unenforceable. This Rule limits the reporting obligation to those
offenses that a self-regulating profession must vigorously endeavor to
28
prevent.1
This comment could not have been adopted in Louisiana because the Louisiana
rule requires broader reporting of rule violations. The Louisiana version of Rule
8.3 provides, in pertinent part: "A lawyer possessing unprivileged knowledge of a
violation of this code shall report such knowledge to a tribunal or other authority
empowered to investigate or act upon such violation."'2 9
This is essentially the same language that was used in the prior Code of
Professional Responsibility. 3 ' The Task Force wanted to incorporate this language

125. See supradiscussion accompanying note 78.
126. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.3 (2000).
127. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.3(a).
128. Id.cmt.
129. Louisiana Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 8.3(a).
130. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-103. The reference to "unprivileged"
knowledge was somewhat troublesome. Did this refer only to information that was not protected by an
evidentiary privilege? SeeIn re Himmel, 533 N.E.2d 790 (111.
1988). Or did it refer, more broadly, to
information that was not subject to the Code's formula for confidential information? See ABA Comm.
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Opinion 341 (1975). It was not at all necessary to
introduce this uncertainty into the text of the Louisiana rule. The word "unprivileged" should simply
have been left out.
Part (c) ofthe Louisiana rule independently excludes, from the reporting requirement, "information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6." Rule 1.6, the confidentiality rule, generally protects all information
"relating to representation ofa client." As a result, the reporting exception in part (c) covers at least as
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into Rule 8.3 because it preferred the old rule to the ABA's new one. Even though
the Task Force Report acknowledged difficulties in the enforceability of the old
rule,' it found the old rule "preferable, because a lawyer, making an evaluation
whether to report a violation, should not be put in the position of making a

subjective judgment as to whether the violation 'raised a substantial question as to
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness and fitness as a lawyer."' "'
The Task Force thought it was better to put the burden on the lawyer to report
all violations.'
The Louisiana Supreme Court apparently agreed, and the result
was a rule that was quite different from the ABA version-different enough so that
the language quoted above from the134ABA comment would have been inconsistent
with the text of the Louisiana rule.
C. Do the OmissionsMatter?
So far, in our look at the omitted materials, we have identified a few sentences
from the omitted materials that were actually included in the Louisiana Rules. We
have also identified other parts of the omitted materials that could not have been
included. This section addresses a more important concern: whether the omission

of the omitted materials matters. Initially we will see that, notwithstanding the
failure to adopt the omitted materials, Louisiana courts have occasionally referred
to them when it has been helpful to do so. That alone suggests that the fact of
omission is not particularly consequential. But that should not be the end of our
analysis. If we consider the content of the omitted materials, we will find a couple
of instances in which Louisiana may be better off for having excluded them. We

much ground, and probably more ground, than the "unprivileged" qualifier in part (a).
131. See Task Force Report: Proposed Rules, supra note 42, Rule 8.3 cmt. The enforceability
problem, which was also referenced in the ABA's comment to Model Rule 8.3, may have been
overstated. See Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics § 12.10.1 (1986):
Much has been made ofthe fact that the Code, in DR 1-103(A), becomes operative without
apparent limitation when an observing lawyer has knowledge of a "violation" even ifit is
of a trivial nature. The fact, of course, is that no recorded instance exists of a lawyer
disciplined under the Code for failure to report a trivial violation.
(footnote omitted).
132. Task Force Report: Proposed Rules, supranote 42, Rule 8.3 cmt..
133. See id.
134. As a practical matter, the difference between the ABA rule and the Louisiana rule may not
matter all that much. Both the ABA Model Rules and the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct
provide that Rule 8.3 "does not require disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6."
Rule 1.6, the confidentiality rule, essentially protects all information "relating to representation of a
client." Most of the information that lawyers receive about the misdeeds of other lawyers comes as a
result of client representation. It would be information covered by Rule 1.6. See Steven Gillers,
Regulation of Lawyers: Problems of Law and Ethics 786 (5th ed. 1998) ("It will be unusual for alawyer
to have knowledge ofanother lawyer's unethical conduct that is not based on protected information
....
")(emphasis in original). It is true that Rule 1.6 information could be disclosed with client consent,
but Rule 8.3 does not require lawyers to try to get client consent for disclosure of misdeeds by other
lawyers. The end result is that lawyers will usually not be obligated to report misconduct under Rule
8.3.
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will also identify a number ofinstances in which adoption ofthe omitted materials
would have been beneficial-sometimes very beneficial. Simply stated, the
omissions do matter.
1. LouisianaCourtsand the OmittedMaterials
Even though the Louisiana Supreme Court approved only black-letter rules
when it approved the Louisiana Rules ofProfessional Conduct, it did not foreclose
the possibility of useful application of the omitted materials. After all, the Task
Force Report suggested that the introductory materials, comments, and other
materials in the ABA Model "be considered as precatory to any interpretation or
application of the Louisiana version of the Model Rules."' 35 While the suggestion
ofthe Task Force was not formally incorporated into the Louisiana Rules, and may
not have survived in the memory of any court or disciplinary authority, Louisiana
courts have sometimes referred to omitted materials (mostly comments to the
Model rules) in written opinions that discuss legal ethics issues.
Indeed, the Louisiana Supreme Court itself has referred to omitted materials in
several opinions." Ina 1994 case, for example, the supreme court considered
whether lawyers who moved from government service to private practice were
subject to the conflict of interest statutes that apply to state government employees
generally, or whether Rule 1.11 of the Rules of Professional Conduct, dealing with
attorney "revolving door" issues, provides the exclusive vehicle for lawyer
regulation. In the course of its opinion, the supreme court stated:
The American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
from which the pertinent part of Rule 1.11 is taken, contemplated the
application ofother laws in the area of successive government and private
employment. Although the Comments to the Model Rules were not
adopted by this Court, they are instructive here. The Model Rule
Comment provides that a government lawyer is subject, not only to Rule
1.11, but "to statutes and government regulations regarding conflict of
interest." The Model Rule Comment also recognized that "statutes and
regulations may circumscribe the extent to which the government agency
may give consent under this Rule.""'

135. See Task Force Report: Report to the House of Delegate, supranote 42.
136. SeeMidboe v.Commission on Ethics for Public Employees, 646 So. 2d 351,360 (La. 1994)
(referring to comment to Model Rule 1.1 1); Succession of Wallace, 574 So. 2d 348, 351 (La. 1991)
(referring to comment to Model Rule 1.16); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Williams, 549 So. 2d 275,278
(La. 1989) (referring to comment to Model Rule 1.3). See alsoFarrington v. Law Firmof Sessions, 687
So. 2d 997, 999 (La. 1997) (referring to what the court calls the "comments" to Model Rule 3.7; the
reference is actually to a "Legal Background" annotation in the ABA's Annotated Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (3d ed. 1996); such annotations were not part ofthe Model Rules as adopted by
the ABA); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Drury, 455 So. 2d 1387,1390 (La. 1984) (referring to comment
to Model Rule 1.7 prior to Louisiana's adoption of the Rules of Professional Conduct).
137. Midboe v. Commission on Ethics for Pub. Employees, 646 So. 2d 351, 360 (La. 1994).
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The comment helped the court reach a conclusion that the conflict of interest
statutes were applicable to attorneys in government service.
In another case, the Louisiana Supreme Court referred to a comment to the
Model Rules to clarify the rule regarding the client's right to discharge a lawyer:
Rule 1.1 6(a)(3), the rule defining and regulating the client-attorney
relationship mostpertinent to thepresent case, provides unequivocally that

.'alawyer... shall withdraw from the representation of a client if... the

lawyer is discharged." The comment under the Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 1.16, explains that the rule means "[a] client has a right to
discharge a lawyer at any time, with or 13without cause, subject to liability
for payment for the lawyer's services."'
In this instance, the court failed to even mention that the comment was not part of
the Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct.
Courts at other levels have also referred to the comments to the Model Rules
39
for guidance on the meaning ofLouisiana's Rules ofProfessional Conduct.
In short, Louisiana cases do not express disapproval of the omitted materials.
To the contrary, courts that have referred to the omitted materials (mostly the
comments) have implicitly or explicitly acknowledged their value.
2. Benefits of Omission

Louisiana's decision not to incorporate the omitted materials into the Louisiana
Rules of Professional Conduct turns out to have been beneficial in some respects.
One of the benefits is that the resulting rules are shorter than the ABA's Model
Rules. As a result, they take up less space in a printed volume, they do not take.as
much time to read, and they focus attention on the essential rules that attorneys must
obey in order to avoid discipline.
Another benefit is that the Louisiana Supreme Court and the Louisiana Bar
Association do not have to be associated with some questionable statements
contained in the omitted materials. The following are at least a couple of these.
a. Lies

ABA Model Rule 4.1 is about "[t]ruthfulness in statements to others."'" Part

138. Succession of Wallace, 574 So. 2d 348, 351 (La. 1991) (omissions in original) (emphasis
omitted).
139. See Douglas v. Dyn McDermott Petroleum Operations Co., 163 F.3d 223,237(5th Cir. 1998)
(Dennis, J., dissenting) (referring to Comment to Model Rule 1.6); United States v. Brown, 72 F.3d 25
(5th Cir. 1995) (referring to Comment to Model Rule 8.2); Jenkins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 956 F.
Supp. 695, 697 (W.D. La. 1997) (referring to Comment to Model Rule 4.2); In re Shell Oil Refinery,
143 F.R.D. 105 (E.D. La. 1992) (referring to Comment to Model Rule 4.2); Miskell v. Ciervo, 557 So.
2d 274, 275 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1990) (referring to Comment to Model Rule 1.3).
140. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1 (1983).
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(a) of the rule provides that a lawyer, in the course of representing a client, "shall
not knowingly ... make a false statement of material fact or law to a third
person."'41 This is not a very shocking rule. Fraud is not good, and lawyers, like
non-lawyers, ought not to engage in it. Ifanything, we might wonder why the rule
does not require more.' The comment to the rule, however, takes a different tack.
It countenances some false statements. The comment provides, in pertinent part:

141. See id.Rule 4.1(a).
142. Judge Alvin B. Rubin wrote: "It is scant comfort to observe here, as apologists for the
profession usually do, that lawyers are as honest as other men. If it is an inevitable professional duty
that they negotiate, then as professionals they can be expected to observe something more than the
morality of the marketplace." Alvin B. Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 La.

L.Rev. 577, 578-79 (1975) (footnote omitted).
Professor Gary Tobias Lowenthal has argued that the standard of Model Rule 4.1 is even lower than
the standard that is generally applicable under tort and contract law:
The notion that a lie is unethical only if it relates to a "material" fact cannot be justified
by the principles underlying the rules of liability for misrepresentation under the law of
contracts or torts....
The materiality of the misrepresented fact is important in the law of
contracts only in cases of unintentional misrepresentation.... On the other hand, contract
avoidance is available as a remedy when a misrepresentation is intentional, regardless of
materiality, because "the wrongdoer has accomplished his intended purpose."
...[T]he materiality of the misrepresentation is important in tort law only because it
assists the trier of fact in determining whether the plaintiff actually relied on the
misrepresentation and whether the plaintiff's reliance wasjustifiable-not because materiality
is required for a misrepresentation to be fraudulent in character. If a lawyer-negotiator
misrepresents facts to deceive another party, the ethics of the lawyer's conduct should not
depend on whether the other party is actually deceived, or even whether a reasonable person
would be deceived under the circumstances.
Gary Tobias Lowenthal, The Bar'sFailureto Require TruthfulBargainingBy Lawyers, 2 Geo. J. L.

Eth. 411, 417-18 (1988) (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
For other perspectives on lying in negotiations see Scott S.Dahl, Ethicson the Table: Stretching
the Truth in Negotiations,8 Rev. of Lit. 173 (1989) (Most interviewed attorneys would mislead the
other side as part of the game of negotiations; many attorneys were in agreement about "the boundary
ofpermissible deceit"); Roger Fisher, A CodeofNegotiationPracticesforLawyers, I Neg. J. 105, 106
(1985) (Includes a proposed memorandum to give to a new client that says: "Ibelieve that it is not a
sound practice to negotiate in a way that rewards deception, stubbornness, dirty tricks, and taking
risks."); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Lawyer's Obligationto be Trustworthy When Dealing With

Opposing Parties, 33 S.Car. L. Rev. 181 (1981) (Standard conventions do not require strict
truthfulness-they permit lawyers to make statements that are literally false; lawyers lack a common
conception of fairness in negotiation; regulation of lawyer untrustworthiness cannot go much firther
than to proscribe fraud); Michael H. Rubin, The Ethics ofNegotiations: Are ThereAny?, 56 La. L.

Rev. 447 (1995) (arguing that the "ethical basis ofnegotiations should be one oftruth and fair dealing,"
and that the standard for ethical behavior in nonlitigation practice ought to be the same as that for
litigation); James J. White, Machiavelliand the Bar: EthicalLimitations on Lying in Negotiation,

1980 A.B.F. Research J. 926, 927 (the negotiator is a poker player who must "facilitate his opponent's
inaccurate assessment"; "careful examination ofthe behavior ofeven the most forthright, honest, and
trustworthy negotiators will show them actively engaged in misleading their opponents about their true
positions."); Gerald B. Wetlaufer, The EthicsofLying in Negotiations,75 Iowa L Rev. 1219 (1990)
("[L]ying is a coherent and often effective strategy," but "we must grant a place to ethics, first in our
discourse and then in our actions.").
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This Rule refers to statements of fact. Whether a particular statement
should be regarded as one offact can depend on the circumstances. Under
generally accepted conventions in negotiation, certain types ofstatements
ordinarily are not taken as statements of material fact. Estimates of price
or value placed on the subject ofa transaction and a party's intentions as
to an acceptable settlement of a claim are in this category, and so is the
existence of an undisclosed principal except where nondisclosure of the
principal would constitute fraud.'43
The comment seems to be tethered to the common law notion of "puffing"-the
notion that some sales talk is merely an expression of the seller's opinion,
something to be discounted by the buyer, and not something on which a reasonable
person would rely. '"Thus, a car seller who engages in puffing might describe a car
as a "dandy" or "the best in the American market.' 45 But Prosser and Keeton have
described the puffing rule as amounting to a "seller's privilege to lie his head off,

143. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.1 cmt. (1983).
144. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on Torts 757 (5th ed. 1984). A "puffing" rule
is also recognized under Louisiana law:
In the course of negotiating a transaction persons may indulge in expressions that
deliberately exaggerate the quality of a thing, for example, or the reasonableness ofa named
price, or the uniqueness of a proposed bargain. Through a centuries-old tradition that has
its roots in the Roman tolerance ofthe dolus bonus, such expressions are not regarded as the
reflection of a fraudulent intent. Indeed, a seller who says to a prospective buyer, "This is
the best thing you can get for your money," or "Nobody will sell this thing for less," though
he knows that what he says is not true, does not say it with the intention to deceive the other •
person, but rather to persuade him to buy. If such a seller's conviction is thathe is offering
a reasonable deal, hethen lacks the intention either to derive an unfair advantage for himself
or to inflict a detriment to the other person, which shows the absence of the intentional
element that defines "fraud." Louisiana courts call such expressions "sales talk" or
"puffing," which at most could be taken as an innocuous opinion and not as a declaration
of quality.
Saul Litvinoff, Vices ofConsent,Error,Fraud,Duress andan Epilogueon Lesion, 50 La. L. Rev. 1,
68 (1989). Older versions ofthe Civil Code provided that false assertions ofvalue would not invalidate
agreements, if the person induced to enter into the agreement "might with ordinary attention have
detected the falsehood." See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art. 1847(3) (1870). See also Davis v. Lacaze, 158
So. 626 (La. 1935) (Error as to value of land is an error of judgment, not fact; the law furnishes no
relief, because the value could have been verified by inspection). On the other hand, "a false assertion
of the value of cost, or quality" would invalidate the agreement if discovery of the truth required
"particular skill or habit, or any difficult or inconvenient operation." See, e.g., La. Civ. Code art.
1847(4). See also Overby v. Beach, 55 So. 2d 873 (La. 1951) (Seller's misrepresentation about
"collectible rentals" from apartments amounted to misrepresentation about quality and could support
rescission). The current Civil Code simply provides: "Fraud does not vitiate consent when the party
against whom the fraud was directed could have ascertained the truth without difficulty, inconvenience,
or special skill." See La. Civ. Code art. 1954.
While "puffing" maynot amount to fraud, fraud itself does not get a good reception under Louisiana
law. It is a "vice of consent"--something that may vitiate the consent that is needed for the formation
of a contract. La. Civ. Code arts. 1927, 1948.
145. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts 756 (5th ed. 1984).
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so long as he says nothing specific" and have pointed out that the rule has not been
a favored one.Y Whatever enthusiasm there may be for puffing rules in tort or
contract law, there seems to be some irony about incorporating one into a comment
to an ethics rule."1
But irony is not the only issue. The comment informs us, among other
things, that it is ordinarily all right for a lawyer to knowingly make false
statements about estimates of price and value and the settlement intentions
of a client. In short, it is "ethical" to lie, at least about those things. What
about the things themselves? First, we should note that the word "estimates"
may carry a lot of freight. Price and value are inevitably subject to change.
At some level, it is possible to regard most calculations of price and value
as estimates. So there would appear to be nothing wrong, according to the
comment, for a lawyer, while knowing it to be false, to say: "The painting that was
destroyed had a value of between $175,000 and $200,000." The comment also
grants broad permission to knowingly make false statements about client
intentions." It would permit a lawyer to say, even when he or she knows it is false:
'Myclient will pay no more than $10,000 to settle this case;" or "My client will not
settle this case for less than $750,000." False statements like these might be
tactically helpful in negotiations, especially against unskilled negotiators, but that
9
is not a good justification for an ethics code to permit them" Besides, there are
ways to negotiate effectively that do not involve telling lies.'
at 757.
146. See id.
147. See Lowenthal, supra note 142, at 422: "The irony of an ethics rule that permits puffing is
that puffing is effective as a bargaining tactic only in circumstances in which it can fairly be described
as dishonest."
148. Professors Hazard and Hodes offer the following observations regarding the language of the
comment:
Kept within moral and responsible limits, the notion that "truth" can have somewhat
different meanings in different contexts is sound. However, there is something seductive
about a mandate to tell the truth that then redefines "truth." Lawyers should not suppose
that qualifications about "mere puffing" or "not material" constitute a license to lie, for the
Comment does not (and cannot) repeal the contemporary legal definition of
misrepresentation. The dividing line is hard to draw, but it must approximate the point
where a statement will not mislead the opposingparty-the very point where "puffery"
would have little practical effect anyway.
See 2 Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. &W.William Hodes, The Law of Lawyering § 4.1:202, at 716 (1998).
The professors are right on target about the risk of redefining "truth." Their statement about the line
being hard to draw is also well taken. But the comment to the rule itself does not articulate the same
standard that they do when they tell us where the approximate point of the dividing line must be. The
language ofthe comment does allow the lawyer to mislead.
149. Judge Alvin B.Rubin wrote: "Another lawyer, or a layman, who deals with a lawyer should
not need to exercise the same degree ofcaution that he would if trading for reputedly antique copper
jugs in an oriental bazaar." Alvin B.Rubin, A Causerieon Lawyers'EthicsinNegotiation, 35 La. L.
Rev. 577, 589 (1975).
150. "One can be a first-rate negotiator without misrepresenting facts or unlawfully concealing
information, even in distributional bargaining. A scrupulously honest negotiator normally succeeds in
zero sum negotiation by preparing thoroughly, establishing firm commitments topositions, andrefusing
to make concessions without adequate trade offs.... Moreover, even those who advocate highly
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No doubt there are some "generally accepted" conventions about negotiations.
For example, lawyers who negotiate, like non-lawyers who negotiate, understand
that initial offers are normally not final offers, that there are advantages in not
reacting with euphoria to offers that can reasonably be expected to be superseded
by more favorable ones, and that it is not customary to voluntarily disclose all ofthe
weaknesses in one's own position. There is indeed something of a "game" to
negotiations, and it is a hard thing to draw all ofthe lines between what should and
should not be permitted. However, it is not obvious that negotiation conventions
do (or should) incorporate the sorts of untruths permitted by the comment to
Rule 4.1."'' Even if the conventions did so, we could doubt that an ethics
code should." 2
Many members of the public think that lawyers are dishonest. Maybe that
perception results, at least in part, from lawyer dishonesty. Unfortunately, the
comment to Rule 4.1 seems to encourage lawyers to tell some untruths. To the
extent that ethics codes are teachers, Louisiana may be better off for not having
adopted the comment to this rule.

adversarial negotiation recognize the long-term importance of a negotiator's ability to maintain a
reputation for honest dealing." Lowenthal, supra note 142, at 433.
151. Professor Lowenthal observed, on this point: "How or why the bar concludes that a
negotiation morality that rewards dishonesty is 'generally accepted' is never stated. The conclusion is
certainly not based on existing empirical evidence." Lowenthal, supra note 142, at 425. See also
Deborah L. Rhode & David Luban, Legal Ethics 421 (2d ed. 1995) (discussing how in many instances
lawyers disagree about the duty of candor in negotiation and there may be no generally accepted
conventions); Dahl, supra note 142, at 193 (Almost all interviewed attorneys would refuse to lie about
their settlement authority and "the client's bottom line."); Larry Lempert, In Settlement Talks, Does
Telling the Truth HaveIts Limits?, 2 Inside Litigation I (1988) (giving examples oflawyers disagreeing
about whether untruths are appropriate); Thomas F. Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation,17 U. Rich.
L. Rev. 99 (1982) (saying that it seems likely that there can be little agreement on the concept of
truthfulness); White, supranote 142, at 934 (suspecting that many lawyers would say that lies about
settlement authority and client intentions "are out ofbounds and are not part ofthe rules ofthe game.").
152. See Lowenthal, supra note 142, at425-26 ("[R]egardless of empirical verification, an ethics
code should not condone conduct merely because it is 'generally accepted."'). Professor Lowenthal
suggests that one alternative that makes more sense than the bar's approach to lying in negotiation
would be to modify the comment to Rule 4.1 to say that "there is no exception to the prohibition against
knowingly misrepresenting facts when the facts in question refer to such matters as a negotiator's
settlement authority or the legitimacy of a bargaining demand." Id. at 426.
It should be acknowledged, however, that even if an ethics code prohibits lying, larger "ethical"
considerations might be called upon tojustify the telling of lies in extreme situations. Examples that
have appeared in the literature include "lying to Genghis Khan in order to save the city, lying in
negotiations with terrorists, or lying to the wheat-hoarding monopolist in order to get a lower price so
that one can buy more grain for the starving children." See Wetlaufer, supranote 142, at 1270.
Although an ethics code may articulate practical rules of ethics, a person's own moral compass might
point in a direction that is contrary to the provisions of the code. The Preamble to the Model Rules
reminds us that "[tihe Rules do not, however, exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should
inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules." Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble. But as long as we are going to have an ethics code, it seems
preferable to stick with a rule that is hostile to mistruth in general, and leave exceptional cases to be
resolved in light of the larger moral considerations that should attend the negotiator's decision.
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b. Adultery
Model Rule 8.4 is the misconduct rule. It covers a lot of ground. Among other
things, the rule provides that it is misconduct for a lawyer to violate any ofthe Rules
of Professional Conduct by engaging in dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or

misrepresentation or by committing a criminal act that reflects adversely on the
lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice law.153 The comment to the
Model Rule elaborates on the nature ofillegal conduct that amounts to misconduct:
Many kinds ofillegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law,
such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file
an income tax return. However, some kinds of offense carry no such
implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms of offenses
involving "moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to include
offenses concerning some matters of personal morality, such as adultery
and comparable offenses, that have no specific connection to fitness for
the practice of law. Although a lawyer is personally answerable to the
entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally answerable only for
offenses that indicate lack ofthose characteristics relevant to law practice.
Offenses involving violence, dishonesty or breach of trust, or serious
interference with the administration ofjustice are in that category."
There are some difficulties with this comment.
i. PersonalMorality

The principal idea of the quoted language from the comment is that lawyers
should be disciplined for criminal conduct that has a specific connection to the
fitness to practice law. This is a useful idea,' but it is no easy matter to describe
the offenses that meet (or do not meet) the standard. The comment rejects the use

153. See Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 8.4 (1983).
154. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4 cmt. (1983).
155. However, the idea alone may not be a sufficient standard for discipline where criminal
offenses are concerned. It would appear to be insufficient, in fact, if some of the words from the same
paragraph of the comment can be read to say that the only offenses that show lack ofcharacteristics
relevant to law practice are offenses involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or serious
interference with the administration of justice. Lawyers are officers of the court, with a special
obligation to uphold the rule of law. It would be inappropriate to rule out discipline for lawyers who,
with impunity, violate other laws that do not involve any of the four characteristics mentioned above.
By way of example, a lawyer who, with impunity, regularly violates laws against speeding, or public
nudity, would seem to be a good candidate for discipline.
The last sentence of the quoted paragraph from the comment indicates, in any event, that the
comment should not be read so narrowly as to authorize discipline only if the criminal offense involves
one of the four listed characteristics. It indicates that "[a] pattern of repeated offenses, even ones of
minor significance," can be a basis for lawyer discipline. Id.
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of "moral turpitude" as a litmus test for discipline because that standard
encompasses some offenses that are thought to lack the relevant connection to
fitness to practice, "such as adultery and comparable offenses."' 56 The comment
explains that these offenses are ones involving "personal morality.""' In context,
it appears that the "personal morality" label is relevant to the issue ofwhether or not
a particular offense ought to be disciplinable. That is, the comment can be read to
say that offenses involving personal morality are not disciplinable. 58 Ifthat is what
the comment means, it would be helpful to include some elaboration on the meaning
of "personal morality." It is not a self-evident concept.
At one level, we might observe that all moral choices made by individuals are
"personal," but that cannot be what the comment's reference to "personal morality"
means. If that were the case, the designation would insulate lawyer criminal
offenders from most, if not all, discipline based on the commission of crimes.
Nor can we understand the reference to "personal morality" to refer
simply to
offenses that are conducted in private. Some privately-conducted crimes, like
murder, would normally involve violence, and others, like willfully cheating on tax
returns, would involve dishonesty. And the comment tells us that crimes involving
violence or dishonesty are crimes that can be the basis of discipline.
Another possibility is that crimes of"personal morality" are ones that have no
victims. But there could be some disagreement as to whether the only specific
example of a non-disciplinable crime that is given, the crime of adultery, is
victimless. To be sure, where both parties to the adulterous encounter are willing
participants, it might seem rather strange to consider either of them to be a victim.
However, adultery that results from seduction might be thought to involve a victim.
And once we move beyond the immediate participants, we niight identify other
potential victims as well. For example, it is not uncommon to refer to the nonparticipating spouse as someone who is "betrayed" by a partner's extramarital
encounter. There is also a fair amount of evidence that the "innocent" spouse and
children ofthe adulterer are sometimes injured by adulterous conduct.159 We should

156. Id.
157. The ABA's position appears to be somewhat analogous to the view, expressed by some
commentators, that criminal sanctions should be imposed only when conduct causes harm to others, but
not for harmless immoralities or harm to self. See infra discussion in note 170.
158. It seems that the personal morality label is intended to give substance to the category of
offenses that ought not to be disciplinable. However, it is possible to read the language of the comment
in a way that places less stress on the label. Instead ofreading the comment to say that crimes involving
personal morality should not be disciplinable, it is possible to read the language of the comment to
indicate thatcrimes involving personal morality may ormay not be disciplinable, depending on whether
those crimes have a specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. In any event, the main point
of the comment to Rule 8.4 is to shift the focus away from traditional moral considerations to
characteristics that are thought to be relevant to the practice of law, such as violence, dishonesty, breach
of trust, or serious interference with the administration ofjustice.
159. See, e.g., Samuel S. Janus &Cynthia L Janus, The Janus Report on Sexual Behavior 392-94
(1993) (stating that the vast majority of surveyed individuals were convinced that extramarital affairs
hurt their marriage relationships; interviewed man observes that extramarital affairs can be
"devastating" for the betrayed spouse); Maggie Gallagher, TheAbolition ofMarriage: How We Destroy
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also note that there appears to be a correlation between adultery and divorce, " and
that divorce itself has been identified as contributing to problems for members of
the affected family and for society.' 6 It may be somewhat easier to identify

Lasting Love 75 (1996) (stating that parental extramarital affairs produce various symptoms of
insecurity in children and frequently lead to extreme behavior in adolescents.); Frank Pittman, Private
Lies, Infidelity and the Betrayal of Intimacy 259, 262, 268 (1989) (stating that extramarital affairs
betray the entire family; children pay heavy price for parental infidelities; catalogs various behavioral
disorders that result from parental infidelity); Jenifer Hanrahan, Ser, Lies & Adultery; What Prompts
One of Us to Put Up with Our Partner's Philandering?, Los Angeles Daily News, Oct. 13,1998, at 1,
availablein 1998 WL 3872075 (refering to survey results showing that adultery is even more stressful
than divorce); Judith S.Wallerstein & Joan Berlin Kelly, Surviving the Breakup: How Children and
Parents Cope with Divorce 21 (1980) (In some cases, revelation of infidelity creates rage, violence,
severe depression, and suicide threats.). Iam indebted to Professor Lynn D. Wardle for his unpublished
manuscript: How Children Suffer: Parental Infidelity and the "No-Harm " Custody Presumption,
which pointed me to several of the sources cited in this footnote.
160. See, e.g., Janus, supra note 159, at 194-95 (stating that extramarital affairs were reported to
be the primary cause of their divorce by 22% ofdivorced women and 11%ofdivorced men.); Nancy
Mayer, Surviving Adultery, Portland Oregonian, Aug. 19, 1998 (explaining that 65% of betrayed
marriages end in divorce); Tony Pugh, FamilyNeeds Time to Heal, Experts Say, Ft. Worth StarTelegram, Aug. 19, 1998, at I,available in 1998 WL 14920248 (noting that after "irreconcilable
differences," adultery is the most frequently cited cause in divorce cases); cf Laura Betzig, Causes of
ConjugalDissolution: A Cross-cultural Study, 30 Current Anthropology 654, 659, 661 (1989)
(studying the causes of conjugl dissolution in various societies; reports that adultery was the most
frequently-cited cause of conjugal dissolution and that adultery, more than anything else, compromises
marriage).
161. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 159, at 14,32,34 ("[The best answer social science can give
is that the collapse of marriage significantly heightens the risk that our children will end up poor,
hungry, ill, ignorant, violent,or dead. The averagechild from anonpoor family will suffer a50 percent
drop in income after divorce. The evidence is now overwhelming that the collapse of marriage is
creating awhole generation ofchildren less happy, less physically and mentally healthy, less equipped
to deal with life or to produce at work, and more dangerous to themselves and others."); Christa Japel
et al., Early Parental Separation and the Psychosocial Development ofDaughters 6-9 Years Old, 69
Am. J.Orthopsychiatry 49 (1999) (noting that girls who experienced early "parental separation" showed
significantlymore types ofdisruptive behavior.); Sara McLanahan & Gary Sandefur, Growing Up with
a Single Parent 3 (1994) ("Low income-and the sudden drop in income that often is associated with
divorce--is the most important factor in children's lower achievement in single-parent homes,
accounting forabout halfofthedisadvantage."); Glenn T. Stanton, Why Marriage Matters 127-28, 13339 (1997) (referring to studies showing physical, emotional and financial difficulties that result from
divorce); Lenore J. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social and Economic
Consequences for Women and Children in America xii, xiv (1985) ("[O]n the average, divorced women
and the minor children in their households experience a73 percent decline in their standard of living
in the first year after divorce." Divorced women and their children "have become the new poor."); cf
Paul R. Amato & Alan Booth, A Generation at Risk: Growing Up in an Era of Family Upheaval 220
(1997) ("[W]e conclude that the rise in marital disruption, although beneficial to some children, has,
in balance, been detrimental to children."); Saul D. Hoffman & Greg J. Duncan, What Are the
Economic Consequences of Divorce?, 25 Demography 641 (1988) (stating that the economic
consequences of divorce are serious, but not likely to be as severe as Weitzman reports; the more likely
reduction in economic status is 30%.); but see David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, The Impact of
Divorce on Children, 50 J.ofMarriage & the Fain. 619 (1988) (stating that empirical evidence on the
relationship between divorce and the well-being of children should be interpreted cautiously because
of deficiencies in the studies on which the evidence is based).
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potential victims of adultery than potential victims of the crime of failing to file a
tax return, which the comment clearly classifies as a disciplinable offense. Thus,
the victimless crime explanation for the personal morality label does not seem
altogether satisfactory.
Yet another approach might be to say that offenses involving personal morality
are offenses of a sexual nature. After all, the only example that is provided ofthese
offenses is adultery. The comment's language about "comparable offenses" could
quite easily be considered to include fornication, when it is a crime. But we would
not want to paint with too broad a brush in the sex crimes area. Certainly we would
not want to add rape and sexual assault to our list of offenses for which discipline
is inappropriate. 62
If we continue with the notion that the personal morality -category concerns

offenses involving sex, we might try to limit the offenses that are included in the
category by applying the comment's later qualifying language about discipline
being appropriate for offenses that involve violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, or
serious interference with the administration of justice. The qualifying language
would knock out conventional rape and sexual assault. But it might not knock out
statutory rape with a willing minor. However, there is another problem. Once we
start trying to define'offenses involving "personal morality" by subjecting them to
the comment's qualifying language about violence, dishonesty, breach oftrust, and
interference with the administration ofjustice, there is no reason not to do that with
all sexual offenses, including adultery itself. From that perspective, we might
suggest that although adultery is generally not disciplinable, it could be if the
particular circumstances ofits commission indicate lack ofcharacteristics that are
relevant to the practice oflaw. Thus, a lawyer who by misrepresentation, seduces
a client and commits adultery might be disciplined, but a lawyer who commits
adultery with a non-client neighbor might not. 63 However, once we subject all
potential offenses in the personal morality category to the later qualifying language
of the comment, we seem to lose any independent justification for the "personal

162. Professor Hazard was the chief reporter for the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. A
volume that he co-authored with W. William Hodes suggests that it would be appropriate to discipline
lawyers for some sexual offenses. Thus, in discussing an argument that the commission ofany crime
reflects on a lawyer's fitness to practice, the authors state:
But this argument does not recognize, as the criminal law does, that even among serious
crimes the degree of immorality involved may differ and so may implications about the
offender's character. Certain sexual offenses illustrate the dividing line, and indicate that
it is not merely the formal offense but the circumstances of its commission that may be
relevant. Adultery or fornication with a mature consenting adult is a crime in many
jurisdictions, and is considered to be immoral by many people. Yet such behavior by a
lawyer tells little about whether he or she can be trusted to represent clients vigorously and
without overreaching. On the other hand, if alawyer were to take sexual advantage of a
client suffering emotional upset in the course of acontested divorce, for example, it would
indicate an inability.to maintain a professional relationship.
2 Hazard & Hodes, supra note 148, at § 8.4:301.
163. Some support for thisconstruction ofthe comment can be found in adiscussion by Professors
Hazard and Hodes in their treatise, The Law ofLawyering. See discussion supra note 162.
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morality" label itself. We might as well eliminate the reference to personal morality
and rely only on the later qualifying language for the resolution of all disciplinary
matters involving crimes.
An alternative explanation for the "personal morality" classification might be
that it includes offenses that may be criminal on the books but are not really
regarded as criminal by society. Times change. Some offenses that might have
been prosecuted in the past are no longer prosecuted because of changes in culture.
To the extent that such offenses are no longer a matter of public criminal concern,
they might be said to involve concerns of only personal morality.
This last explanation for the personal morality classification relates fairly well
to the adultery example. It does not seem that many people are actually prosecuted
for adultery, even in states in which it remains a crime. Further, many people,
lawyers included, seem to commit it. Given the level of tolerance for adultery that
exists in modem American society, there would be little enthusiasm for disciplining
lawyer-adulterers. ' But it remains unclear that this is what the comment means.
ii. Dishonesty and Breach of Trust
There is another difficulty with the comment to Rule 8.4 that we should
mention. The comment tells us that crimes involving dishonesty and breach of trust
are among the types of crimes for which lawyers could be professionally
answerable-crimes, in other words, that have some connection to the practice of
law. But the comment also provides that adultery is an example of an offense that
has no specific connection to the practice of law. There is some tension here. At
least some adulterous activities could be said to involve a type of dishonesty or
breach of trust. Certainly some adulterous relationships involve deception of the
nonparticipating spouse.'65 Many married people believe that sexual fidelity is part
of the marriage contract.'" Indeed, the Louisiana Civil Code expressly provides
that "[m]arried persons owe each other fidelity."'" 7 And the married relationship

164. This state of affairs might change. If, at some future time, adultery were to be regarded as
a significant societal problem that needed to be seriously addressed by criminal law enforcement
authorities, then the offense would no longer be merely one of"personal morality," under the standard
articulated here.
165. See Janus, supra note 160, at 197. The authors state that open marriage, which involves
extramarital sexual encounters undertaken with the acquiescence and knowledge ofone's spouse, has
never been as prevalent as nonconsensual, clandestine, extramarital activities. Id. at 197-98. They also
report survey results indicating that the vast majority of married individuals are convinced that
extramarital affairs negatively affect the marriage relationship. Id. at 392-393. See also,e.g., Doe v.
Doe, 712 A.2d 132 (Md. App. 1998) (holding that the husband's allegations that wife had had an
adulterous affair, that two children had resulted from the affair, and that she had concealed the paternity
of the children from him for three years, stated a claim for intentional infliction of severe emotional
distress.).
166. See Weitzman, supra note 161, at 24.
167. La. Civ. Code art. 98. The entire article states: "Married persons owe each other fidelity,
support, and assistance." The comments to the 1987 revision of this article state: "As used in this
Article, the term 'fidelity' refers not only to the spouses' duty to refrain from adultery, but also to their
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is occasionally characterized as one of trust. 6"
iii. Language

None of this is to suggest that it is high time to begin vigorous professional
discipline oflawyers who commit adultery. What it does suggest, however, is that
there are some problems with the language ofthe comment to Model Rule 8.4.
Maybe the problems could be alleviated by tinkering with the language. For
example, if we consider the original comment's reference to personal morality to
mean that we should not discipline lawyers for criminal offenses that are not
thought to be within the practical purview ofthe criminal law, we might revise the
"moral turpitude" paragraph to say:
Many kinds ofillegal conduct reflect adversely on fitness to practice law,
such as offenses involving fraud and the offense of willful failure to file
an income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses carry no such
implication. Traditionally, the distinction was drawn in terms ofoffenses
involving "moral turpitude." That concept may be useful in insulating
lawyers from discipline for trivial administrative infractions, such as
instances of inadvertent overparking, that do not seriously call into
question an individual's fitness to practice law. However, the concept can
be construed to include offenses that some statutes may continue to define
as criminal, but are no longer regarded by prosecutors and society as
prosecutable criminal offenses. Adultery between consenting adults could
be an example of such an offense. Although a lawyer is personally
answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally
answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics
relevant to the practice of law. Serious offenses involving violence,
dishonesty, breach of trust, and interference with the administration of
justice are clearly in that category. Lesser offenses could be in that
category as well, especially when there is a pattern of repeated
commission. But subpart (b) of the rule should not apply to isolated,
trivial, administrative infractions or to offenses that are no longer regarded
by prosecutors and society as prosecutable criminal offenses.
This formulation is not free fromproblems either. The qualifiers "serious" and
"prosecutable" are rather vague. But they have the advantage of placing the
mutual obligation to submit to each other's reasonable and normal sexual desires." La. Civ. Code art.

98 cmt.(b).
168. See, e.g., Eubanks v. Eubanks, 159 S.E.2d 562, 587 (N.C. 1968) ("Relationship between
husband and wife is the most confidential ofall relationships."); Smith v. Smith 438 S.E.2d 457,459
(N.C. App. 1994) ("Relationship between married persons demands the highest level ofintegrity," but
is not subject to "the strict duties ofa business partnership."); Cal. Fam. Code § 1100(e) (West 2000)
(describing family finances in a marital relationship as a fiduciary relationship); but cf Toups v. Toups,
702 So. 2d 822, 824 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1997) ("Under current scheme ofequal management, the spouses
are not fiduciaries in the management of community property.").
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disciplinary focus where it probably ought to be, at least where criminal offenses
are concerned. This version ofthe comment at least tends to diminish the problem,
referred to above, that adultery could be considered to be an offense that involves
dishonesty or breach oftrust. It may frequently involve such things, but if adultery
is not considered tobe a prosecutable criminal offense, adultery would not properly
be the basis of discipline. The word "clearly" in the sentence about "offenses
involving violence, dishonesty, breach of trust, and interference with the
administration of justice" indicates that the characteristics mentioned there are
merely illustrative rather than exclusive. That may be helpful to indicate, because
iAis true. No one would seriously argue that a lawyer who quietly uses poison to
murder someone should not be disciplined because the victimdied peacefully in his
or her sleep.' 6 9
Perhaps the most salient point to make in this context is that it is rather difficult
to come up with a totally satisfactory rule for disciplining lawyers who engage in
criminal offenses. This discussion has identified some difficulties with the
formulation set forth in the comment to Model Rule 8.4. It has not even begun to
address the difficult and controversial matter ofidentifying the characteristics and
conduct that render a lawyer unfit to practice.'2 0 Given the relative difficulty of the
task, it is not surprising that the ABA elected to draft a comment that is rather
vague.171

169. This assumes that it is possible to have a nonviolent murder. Itwould not be unreasonable
to think of murder as a violent crime, no matter how it is committed.
170. The analogous issue in the criminal law arena is identifying the types of conduct that ought
to be criminalized. Some observers have claimed that the criminal laws are being used inproerly to
regulate offenses involving "morally neutral" conduct, and that such overcriminalization dilutes the
value ofcriminal sanctions. See. e.g., Paul S. Robinson, MoralCredibilityand Crime,At. Monthly,
Mar. 1995, at 72,77; Paul H. Robinson &John M. Darley, Justice, Liability and Blame: Community
Views and the Criminal Law 201-02 (1995). There has been disagreement among commentators over
whether criminal sanctions are justified for immoral conduct that causes no harm, or only harms
oneself. Cf., e.g., Patrick Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals 7,13,23-25 (1965) (stating that immoral
conductjustifies criminal sanctions); Joel Feinberg, Harm to Others 11-13, 31-36 (1984) (sanctions are
appropriate to prevent harm to others). My colleague Stuart P. Green has argued that the moral content
of regulatory offenses is more complex than has been acknowledged. He has suggested that, in order
to preserve the moral integrity ofthe criminal law, legislatures should stop enacting statutes that allow
the same conduct to be dealt with criminally or civilly without indicating which sanction is preferred,
and prosecutors should follow principled guidelines for choosing one remedy over another. See Stuart
P. Green, Why It's a Crime to Tear the Tag Off a Mattress: Overcriminalizationand the Moral
Content ofRegulatory Offenses, 46 Emory L.J. 1533, 1535 (1997). l am indebted to Professor Green
for his thoughts on this subject, and for directing me to the sources mentioned in this footnote.
171. Professor Hazard,in a letter to the author, recalled some of the Kutak Commission's thinking
about this rule and its comment. He observed that "the Kutak Commission felt it appropriate to
eliminate 'moral turpitude' but also to keep a relatively open-ended residual provision on the subject;
that we anticipated them would be regional differences in interpreting and applying the concept; and
that we anticipated there would be change over time in interpreting and applying the concept." Letter
from Geoffrey C.Hazard, Jr., Trustee Professor of Law, University ofPennsylvania, to the author (Mar.
17, 2000) (copy on file with author).
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iv. UncomfortableFit
Louisiana avoided some of the difficulties referred to above by the simple
expedient ofnot adopting the comments to the Model Rules. But Louisiana has also
adopted a version of Rule 8.4 that is conceptually different from its ABA
counterpart. As we have seen, the corament to Model Rule 8.4 strives to distinguish
criminal offenses that could be the basis of discipline from those that should not.
This is consistent with the language ofModel Rule 8.4(b) itself, which qualifies the
types of offenses for which discipline may be imposed. Thus, the ABA rule
is professional misconduct for a lawyer to commit a criminal act
provides that "[i]t
that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer
in other respects."'" 2 In contrast, the text of Louisiana Rule 8.4(b) provides that
"[i]t is professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . [c]ommit a criminal act,

especially one that reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects."'" The Louisiana rule was changed to
permit discipline for the commission of any criminal act. In this respect, the
quoted language from the ABA comment would not fit comfortably into
Louisiana's version of the rules. The fit would be bad for another reason as well.
As we have seen, the ABA's comment identifies adultery as a criminal offense that
should not be disciplinable. As it turns out, adultery is not a criminal offense in
Louisiana.
Louisiana's version of the, rule does open the door to a potential
problem. Because lawyers could, in theory, be subject to discipline for the
commission of any criminal offense, the Louisiana version of the rule would seem
to permit lawyer discipline based upon fairly trivial conduct. However, the
Louisiana rule recognizes that all criminal offenses are not equal. Because
disciplinary resources are not infinite, it is not likely, as a practical matter, that the
disciplinary counsel would devote many resources to lawyer discipline for trivial
criminal infractions.
If Louisiana was seriously to consider the adoption of comments to its own
version ofthe rules, the text ofLouisiana Rule 8.4(b) would invite consideration of
the factors that make some criminal offenses better targets for professional
discipline than others. That invitation could well extend to some of the same
matters that are discussed in the ABA's comment to Model Rule 8.4. Of course a
Louisiana-centered comment to Rule 8.4 would not need to mention adultery as a
nondisciplinable offense because the Louisiana Criminal Code does not criminalize
that conduct. And Louisiana would probably do well to avoid incorporating the
troublesome concept of"personal morality" that is featured in the ABA's comment
to the rule.

172.
173.

See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(c) (1983).
See Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(b) (1986).
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3. DetrimentsofOmission
The foregoing section of the article identified some benefits associated with
Louisiana's non-adoption of the omitted materials. This section looks at some
detriments.
a. Inaccessibility
The most obvious detriment is a practical one. Even though Louisiana courts
have indicated that there are some valuable things in the omitted materials, and that
at least some parts of the omitted materials can be helpful in interpreting and
applying the rules, those benefits are not readily available to Louisiana lawyers.
Because the omitted materials are, in fact, omitted from Louisiana's version of the
Rules of Professional Conduct, Louisiana practitioners do not have ready
access to them. The omitted materials are not found in the Louisiana Rules
ofCourt volume, in the various volumes of West's Louisiana Statutes Annotated,
orin other Louisiana-tethered books that include the Rules ofProfessional Conduct.
Of course, there are books and on-line databases that include the ABA version of
the rules, but not all Louisiana lawyers may have immediate access to these
resources. A lawyer who needs to make a quick decision about an ethics problem
may not be able to take advantage of the help that the omitted materials could
provide.
There are other access barriers as well. First, it is likely that many Louisiana
lawyers do not know that the ABA Model Rules contain comments and prefatory
materials. Those who are unaware might not think to look at the ABA's model.
Second, even if a Louisiana lawyer happens to know that the form of the Model
Rules is different from the form of the Louisiana Rules, he or she may well be
unaware ofstatements in Louisiana Supreme Court decisions that point to the value
ofthe omitted materials. The lawyer may see little reason to consult them. Finally,
even a Louisiana lawyer who knows about the ABA Model Rules, and knows that
Louisiana courts have occasionally referred to parts of the omitted materials with
approval, will not be sure whether particular statements in the omitted materials
would meet with the approval of Louisiana disciplinary authorities. The lawyer
would probably be unwilling, at least, to bet his or her professional license on some
statement in the omitted materials.
b. Lost Value
Formal adoption of the omitted materials would not only have facilitated their
accessibility, itwould also have given them an authoritative status. Adoption would
have sent a message to Louisiana lawyers and to Louisiana disciplinary authorities
that it would be worthwhile to consider what the omitted materials say, that they had
value, and that they could be relied on.
Some ofthe value of the omitted materials arises from explanations that could
help lawyers make professionally responsible decisions. Some of the omitted
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materials reflect principles oflawyering that are higher than the minimnum standards
of conduct-principles that might encourage lawyers to be better than they are.
Some omitted materials actually contain helpful substantive rules, and some parts
of the omitted materials teach useful lessons about the nature of legal ethics. There
is value in the omitted materials. Unfortunately much of that value remains
unrealized in Louisiana.""
i. Valuable Explanations
Many of the comments to the Model Rules contain excellent explanations of
concepts that are sometimes difficult to grasp. Ifthe comments were to be approved
by the Louisiana Supreme Court, and ifthey were to be made more readily available
to Louisiana lawyers, Louisiana lawyers might become better informed about their
professional responsibilities. What follows is an illustrative, rather than an
exhaustive, collection of references to comments that could be of assistance to
practitioners.
(1) Comment to Rule 1.6

Lawyers, and even judges, are sometimes confused about the difference.
between the attorney-client privilege and the duty of confidentiality. A brief, but
good, discussion of the difference between these two concepts is found in the ABA
comment to Model Rule 1.6:
The principle of confidentiality is given effect in two related bodies
of law, the attorney-client privilege (which includes the work product

doctrine) in the law of evidence and the rule of confidentiality
established in professional ethics. The attorney-client privilege applies

in judicial and other proceedings in which a lawyer maybe called as
a witness or otherwise required to produce evidence concerning a
client. The rule of client-lawyer confidentiality applies in situations

other than those where evidence is sought from the lawyer through
compulsion of law. The confidentiality rule applies not merely to
matters communicated in confidence by the client but also to all

information relating to the representation, whatever its source. A lawyer
or required by
may not disclose such information except as authorized
75
the Rules of Professional Conduct or other law.'

174. Some value has been realized as a result of court decisions that refer to parts of the omitted
materials to clarify the meaning or application ofblack-letter rules, but this value is rather limited. The
few decisions that have made these references have cited only a few portions of the omitted materials.
Besides, as we will see, the omitted materials do more than assist with rule interpretation and
application.
175. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. (1983).
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Thus, the attorney-client privilege is the source of an evidentiary shield in
legal proceedings, while the duty of confidentiality -generally requires the
lawyer to keep his or her lip buttoned about client matters. The duty has a much
broader scope than the privilege. It also has a different orientation. While one
might reasonably take issue with the statement about the work product doctrine
being included within the attorney-client privilege,' the comment is, otherwise,
helpful in explaining the essential difference between the nature of the attorneyclient privilege and the duty of confidentiality. That is a useful thing for a lawyer
to know.
(2) Comment to Rule 1.8
Model Rule 1.8(a) states the basic prohibition against lawyers entering into
business transactions with their clients. Lawyers cannot do this unless: (1) the
transaction and its erms are fair and reasonable to the lient and are communicated
to the client in an understandable writing, (2) the client is given reasonable
opportunity to obtain independent legal advice, and (3) the client consents to the
transaction in writing. This is an important rule. It also seems to be quite
expansive. How far does it go? Would it prohibit a lawyer from purchasing a
'product or service from a client who is engaged in the business of providing such
products or services? It would be rather silly to require a lawyer to jump through
the various hoops in Rule 1.8(a) in order to purchase artichokes from a client who
is a grocer and silly as well to require a lawyer to satisfy Rule 1.8(a) when the
lawyer desires to purchase an automobile from a car dealership that the lawyer
represents. Fortunately, the comment to Model Rule 1.8 offers a useful
clarification:
Paragraph (a) does not, however, apply to standard commercial
transactions between the lawyer and the client for products or services that
the client generally markets to others, for example, banking or brokerage
services, medical services, products manufactured or distributed by the
client, and utilities services. In such transactions, the lawyer has no
advantage in dealing with the client, and the restrictions in paragraph (a)
are unnecessary and impracticable.'
The clarification helps avoid silly applications of the basic rule. It is too bad that
Louisiana lawyers do not have ready access to it.

176. Both ar evidentiary privileges, but they are rather different. Ingeneral, the attorney-client
privilege arises when a client and an attorney engage in a confidential communication for the purpose
offacilitating the giving or receiving of legal advice. Ingeneral, the work product doctrine arises when
an attorney prepares a document in anticipation of litigation.
177. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8 cmt. (1983).
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(3) Comment to Rule 3.3

Rule 3.3 deals with the lawyer's duty of candor to the tribunal. Among other
things, the rule is concerned with client perjury-one ofthe most difficult ethical
problems a lawyer can face. The comment offers some useful information to a
criminal defense lawyer who becomes aware that his or her client has lied on the
witness stand. For example, the comment explains that three different
"resolutions" ofthe perjury problem have been proposed, and it explains why the
Model Rules favor a resolution that, ultimately, may require the attorney to disclose
the perjury to the court. But the comment also warns the attorney not to be too
precipitate about disclosure. First, the comment indicates that the lawyer should
first attempt remedial measures that do not involve disclosure""8 because disclosure
would harm the interests of the client. If other remedial measures succeed,
disclosure need not be made. Second, the comment indicates that the lawyer's
ethical duty "may be qualified by constitutional provisions for due process and the
right to counsel in criminal cases."'7 9 This is certainly worth pointing out. A
criminal defense lawyer who discloses client perjury to a judge who is trying the
case without a jury might be found to have provided ineffective assistance of
counsel. '
The Model Rules' approach to client perjury is not without its critics,'"' and it

does not answer all the questions that might be asked about perjury. '
Nevertheless, the Louisiana version of Rule 3.3 is very similar to Model Rule 3.3,
help to a Louisiana lawyer who is
and the comments to the ABA Rule could be 8of
3
faced with a difficult client perjury problem.1
(4) Comment to Rule 8.1
A fourth illustrative example is found in the comment to Rule 8.1-a
rule about statements that are made in connection with bar admission applications
and disciplinary matters. The rule prohibits false statements of material fact,

nondisclosure of facts necessary to correct known mis-apprehensions, and

178.

See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3 cmt. (1983). The comment mentions

remonstrating with the client and seeking to withdraw. Id.
179. Id.
180. See Lowery v. Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1978).
.181. See, e.g., Freedman,supranote 50, at 129.32,141.
182. For example, it is not clear whether the lawyer's remedial duties are engaged when the
perjurious testimony is elicited by another advocate in the same proceeding. See Charles A. Wolfram,
Modem Legal Ethics § 12.5.3 (1986). Neither is it totally clear what the expression "conclusion of the
proceeding" means, with respect to the duration of the lawyer's remedial obligation. See I Hazard &
Hodes, supranote 148, at § 3.3:301 (arguing "that the 'proceeding' should be considered still open
while it is on appeal or still appealable"). And, there are some important constitutional law issues
relating to client peijury that are not easy to resolve. See Freedman, supranote 50, at 130-41.
183. Not all of the comment to Model Rule 3.3 could be adopted in Louisiana. See discussion of
Model Rule 3.3 supraPart HII(B).
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knowing failure to respond to lawful demands for information. The only stated
exception to the rule is that the rule "does not require disclosure of information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6"--the confidentiality rule.'"
But the comment to the rule identifies another exception, of sorts. It states:
'ThisRule is subject to the provisions ofthe Fifth Amendment ofthe United States
Constitution."'8 5 The comment may not be necessary. Lawyers should appreciate
the fact that if there is a conflict between the provisions of an ethics rule and the
provisions of the Constitution, the provisions of the ethics rule ought to yield.
Nevertheless, reminders of this hierarchy are a good idea. Here, the comment alerts
lawyers to the possibility that Fifth Amendment issues might come up in connection
with requests for information that are subject to this rule, and it reminds lawyers to
preserve relevant constitutional rights.
ii. ProfessionalIdeals
In recent years, the Louisiana Supreme Court has been interested in
encouraging professionalism among Louisiana lawyers, especially to the extent that
"professionalism" incorporates the idea ofcivility. In May 1997, the court issued
a rule for mandatory continuing legal education that requires Louisiana lawyers to
include at least one hour of professionalism in their annual continuing legal
education instruction. 86 The CLE rule encourages instruction in such matters as the
duty of lawyers to the courts, the public, clients, and other attorneys. It also
encourages instruction in lawyer pro bono obligations. In August 1997, the
supreme court adopted a voluntary "Code of Professionalism in the Courts," and
directed that it be published as Section 11 of the Louisiana Supreme Court
Administrative Rules.1 7 The court's order states that "civility and professionalism

among judges and lawyers should be the bedrock upon which fair and impartial
judicial proceedings are built."'88 In a preamble to the new code, the court
identified professionalism and civility as "hallmarks of a learned profession
dedicated to public service." 8 9 And the code itselfsets forth a number of standards
of behavior to which judges and lawyers are encouraged to aspire."

184.

See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.1(b) (1983).

185.

See id. Rule 8.1 cmt.

186.

See Rules ofSupreme Court of Louisiana, Rule XXX, Rules for Continuing Legal Education,

Rule 3, in 8 La. R.S. (1991 and 2000 Supp.).
187. See Order of Aug. 5, 1997.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. For example, the "duties" for lawyers include the following:
We will speak and write civilly and respectfully in all communications with the court ....
We will not engage in any conduct that brings disorder or disruption to the courtroom ....
We will act and speak civilly to court marshals, clerks, court reporters, secretaries, and law

clerks with an awareness that they too, are an integral part of the judicial system.
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Similar themes ofprofessionalism and/or civility could have been articulated
by the Louisiana Supreme Court more than ten years earlier, if it had adopted the
Preamble to the Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct. Many of the statements in
that Preamble, which, of course, is a preamble to an "ethics" code, are statements
that the Louisiana Supreme Court might today characterize as statements about
"professionalism."
Among other things, the Preamble provides that:
A lawyer is a representative of clients, an officer ofthe legal system and
a public citizen having special responsibility for the quality ofjustice....
A lawyer should use the law's procedures only for legitimate purposes and
not to harass or intimidate others. A lawyer should demonstrate respect
for the legal system and for those who serve it, including judges, other
lawyers and public officials. . . . A lawyer should be mindful of
deficiencies in the administration ofjustice and of the fact that the poor,
and sometimes persons who are not poor, cannot afford adequate legal
assistance, and should therefore devote professional time and civic
influence in their behalf.... A lawyer should strive to attain the highest
level ofskill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to exemplify
the legal profession's ideals of public service.
There are other parts ofthe omitted materials that express similar ideas. For
example, the comment to Model Rule 3.5, about conduct in litigation, sounds a
civility theme:
Refraining from abusive or obstreperous conduct is a corollary of the
advocate's right to speak on behalf of litigants. A lawyer may stand firm
against abuse by a judge but should avoid reciprocation; the judge's
default is no justification for similar dereliction by an advocate. An
advocate can present the cause, protect the record for subsequent review
and preserve professional integrity by patient firmness no less effectively
than by belligerence or theatrics. 9
These words express sound professional ideals. It would be surprising if any
member of the Louisiana Supreme Court would disagree with any of them. But
none of these statements made it into the version of the Rules of Professional
Conduct that was adopted by the court in 1986. If "professionalism" codes have
any value at all, and the supreme court must believe that they do, then some ofthat
value could have been realized years ago with the incorporation of the omitted
materials into Louisiana's version ofthe Rules of Professional Conduct."9

191. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.5 cmt. (1983).
192. It is worth noting here, however, that there would be something of a language barrier to
overcome ifthe Louisiana Supreme Court were to consider adoption ofthese statements on professional
ideals from the Model Rules. The barrier was created by the supreme court's 1997 order that required
lawyers to take an hour ofprofessionalism coursework as part of their annual CLE obligations.
The 1997 order drew a sharp distinction between legal ethics and professionalism. The order stated
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iii. "Hidden"Rules
Some ofthe omitted materials, especially some ofthe comments, do more than
explain the rules or offer examples of rule application. Some of them actually
contain substantive rules. This is not what one would expect to find, based on the
structure of the Model Rules. The Scope section of the Model Rules explains that
"[t]he comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each Rule
is authoritative.""' Nevertheless, many substantive elements are found in the

omitted materials anyway. Maybe these "hidden" rules are not as "authoritative"
as the black-letter rules themselves, butthey certainly amount to more than "guides
to interpretation.".'9 The hidden rules probably should have been moved into the
black-letter text from the beginning.
(1) When the Lawyer's Duty of ConfidentialityArises
The text of Model Rule 1.6-the confidentiality rule-does not expressly state
when the duty ofconfidentiality arises.' 9 However, since the rule's confidentiality

that legal ethics "sets forth the standard ofprofessional conduct and responsibilityrequired of a lawyer."
This includes courses in legal malpractice. In contrast, "professionalism" was said to entail "what is
more broadly expected ofattorneys. It includes courses on the duties ofattorneys to thejudicial system,
courts, public, clients, and other attorneys; attorney competency; and pro bono obligations." If legal
ethics and professionalism are distinct things, and legal ethics does not include professionalism, there
would seem to be aproblem with acode ofethics that incorporates professionalism ideals. Unless the
court were willing to rethink the 'legal ethics versus professionalism" dichotomy (and it should), it
would not be very tidy for the supreme court to modify the Rules ofProfessional Conduct, which are
generally thought to be "ethics" rules, to incorporate standards from the realm ofprofessionalism.
193. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope (1983).
194. It may well be, as the Scope says, that the text of the rules is authoritative, but when there is
aconment that serves up a substantive rule that is not inconsistent with the text ofa black-letter rule,
it makes sense to regard the comment as having some authoritative impact.
195. Mode Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.8:
Rule 1.8 Conflict of Interest: Prohibited Transactions
As a general principle, all transactions between client and lawyer should be fair and
reasonable to the client. Furthermore, a lawyer may not exploithis representation ofa client
or information relating to the representation to the client's disadvantage. Examples of
violations include, but are not limited to, the following:
(a) A lawyer shallnot enter into abusiness transaction with a client orknowingly acquire
an ownership, possessory, security or other pecuniary interest adverse to aclient unless:
(1) The transaction and terms on which the lawyer acquires the interest are fair and
reasonable to the client and are fully disclosed and trafismitted in writing to the client
in a manner which can be reasonably understood by the client;
(2) The client is given a reasonable opportunity to seek the advice of independent
counsel in the transaction; and
(3) The client consents in writing thereto.
(b) A lawyer shall not use information relating to representation of a client to the
disadvantage of the client unless the client consents after consultation.
(c) A lawyer shall notprepare an instrument giving the lawyer or a person related to the
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obligation applies to "information relating to representation of a client," it
might reasonably be supposed that the duty of confidentiality does not apply
until an attorney-client relationship has been formed. It might be thought,
then, that an attorney owes no duty of confidentiality to a person whom the
attorney declines to represent. However, that would be a bad result being harmful
to the prospective client who provides the attorney with sensitive information in an
initial meeting. At the very least, it would be unseemly for the attorney to be able
to turn around and use that information, on behalf ofanother client, against the very
person who initially provided it to the attorney in hopes ofestablishing an attorney-

client relationship.

lawyer as parent, child, sibling, or spouse any substantial gift from a client, including a
testamentary gift, except where the client is related to the donee.
(d) Prior to the conclusion of representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or
negotiate an agreement giving the lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account
based in substantial part or information relating to the representation.
(e) A lawyer shall not provide financial assistance to a client in connection with pending
or contemplated litigation, except that:
(1) A lawyer may advance court costs and expenses of litigation, the repayment of
which may be contingent on the outcome of the matter; and
(2) A lawyer representing an indigent client may pay court costs and expenses of
litigation on behalf ofthe client.
(f) A lawyer shall not accept compensation for representing a client from one other than
the client unless:
(I) The client consents after consultation, or the compensation, is provided by
contract with a third persons such as an insurance contract or a prepaid legal service
plan.
(2) There is no interference with the lawyer's independent or professional judgment
or with the client-lawyer relationship; and
(3) Information relating to represeitation of a client is protected as required by Rule
1.6.
(g) A lawyer who represents two or more clients shall not participate in making an
aggregate settlement of the claims of or against the clients, or in a criminal case an
aggregated agreement as to guilty or nolo contendere pleas, unless each client consents after
consultation, including disclosure of the existence and nature of all the claims or pleas
involved and of the participation of each person in the settlement.
(h) A lawyer shall not make an agreement prospectively limiting the lawyer's liability
to a client for malpractice unless permitted by law and the client is independently
represented in making the agreement, or settle a claim for such liability with an
unrepresented client or former client without first advising that person in writing that
independent representation is appropriate in connection therewith.
(i) A lawyer related to another lawyer as parent, child, sibling or spouse shall not
represent a client in a representation directly adverse to a person who the lawyer knows is
represented by the other lawyer except upon consent by the client after consultation
regarding the relationship.
(0) A lawyer shall not acquire a proprietary interest in the cause of action or subject
matter oflitigation the lawyer is conducting for the client, except that the lawyer may:
(1) Acquire a lien granted by law to secure the lawyer's fee or expenses; and
(2) Contract with a client for a reasonable contingent fee in a civil case.
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Something in the Scope section ofthe Model Rules helps. It explains that:
Most of the duties flowing from the client-lawyer relationship attach only
after the client has requested the lawyer to render legal services and the
lawyer has agreed to do so. But there are some duties, such as that of
confidentiality under rule 1.6, that may attach when the lawyer agrees to
consider whether a client-lawyer relationship shall be established.
Whether a client-lawyer relationship exists for any specific purpose can
depend on the circumstances and may be a question of fact."9
This is, of course, the right rule, and it would be good for lawyers to know about it.
A lawyer who does not may fail to maintain the confidentiality of information
obtained from an individual who sought, but did not secure, representation. An
uninformed lawyer may also stumble into a conflict of interest by taking on
representation that is directly adverse to a person who engaged in an initial
communication with the lawyer. Sophisticated lawyers are aware that prospective
9
client "beauty contests" carry the risk of serious conflicts of interest. A lesssophisticated lawyer who does not have easy access to the Scope section of the
Model Rules may have to learn about the problem the hard way.
(2) A Self-Defense Exception to the Duty of Confidentiality
Rule 1.6 imposes a duty on lawyers to maintain the confidentiality of
"information relating to representation of a client." 9 ' An explanatory comment
says that the "rule applies not merely to matters communicated in confidence by the
client but also to all information relating to the representation, whatever its
source."'" There are several exceptions to the duty ofconfidentiality stated in the
text ofRule 1.6, but there are other exceptions that are not. One ofthese exceptions
relates to the matter oflawyer self-defense, and it is articulated in a comment to the
rule.
Rule 1.6 itself permits the lawyer to use otherwise confidential information:
to establish a claim or defense on behalf of the lawyer in a controversy
between the lawyer and the client, to establish a defense to a criminal
charge or civil claim against the lawyer based upon conduct in which the
client was involved, or to respond to allegations in any proceeding
concerning the lawyer's representation of the client."°°
Rule 1.6 is not particularly generous with exceptions to the duty ofconfidentiality,
but this part of the rule offers some that are quite helpful to lawyers. The

196. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope (1983).
197. See Thomas D. Morgan & Ronald D. Rotunda, Problems and Materials on Professional
Responsibility 192 (6th ed. 1995).
198. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(a) (1983).
199. See id. Rule 1.6 cmt.
200. See id. Rule 1.6(bX2).
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comment to Model Rule 1.6 offers even more help, at least when the lawyer
becomes innocently involved in the client's bad conduct. The relevant situation
could arise when a third party makes an assertion that the lawyer has
participated in the client's evil scheme. Must the lawyer await the filing ofcriminal
charges or a civil action before disclosure is permitted? The comment answers no:
The lawyer's right to respond arises when an assertion of such complicity
has been made. Paragraph (b)(2) does not require the lawyer to await the
commencement ofan action or proceeding that charges such complicity,
so that the defense may be established by responding directly to a third
party who has made such an assertion.2 '
The text of the rule indicates that the confidentiality exception kicks in when the
lawyer is faced with a criminal charge or a civil claim, but the comment engages the
exception at an earlier time. That potential engagement is worth noting, because it
might help the lawyer avoid discipline or monetary liability.
(3) Another Exception to the Duty of Confidentiality: Court
OrderedDisclosure
The Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility included an express exception
to the duty of confidentiality for disclosures that were "required by law or court
order."20 2 A comparable provision had been recommended for inclusion in the text
of Model Rule 1.6, but it was rejected by the ABA's House of Delegates. 0 3 This
was a strange result. Alawyer who ultimately loses on an attorney-client privilege
claim, and who is ordered by a court to testify about his or her client's affairs,
would be under legal compulsion to testify, but the text of Model Rule 1.6 would
not permit the testimony.
In discussing the problem, Professors Hazard and Hodes have said:
[I]t is inconceivable that a legal system which has just ordered a
lawyer to testify-after the expenditure of considerable judicial
resources-would suddenly contradict itself and require instead that he
refuse. The court order creates a "forced" exception to confidentiality,
regardless ofwhat the text ofthe rule provides.... The short ofthe matter
is that every case in which a lawyer is "required by law" to disclose

201. See idRule 1.6 cmt.
202. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 4-101(cX2) (1983).
203. See I Hazard& Hodes, supra note 148, at § 1.6:112. The key amendment, which also
eliminated other confidentiality exceptions, was sponsored by the American College ofTrial Lawyers.
See The Legislative History of the Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct: Their Development in the
ABA House of Delegates 48-50 (1987). Supporters of the amendment argued that the Kutak
Commission's proposal transformed the lawyer into a "policeman" for the client, and that narrowing
the exceptions to the duty of confidentiality would encourage better communications between lawyer
and client. See id.
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is also a case in which he cannotbe prohibited from doing
information
20 4
SO.

The ABA's House of Delegates should have included an express exception to
confidentiality in the text of Model Rule 1.6 for court-ordered disclosures. It did
not do that. But it did include exception language in the comment to the rule. The
comment states in part:
If a lawyer is called as a witness to give testimony concerning a client,
absent waiver by the client, Rule 1.6(a) requires the lawyer to invoke the
privilege when it is applicable. The lawyer must comply with the final
orders of a court or other tribunal of competent jurisdiction requiring the
lawyer to give information about the client.'S
This is a substantive rule, one that provides some useful guidance to a lawyer who
might be struggling with confidentiality and attorney-client privilege issues.
Unfortunately, Louisiana's omission of the comments to the Model Rules resulted
in the omission of the rule itself.
(4) Yet Another Exception to the Duty of Confidentiality:
Noisy Withdrawal
There is another exception to the confidentiality obligation that is set forth in
the comment to Rule 1.6. It permits a withdrawing lawyer to signal that his or her
client has been involved in criminal or fraudulent conduct. The comment to the
Rule provides in pertinent part:
If the lawyer's services will be used by the client in materially
furthering a course of criminal or fraudulent conduct, the lawyer must
withdraw, as stated in Rule 1.16(a)(1).
After withdrawal the lawyer is required to refrain from making
disclosure of the clients' confidences, except as otherwise provided in
Rule 1.6. Neither this rule nor Rule 1.8(b) nor Rule 1.16(d) prevents the
lawyer from giving notice of the fact of withdrawal, and the lawyer may
also withdraw or disaffirm any opinion, document, affirmation, or the
like.2° '
The comment permits a lawyer who withdraws from representation to disassociate
himself or herself from client fraud by signaling to third parties that something is

204. See I Hazard & Hodes, supra note 148. The new Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers does not suffer from this problem. It has aprovision permitting the lawyer to disclose what
itcalls "confidential client information" when such disclosure is "required by law, after the lawyer takes
reasonably appropriate steps to assert that the information is privileged or otherwise protected against
disclosure." See I Restatement ofthe Law Goveming Lawyers §63 (2000).
205. See Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.6 cmt. (1983).

206. Id.
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20°
wrong.2 "7 It permits a "noisy withdrawal."
The comment about noisy withdrawal represents a kind of political
compromise. The original Kutak Commission draft of Rule 1.6 included a
subsection that permitted lawyers to reveal client information "to rectify the
consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the furtherance ofwhich the
lawyer's services had been used."' 9 But the proposal generated considerable
controversy, 20 and the ABA House of Delegates rejected it at the February 1983
midyear meeting. 2 ' At the same time, the House of Delegates approved an
2t 2
exception to confidentiality that would permit a lawyer to collect an unpaid fee.
These developments were much criticized.2 3 Thereafter a proposal was generated
to amend the comment to Rule 1.6 to allow the lawyer to give notice of his or her
withdrawal.2t4 Members of the Kutak Commission who had opposed the actions in
the February meeting accepted this proposal as a compromise. t Commission
members had originally thought that a noisy notice of withdrawal would constitute
a breach ofclient confidences, and needed to be recognized as an express exception
2t 6
to confidentiality, but that was apparently not the view ofthe House ofDelegates.

207. See I Hazard & Hodes, supra note 148, at § 1.6:312 n.l; Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr.,
Rectificationof ClientFraud:Death and Revival ofa ProfessionalNorm, 33 Emory L.J. 271 (1984).

208. Rule 1.6 itself is not about withdrawal from representation, as such. That iscovered by Rule
1.16. But withdrawal is important to the application of the comment to Rule 1.6.
209. The Kutak Commission draft said, in pertinent part:
(b) A lawyer may reveal [confidential] information to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary:
(1) to prevent the client from committing a criminal or fraudulent act that the lawyer
reasonably believes is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or in substantial
injury to the financial interests or property of another;
(2) to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act in the furtherance of
which the lawyer's services had been used....
1982 Draft of Model Rule 1.6, reprintedin Gillers &Simon, supranote 82, at 73.
210. The Commission apparently considered theproposed language to bea fair statement of thenexisting law, see Gcoffrey C.Hazard, Jr., ct al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 297 (2d ed. 1994),
but critics attacked it as calling for radical change. See, e.g., Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyer-Client
Confidences: The Model Rules" RadicalAssault on Tradition,68 A.B.A.J. 428, 432 (1982) ("The

model rules' provisions on client confidences are radical, poorly drafted, misleading, inconsistent, and
unconstitutional."). Critics contended that the proposed Rule would undermine confidentiality, make
clients less candid with their lawyers, and impair client compliance with law. See Hazard, supra,at
298. They also argued that the proposed Rule would open the door to expanded civil liability against
lawyers who decided not to disclose client information. See id.
211. See Ronald D. Rotunda, The Noticeof Withdrawalandthe New ModelRules ofProfessional
Conduct: Blowing the Whistle and Waving the Red Flag,63 Or. L Rev. 455, 471 (1984).

212. Seeid. The language of this provision permitted the lawyer to reveal client information "to
establish a claim or defense on behalf ofthe lawyer in a controversy between the lawyer and the client,
or to establish a defense to a criminal charge, civil claim or disciplinary complaint against the lawyer
based upon conduct in which the client was involved." Id.
213. See id.at 474 ("Public outcry greeted the February 1983 actions.").
214. See id.at 478-79.
215. Seeid.at481.
216. Seeid. At least some proponents of amended rule 1.6 "took the position that waving a red
flag at the time ofwithdrawal did not involve a disclosure of confidential client information because

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

However, as one observer noted, "[t]his notice of withdrawal appears to amount to
disclosure and thus accomplishes indirectly what the original Kutak draft sought to
accomplish directly."2 '
Whatever the House of Delegates may have thought, noisy withdrawal does
involve a disclosure of "information relating to representation.""' The implicit
message of such signaling is that the client has been engaged in some sort of
criminal or fraudulent conduct. Further, the comment permits the lawyer to point

to an "opinion, document, affirmation or the like" that incorporates the evil. A
reasonably sophisticated person who is on the receiving end ofsuch a signal should
understand that the withdrawing lawyer is saying, in a kind of code: "There is
something fraudulent about this transaction. Watch out!" That is a pretty
significant disclosure." 9 What is being disclosed, through code language, is
information "relating to representation ofa client."
Why might a lawyer want to take advantage ofa noisy withdrawal option? The
option offers some protection to a lawyer who has been innocently involved in a
client's evil scheme, and it enables the lawyer to give third parties enough
information about the existence of a problem to enable them to make further
inquiry." ° Noisy withdrawal might help a lawyer avoid liability or sanction, and it

the permitted actions, such as withdrawing a legal opinion, do not reveal a lawyer's knowledge of the
details of the client's fraud." See Hazard,supra note 207, at 299.
217. See id. (footnote omitted).
218. Several commentators have taken the position that noisy withdrawal amounts to anexception
to the confidentiality rule. See. e.g., Hazard, supranote 207, at 303-06; see also Rotunda, supranote
211, at 481. Professors Hazard and Hodes have written about the provision for noisy withdrawal:
One final exception to Rule 1.6 is not contained in the text of the rule. This exception,
buried disingenuously in the final version of the Comment, has potentially broad scope.
Indeed, unless it is narrowed by interpretation, or ignored as simply inconsistent with the
text of the rule, it could create an exception broader than any proposed by the Kutak
Commission.
I Hazard & Hodes, supranote 148, at § 1.6312.
A 1992 opinion ofthe ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility acknowledges that
noisy withdrawal represents an exception to the lawyer's obligations under Rule 1.6:
[A] lawyer's explicit disaffirmance ofwork product prepared by the lawyer in the course of
the representation, may well be understood as amounting to a representation by the lawyer
that the client information on which the disaffirmed document relied is untrustworthy,
thereby necessitating the withdrawal.... Every lawyer and every individual or entity
involved in the transaction which has had occasion to rely upon those documents is likely
to so interpret their unilateral disaffirmance by the lawyer who prepared them. It must be
recognized, therefore, that a "noisy" withdrawal may result in a disclosure of"information
relating to representation" that is generally prohibited by Rule 1.6.
See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-366 (1992). But the ABA
committee also opined that the noisy withdrawal comment to Rule 1.6 allowed disaffirmance only when
the lawyer's withdrawal is ethically required because of the client's intention to use the lawyer's
services in a fraud. See id.
219. Professor Hazard said, on this point: "What the ABA has done is loudly to proclaim that a
lawyer may not blow the whistle, but quietly to affirm that he may wave a flag." Hazard, supranote
207, at 304.
220. By giving such notice, the lawyer "guards against a later charge of facilitating the client's
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might help innocent parties avoid fraud. It seems a useful thing.
The comment about noisy withdrawal is more than a guide to interpretation of
Model Rule 1.6. It articulates a substantive exception to the confidentiality rule.22
In not adopting the comments to the Model Rules, Louisiana did not adopt the
exception. Louisiana lawyers who wish to engage in noisy withdrawals are much
more at risk than lawyers in jurisdictions that have at least adopted the comments
to the Model Rules.
(5) The Duty to Expedite Litigation
Model Rule 3.2 is about expediting litigation. It is hostile to delay. It requires
a lawyer to "make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the
interests of the client." 22' This makes sense-lawyers are, after all, supposed to be
officers of the court, not just advocates for their clients. But there seems to be a
problem. The duty to expedite litigation appears to be subordinate to the lawyer's
duty to advance the interests of the client. What if the interests of the client are in
delay itself? For example, would it be all right for the lawyer to engage in delaying
tactics if the delay will likely induce the opponent to agree to more favorable
settlement terms? The comment to the rule offers a clarifying answer: No.
The comment provides: "Realizing financial or other benefit from otherwise
improper delay in litigation is not a legitimate interest of the client."223 The
comment thus provides an important substantive limitation on the scope ofthe rule.
A lawyer who is unaware of the limitation might believe that he or she is justified
in behaving in a way that is exactly opposite to the intent of the rule.

wrongful behavior." See Rotunda, supra note 211, at 480; Geoffrey.C. Hazard, Jr., How Far May a
Lawyer Go in Assisting a Client in Legally Wrongful Conduct?, 35 U. Miami L. Rev. 669 (1981).
221. Professor Ronald Rotunda has argued that the noisy withdrawal concept helps to achieve a
consistency in the Model Rules that would not otherwise be present, and that that role "undermines any
expected argument that the Comment is not authoritative." See Rotunda, supra note 211, at 482. He

describes the problem as follows:
Consider Model Rule 4.1. It provides, in subsection (b), thatwhile representing aclient the
to disclose amaterial fact ...when disclosure is necessary
lawyer may not knowingly "fail
to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent actby aclient, unless disclosure isprohibited by
Rule 1.6." Rule 4.1 appears to state that when disclosure is prohibited by Rule 1.6, the
lawyer must keep secret material facts even if such nondisclosure would assist a client's
criminal or fraudulent act. But if the lawyer does assist in such an act through his or her
nondisclosure, the lawyer will be held liable by other law. Such nondisclosure also appears

to violate Rule 1.2(d). The Comment to Rule 1.2 makes clear that a 'lawyer may not
continue assisting aclient in conduct that the lawyer originallysupposes islegally proper
but then discovers iscriminal or fraudulent. Withdrawal from the representation, therefore,
may be required." The remedy for the apparent inconsistency may be found in the concept
of filing a notice of withdrawal.
Id. at 483 (footnotes omitted).
222. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.2 (1983).
223. Id. Rule 3.2 cmt. Not all delays are improper, ofcourse. A delay in proceedings that would
accommodate asick witness, for example, would not violate the rule.
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(6) Contactwith Employees ofa RepresentedEntity
Another rule that has a comment with substantive impact is Rule 4.2, which
concerns communications with persons who are represented by counsel. The text
of Model Rule 4.2 is fairly straightforward. As originally adopted, it stated: "In
representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the
representation with a party the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer
in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent ofthe other lawyer or is authorized
'
by law to do so."224
The rule is intended to prevent overreaching by lawyers. It seeks to prevent
them from taking advantage ofopposing parties without the knowledge oftheir own
attorneys. As applied to opponents who are individuals, the application of the rule
seems clear enough. 2" But how does the rule work when the opposing party is a
corporation?
One portion of the comment to Rule 4.2 addresses that issue. In doing so, it
articulates a substantive rule:
In the case of an organization, this Rule prohibits communications by a
lawyer for another person or entity concerning the matter inrepresentation
with persons having a managerial responsibility on behalf of the
organization, and with any other person whose act or omission in
connection with that matter may be imputed to the organization for
purposes of civil or criminal liability or whose statement may constitute
an admission on the part of the organization. 6
How Rule 4.2 works with respect to corporations is an important question. The
comment addresses the issue directly. It does not answer all the questions that can
arise,"' but it is surely helpful in engaging an issue that the text of the rule itself
does not even mention. 22

224. Id. Rule 4.2. As a result of a 1995 amendment, the current version ofthe Model Rule refers
to "person" instead of "party." See.Gillers & Simon, supra note 82, at 270, 273-76. The change in the
ABA version of the rule is hostile to the practice ofprivately interviewing prospective adversaries, who
are represented by counsel, immediately before filing suit. See 2 Hazard & Hodes, supra 148, at §
4.2:105. Louisiana's version of the rule still refers to "party." See Louisiana Rules of Professional
Conduct Rule 4.2 (2000).
225. Although the "authorized by law" exception to the rule is rather ambiguous. See 2 Hazard
& Hodes, supra note 148, at § 4.2:109-1.
226. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 cmt. (1983).
227. As a practical matter, "the rules of respondeal superior and vicarious admissions against
interest are notoriously fuzzy." See2 Hazard &Hodes, supra note 148, at§ 4.2:105. And, even though
the comment to the rule does not expressly cover former corporate employees, it may be that some of
them should be off limits. See id. § 4.2:107 (describing an example of former managerial employee
who is helping the corporation's lawyer gather information about the case).
228. A Louisiana appellate court cited the comment to Model Rule 4.2 in considering whether
Louisiana's version ofthe rule prohibited ex pare contacts with former corporate employees, but it did
not place direct reliance upon it. See Schmidt v. Gregorio, 705 So. 2d 742 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1993).
The court noted that the Louisiana rule was "essentially the same" as Model Rule 4.2, but "it lacks the
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(7) A Duty to ProvideUnsoughtAdvice
Model Rule 2.1, which is about the lawyer's role as an advisor, requires the
lawyer to "exercise independent professional judgment and render candid advice."
It also provides that a lawyer who gives advice "may" refer to moral, social and
9
other considerations that may be relevant to the client's situation. The rule is not
a
very shocking. A lawyer who has been engaged to represent client certainly
should not be prohibited from offering decent advice about the subject matter of the
representation. However, the comment to the rule goes further and offers a
substantive rule about advice beyond the subject matter of the representation.
Initially, the comment says that a lawyer is generally "not expected to give
advice unless asked by the client." But it also refers to a situation in which a lawyer
may have a duty to provide unsought advice:
However, when a lawyer knows that a client proposes a course of action
that is likely to result in substantial adverse legal consequences to the
client, duty to the client under Rule 1.4 may require that the lawyer act if
'30
the client's course of action is related to the representation.
It seems clear enough fromthe context ofthe comment that the "act" that the lawyer

may be required to undertake isthe act ofproviding advice. The comment says that
this act may be required under Rule 1.4. But that rule concerns the requirement that
a lawyer keep his or her client reasonably informed about the client's matter; it is
not a rule about providing advice. So here we have a comment to Rule 2.1 that says
that the lawyer may be required to provide unsought advice because ofthe duty to
keep the client informed under Rule 1.4. The comment does more than explain
Rule 2.1 and 1.4. It sets forth a substantive rule concerning when a duty to provide
unsought advice arises.

... ABA clarifying comment." Relying on an opinion by the ABA's ethics committee, Formal Opinion
91-359, the court concluded that Louisiana Rule 4.2 did not bar ex parte communications with former
employees. See id.
The comment to Model Rule 4.2 has also been cited in a couple ofopinions issued by federal courts
sitting in Louisiana. See Jenkins v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 956 F. Supp. 695, 697 (W.D. La. 1997)
(stating, based on the language of the comment, that ex parte contacts with former employees is not
prohibited by the rule, but exparte contacts with current employees may be); In re Shell Oil Refinery,
143 F.R.D. 105,107 (E.D. La.), amended on reh'g, 144 F.R.D. 73 (E.D. La. 1992) (citing the comment
for the proposition that there are three categories of corporate employees that should be treated as
parties for purposes of the rule).
229. The pertinent language from bcth the ABA and the Louisiana versions ofthe rule is: "In
rendering advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's situation." Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 2.1(1983); Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1 (1986).
230. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1 cmt. (1983). Rule 1.4, which is referred to
in the quoted language from the comment, is a rule that requires the lawyer to keep the client
"reasonably informed."
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(8) MigratoryLawyers andImputed Conflicts ofInterest
One of the most difficult conflict-of-interest problems is the problem of the
migratory lawyer-the lawyer who moves from one law firm to another. There are
provisions in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct that are relevant to
the problem,23 and some of the comments address it as well, but the rules and the
comments are difficult to understand. More importantly, for present purposes, it
turns out that there is a substantive rule about imputed disqualification that is buried
in the comments to the Model Rules.
A situation in which the problem arises might look like this:
Associate A in Old Firm is assigned to do some work on Corporation
One's litigation against Corporation Two. Corporation One is Old Firm's
client. After doing some work on the matter, Associate A moves to New
Firm, which represents Corporation Two in the litigation against

Corporation One.
This situation presents issues ofdisqualification for both the migrating lawyer and
for the new law finn Can Associate A work on the Corporation Two litigation
team at New Firm? Can other lawyers at New Firm continue to represent

Corporation Two in the litigation against Corporation One?
These sorts of questions provoked a fair amount of controversy in the
ABA's deliberations on the Model Rules, and different resolutions were
proposed.23 2 In the end, the ABA crafted provisions that dealt with the
moving lawyer, the old law firm, and the new law firm. These were incorporated
into Model Rule 1.10-the imputed disqualification rule. However, there was
some dissatisfaction with the structure of the rule. Because most imputed
disqualification issues involving migratory lawyers can be characterized as
issues involving former clients, like Corporation One in the above
hypothetical, it was thought that those issues ought to be dealt with under Model
Rule 1.9, which deals with former client conflicts of interest.23 3 So, in 1989 the
ABA shifted some of the language of Model Rule 1.10 to Model Rule 1.9. 234

231.

The pertinent rules are Model Rule 1.9 and 1.10.

232. See 1Hazard &Holdes, supranote 148, at § 1.10:207.
233. See id.§ 1.9:102.
234. Professors Hazard and Hodes have described the 1989 changes in this way:
Technically, the revision was accomplished as follows: moved most of what formerly was
Rule 1.10(b) into Rule 1.9 as new Rule 1.9(b); redesignated what formerly was Rule 1.9(b)
as new Rule 1.9(c); and then modified that redesignated subsection in two ways. First, the
new subsection was harmonized with other aspects.of Rules 1.9 and 1.10 by adding a
reference to prior representation by a lawyer'sfirm as well as to representation by the lawyer
individually. Second, Rule 1.9(c) now refers separately to both adverse use of and
disclosure of confidential client information, making it consistent with Rules 1.6 and 1.8(b).

See id. §1.9:102.

2000]

N. GREGORYSMITH

The change did not represent an improvement to the Model Rules, " s and
Louisiana did not amend its Rules ofProfessional Conduct to follow the ABA's
lead. In any event, as with most of the other sections of this article, references to
the Model Rules, and their comments, will be to the 1983 version of the Model
Rules. We should now turn to the rules themselves.
We should first refer to Model Rule 1.9, which states the general rule on former
client conflicts of interest. It provides in part:
A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter shall not
thereafter:
(a) represent another person in the same or a substantially related matter
in which that person's interests are materially adverse to the interests of
the former client unless the former client consents after consultation.236
This part ofthe rule does not speak directly to the situation of the migratory lawyer,
and it is not clear from the above text whether or not we should apply Rule 1.9 in
such a context. However, if we do apply the rule to our hypothetical involving
Associate A, we would conclude that Associate A should not represent Corporation
Two at New Firm. The interests of.Corporation One and Corporation Two are
materially adverse, and it is the same matter that Associate A worked on at Old
Firm. Associate A has simply "switched sides."
What about the other lawyers in New Firm? Rule 1.9 says nothing about them.
We must turn to Model Rule 1.10 for help with respect to them. Model Rule
1.10(a) offers the following:
While lawyers are associated in a firm, none of them shall knowingly
represent a client when any one of them practicing alone would be
prohibited from doing so by Rules 1.7, 1.8(c), 1.9 or 2.2.37
We should note the cross-reference here to Rule 1.9. Rule 1.10 provides that ifthe
individual lawyer would be disqualified under Rule 1.9, the other lawyers in the
firm would be disqualified as well. As applied to our migratory lawyer
hypothetical, then, we would say that if Associate A is individually prohibited from
taking on representation ofCorporation Two at New Firm, the other lawyers at New
Firm would also be disqualified. At least that is the apparent implication of the
literal language ofModel Rule 1.10(a).

235. Professors Hazard and Hodes have observed:
[E]ven after the revision Rule 1.9 focusses [sic] on the former client and the moving
lawyer's personaldisability or disqualification with respect to that client. The imputation
consequences of a personal disqualification continue to be treated in Rule 1.10, and
reference to that rule is still necessary to a complete analysis. Thus, the 1989 revision may
have been ill advised, for the new text added little to overall clarity and virtually nothing of
substance....
See id. § 1.9:102. Indeed, a good case could be made that the 1989 change actually subtractedfrom
overall clarity.
236. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9 (1983).
237. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.10(a) (1983).
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But there is reason to think that Model Rule 1.10(a) should not apply to the
situation ofthe migratory lawyer. Model Rule 1.1 0(a) talks about lawyers who "are
associated in a firm." This expression contrasts with other words in Model Rule
1.10(b) that clearly refer to a migratory lawyer:
When a lawyer becomes associated with a firm, the firm may not
knowingly represent a person in the same or a substantially related
matter in which that lawyer, or a firm with which the lawyer was
associated, had previously represented a client whose interests are
materially adverse to that person and about whom the lawyer had acquired
information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that is material to the
matter.
As applied to the facts of our hypothetical, Rule 1.10(b) rules out New
Firm's representation of Corporation Two if, while working at Old Firm, A
obtained confidential information 9 about Corporation One that is material to the
matter. The end result-disqualification of New Firm-is the same one that we
obtained when we tried to apply Model Rule 1.9 and Model Rule 1.10(a) to our
hypothetical. But if we are to give effect to the plain language of Model Rule
1.10(b), the end result should be different if we imagine that Associate A performs
only limited legal research functions on Corporation One's matter while working
at Old Firm and acquires no material confidential information about Corporation
One. In that case, Model Rule 1.1 0(b) would seem to permit New Firm to represent
Corporation Two against Corporation One but Model Rule 1.10(a) would not. It
looks like Model Rule 1.10(b), not 1.10(a), should apply in the case of migratory
lawyers.
At this point, it might be helpful to consider whether the comments to the
Model Rules confirm our tentative conclusions about how the rules work.
Fortunately, they do offer some help. For example, one part of the comment to
Model Rule 1.10 provides:
The second aspect ofloyalty to client is the lawyer's obligation to decline
subsequent representations involving positions adverse to a former client
arising in substantiallyrelated matters. This obligation requires abstention
from adverse representation by the individual lawyer involved, but does
not properly entail abstention of other lawyers through imputed
disqualification. Hence, this aspect of the problem is governed by Rule
1.9(a). Thus, if a lawyer left one firm for another, the new affiliation
would notpreclude the firms involved from continuing to represent clients
with adverse interests in the same or related matters, so long as the
conditions of Rule 1.10(b) and (c) concerning confidentiality have been

238. Id. Rule 1.10(b).
239. Throughout this section of the article, Iam using "confidential information" as a shorthand
expression for "information relating to representation of a client" under Model Rule 1.6.
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met.,
This language seems to answer one of the questions raised earlier. It indicates that
Model Rule 1.9(a) can apply to the case ofa migratory lawyer. It also indicates that
the migratory lawyer would be disqualified from representing a client at the new law
firm if (1)the lawyer previously represented another (former) client in the same or

a substantially related matter, and if(2) the interests ofthe two clients are materially
adverse. 24'

The language from the comment also tends to confirm that disqualification of
the individual migratory lawyer does not necessarily mean the disqualification of
other lawyers at the new law firm. Translated into the structure ofModel Rule 1.10,
the comment suggests that Model Rule 1.10(a) does not apply to the situation ofthe
migratory lawyer. Another part ofthe comment to Model Rule 1.10 confirms this
even more directly. It explains: "Paragraph (a) operates only among the lawyers
currently associated in a firm. When a lawyer moves from one firm to another, the
situation is governed by paragraphs (b) and (c)." 2"2 In other words, as indicated
earlier, disqualification depends on whether or not the "conditions ofRule 1.10(b)
and (c) concerning confidentiality have been met.""4 3
What are these "conditions concerning confidentiality"? Another portion ofthe
comment to Model Rule 1.10 offers this instruction:
Paragraph (b) and (c) operate to disqualify the firm only when the lawyer
involved has actual knowledge of information protected by Rule 1.6 and
1.9(b). Thus, if a lawyer while with one firm acquired no knowledge of
information relating to a particular client ofthe firm, and that lawyer later

240. We have not discussed Model Rule 1.9(c) before. It provides:
(c) A lawyer who has formerly represented a client in a matter or whose present or former
firm has formerly represented aclient in a matter shall not thereafter:
(1) use information relating to the representation to the disadvantage ofthe former client
except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with respect to a client, or when the
information has become generally known; or
(2) reveal information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would
permit or require with respect to a client.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9(c) (1983).
241. "[U]nless the former client consents after consultation." See id.Rule 1.9.
242. See Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.10 cmt. (1983).
243. There isasmall problem with this part of the comment. It refers not only to disqualification
"conditions" set forth in Model Rule 1.10(b), but also to conditions set forth in subpart (c). However,
subpart (c) has nothing to do with the new law firm that the migratory lawyer joihs. Itdeals with the
law firm that the migratory lawyer left behind. That part of the rule provides:
When a lawyer has terminated an association with a firm, the firm isnot prohibited from
thereafter representing a person with interests materially adverse to those of a client
represented by the formerly associated lawyer unless:
(1) the matter is the same or substantially related to that in which the formerly associated
lawyer represented the client; and
(2)any lawyer remaining in the firmhas information protected by Rules 1.6 and 1.9(b) that
ismaterial to the matter.
See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.10(c) (1983).
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joined another firm, neither the lawyer individually nor the second firm is
disqualified from representing another client in the same or a related
matter even though the interests of the two clients conflict.'
This last-quoted language reinforces what we have already learned about when
a new law firm would be disqualified, but it also adds something new. It adds
something new about the circumstances under which the individual lawyer will be
disqualified. At first glance, the language ofthe comment might seem to do little
more than confirm the basic notion, implicit in the black-letter text ofModel Rules
1.9 and 1.10, that a moving lawyer will not be disqualified if he or she did not work
on the relevant client's matter at the prior law firm and, therefore, obtained no
confidential information about it. Thus, in the context ofour hypothetical involving
Corporation One and Corporation Two, Associate A would not be disqualified from
working on Corporation Two's matter at New Firm simply because he or she
happened-to have been employed at Old Firm at a time when other lawyers at the
firm were working on Corporation One's matter. Imputed disqualification does not
go that far. However, the quoted language also suggests a less obvious proposition.
It suggests that Associate A might not be disqualified even ifhe or she happened
to work on Corporation One's matter at Old Firm, so long as Associate A "acquired
no knowledge of information" that is material to Corporation One's matter.
This latter possibility is not an outcome one would necessarily expect in light
of the black-letter provisions of Model Rules 1.9 and 1.10. According to a portion
of the comment to Model Rule 1.10 that we have previously discussed, the
migratory lawyer is subject to individual disqualification under the general rule
about former clients that is articulated in Model Rule 1.9. That is, absent client
consent, the individual lawyer would be disqualified if the lawyer previously
worked on the same or a substantially related matter and if the interests of the two
clients are materially adverse. The literal language of Model Rule 1.9(a) can be
read to say that if the lawyer did the work, the disqualification kicks in, whether or
not the lawyer acquired confidential material information about the former client.
But the above-quoted language from the comment to Model Rule 1.10 says
something quite different. In doing so, it appears to give voice to a hidden rule
about lawyer disqualification.
But how much substance does this hidden rule actually have? To give it some
meaning in the imputed disqualification context, we would have to imagine a
situation in which the individual lawyer might otherwise be disqualified under the
literal language of Model Rule 1.9, but would not be disqualified because of the
"hidden" rule. One such situation might look like this:

244. See Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.10 cmt. (1983). The reference to paragraph

(c)is to Model Rule 1.10(c). That part of the rule describes the circumstances in which the law firm
from which the migratory lawyer departed (the "Old Firm" in our hypothetical) can take on

representation adverse to the client that the migratory lawyer represented at the Old Firm before he or
she left.
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Associate A in Old Finn is assigned to do some legal research on an issue
related to Corporation One's litigation against Corporation Two.
Corporation One is Old Firm's client. A learns no facts about the
underlying dispute. After doing the research, A moves to New Firm,
which represents Corporation Two in the litigation with Corporation One.
In this case, it appears that A has literally represented Corporation One and
represented Corporation One in the same matter that New Firm is working on.
Under the language of Model Rule 1.9(a), it does not appear that A could work on
Corporation Two's matter at New Firm, absent appropriate client consent. Under
the language of the comment, however, A could do so.
This hidden rule is reminiscent of the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's
approach to disqualification in Silver ChryslerPlymouth, Inc. v. ChryslerMotors
Corp.245 In that case, an associate did some work for Chrysler at a large law firm
then moved to a smaller firm where he became a partner and apparently participated
in representation against Chrysler. Chrysler sought disqualification, contending, in
part, that the migratory lawyer had worked on matters that were substantially related
to the matter currently in litigation. However, the court did not disqualify the
lawyer or the new law firm. The evidence indicated that the lawyer's involvement
in Chrysler matters at the previous firm was "at most, limited to brief, informal
discussions on a procedural matter or research on a specific point of law. '24 This
was not enough to justify disqualification. 24'7
The rule from the comment seems sensible enough, even though its scope is
rather limited. There seems to be little virtue in disqualifying an individual
migratory lawyer if he or she acquires no knowledge of material information
relating to the client in question. In some instances it might be difficult to
determine whether the migratory lawyer satisfies the "no knowledge" standard, but
the law regularly deals with difficult determinations, so that is not alone reason
enough to reject the rule. 45
What are we to make of all this? First, we should acknowledge that the
comment to Model Rule 1.10 provides considerable help with respect to difficult
disqualification issues involving migratory lawyers. The comment teaches us some
useful things about the relationship between Model Rule 1.9 and Model Rule 1.10,
and it clarifies some matters that are not altogether clear from the text of the rules.
It would be beneficial if these teachings and clarifications were more readily
available to Louisiana lawyers. In addition, the comment to Model Rule 1.10

245.

518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).

246. Id. at 756.
247. See also Hazard, supra note 210, at 707.
248. In Silver Chrysler, the migratory attorney submitted an affidavit that detailed the nature of
his responsibilities in various Chrysler matters. He also submitted affidavits about the nature of his
work from two former colleagues at the old law firm. See 518 F.2d at 756. The court noted that
Chrysler was in a position to submit time records or affidavits by the lawyer's former supervisors in an
effort to refute his claim ofperipheral involvement, but Chrysler had approached the matter "in largely
conclusory terms." See id. at 757.
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articulates a disqualification rule relating to migratory lawyers that is neither stated
in the text of that rule nor in the text of Model Rule 1.9. Although this hidden rule
is rather narrow, it appears to be sensible enough, and there is no reason why it
should not be adopted in Louisiana.
(9) The OmittedMaterialsand SubstantiveRules
Shortly after the promulgation of the Model Rules, a commentator suggested
that there could be problems in the relationship between the comments and the text
ofthe rules:
Other problems can be identified. For example, it is not clear how the text
ofthe Rules and the Comments will interact. The preamble states that the
"Comments are intended as guides to interpretation, but the text of each
Rule is authoritative." However, the Comments might provide a sufficient
basis from which to infer a mandatory duty apart from the language ofthe
Rules.2"9
The commentator was right. There are statements in the comments (and at least one
in the Scope section ofthe Model Rules) that are more than guides to interpretation.
They amount to hidden substantive rules. This is not exactly an ideal state of
affairs. In some circumstances, a lawyer might be faced with discipline based upon
an obligation that is unexpectedly articulated in a comment instead of in the text of
the rules. Of course, this risk would be remote in Louisiana, on account of
nonadoption ofthe omitted materials.
On the other hand, Louisiana lawyers are not in a good position to take
advantage ofhidden rules that might be ofuse to them. Louisiana lawyers ought to
be able to look to the Rules of Professional Conduct for guidance concerning
professional responsibility problems. Sound substantive rules, whether they are
articulated in the text, or in the comments, could provide the sort ofguidance that
would enable a lawyer to better serve his or her clients and the system ofjustice.
One would hope that the main value of a code of lawyer conduct would not be as
a tool for discipline but as a teacher for lawyers who are trying to do the right thing.
The 1986 omission ofthe ABA comments and prefatory materials took some ofthe
teaching tools out ofthe Louisiana code.
Besides, not all of the hidden rules that we have discussed carry a disciplinary
threat. Some of them, like the noisy withdrawal rule, articulate exceptions to
general rules that would riiake discipline less likely. Others, like the hidden rule on
imputed disqualification for migratory lawyers, temper the otherwise potentially
harsh implications ofthe black-letter rules.
What kind ofstatus do these hidden rules enjoy in Louisiana? Not much. Any
substantive rules that may be lurking in the omitted materials can hardly be

249.

Roger N. Walter, An Overview ofthe Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct, 24 Washburn

L.J. 443, 469 (1985).
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expected to be given authoritative status in a state that did not even adopt them.
What about as guides to interpretation or application of other rules? As noted
earlier, the Louisiana Supreme Court has sometimes cited comments to the Model
Rules for precisely those purposes in its published opinions. However, substantive
rules found in the omitted materials are probably not as useful as guides to
interpreting other substantive rules as are comments that were actually written with
that purpose in mind. At most, the hidden rules enjoy a limbo status in
Louisiana-they may have some utility to the limited extent that they might shed
light on the meaning and application of some other rule.
The result is some missed opportunities. Not only do Louisiana lawyers miss
the opportunity to have ready access to materials that might help them interpret and
apply the rules of conduct and resolve professional responsibility problems, they
also lack accessible information about some substantive rules of conduct. Most
Louisiana lawyers are probably unaware that there are substantive rules in the
omitted materials. Even if they were aware, that awareness would probably yield
little more than uncertainty. A Louisiana lawyer who is knowledgeable enough to
be aware ofthe substantive rules that are hidden in the omitted materials would also
be aware that they have not been adopted by the Louisiana Supreme Court. The
lawyer would likely be hesitant to rely upon them. This is too bad, because there
is value in the hidden rules.
iv. A Message aboutLegalEthics
Louisiana's decision to omit the preliminary sections and comments from
the Rules of Professional Conduct represents another missed opportunity as
well: a modest opportunity to say something instructive about the nature of legal

ethics.
In its broadest sense, legal ethics is a subset of ethics in general.25 ° There is a
connection between legal ethics and moral philosophy, between legal ethics and
questions of good and bad, right and wrong." ' Professors Deborah Rhode and

David Luban have written that "legal ethics cuts more deeply than legal regulation:

250. Charles Wolfram has observed that the term "legal ethics" is used in at least two ways. The
first is as a description of the "so-called self-regulatory system out ofwhich the legal profession's codes
emerge." Charles W. Wolfram, Modem Legal Ethics v (1986). The second is "in the quite different
sense of applied moral philosophy in the field of legal service." Id. Professors Deborah Rhode and
David Luban have written that, in this second, broader sense, legal ethics represents "a special case of
ethics in general, as ethics is understood in the central traditions of philosophy and religion." Rhode
&Luban, supra note 151, at 3.
251. See Ethics and the Legal Profession 23 (Michael Davis &Frederick A. Elliston, eds., 1986).
The editors wrote:
As "moral philosophy," that is, the study of the norms that should guide the conduct of
rational agents, ethics is concerned with what makes acts right or wrong, good or bad,
virtuous or vicious, and with the reasons properly offered to justify conduct. Ethics makes
explicit our understanding of norms, opening them to criticism and revision. Although
ethics cannot make people good, it can help people to see better what the good is.
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it concerns the fundamentals ofour moral lives as lawyers. As Socrates noted about

ofethics, it 'is not about just any question, but about the way one should
the subject
252

live."'
One might expect a code of legal ethics to reflect this broader perspective. It
can be seen, to some extent at least, in the American Bar Association codes that
antedated the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. The earlier codes articulated
a vision of legal ethics that expressly incorporated moral virtues and exhorted
lawyers to do more than comply with minimal standards of discipline.
3
The 1908 Canons, as I have already mentioned, had an aspirational or
hortatory thrust, rather than a disciplinary focus. Many ofthe expressions found in
the canons had an overt moral dimension. By way ofexample, Canon 17 provided
that, in trial, "it is indecent to allude to the personal history or the personal
'5 4
peculiarities and idiosyncrasies of counsel on the other side." Canon 22 said that
is unprofessional and dishonorable to deal other than candidly with the facts
"[i]t
in taking the statements of witnesses, in drawing affidavits and other documents,
and in the presentation of causes."25 The same canon described inappropriate
256
'
evidentiary practices as "unworthy of an officer of the law." Canon 32 said that
"a lawyer will find his highest honor in a deserved reputation for fidelity to private
citizen.9 257
trust and to public duty, as an honest man and as a patriotic and loyal
Canon 18 intoned that the "client cannot be made the keeper of the lawyer's
conscience."'2 s
The 1969 Model Code ofProfessional Responsibility incorporated a number
of "Ethical Considerations" that had overtly aspirational, and sometimes moral,
Considerations said that a lawyer
dimensions. Among other things, the2 Ethical
"should be temperate and dignified," 9 and "should refrain from all illegal and
to
morally reprehensible conduct."" ° They exhorted the lawyer to "be courteous
262
and
opposing counsel,"' to "uphold the integrity and honor of his profession,"
"to conduct himself so as to reflect credit on the legal profession and to inspire the
26
confidence, respect, and trust of his clients and of the public."" The Ethical
Considerations also said that the lawyer owes a solemn duty "to strive to2avoid not
"
only professional impropriety, but also the appearance of impropriety."1

252. See, Rhode & Luban, supra note 151, at 3 (quoting from Plato, The Republic of Plato 31
(Allan Bloom trans., 1968)).
253. See supraPart H(AX Xa).
254. Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 17 (1908).
255. Id. Canon 22.
256. See id.
257. Id. Canon 32.
258. Id. Canon 18.
259. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 1-5 (1983).
260. See id.
261. Seeid. EC7-38.
EC 9-6.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See id.
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In contrast to these earlier codes, the ABA's Model Rules of Professional
Conduct are much more focused on disciplinary standards themselves. However,
the Model Rules contain a few statements that acknowledge the larger world of
ethical and moral considerations to which disciplinary standards relate, and they
contain a few statements ofaspirational ideals for the profession itself. Almost all
of these statements are found in the Preamble and Scope sections of the Model
Rules.
One example of a reference to the connection between moral considerations
and disciplinary standards is found in this statement from the Scope:
The Rules do not ... exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that
should inform a lawyer, for no worthwhile human activity can be
completely defined by legal rules. The Rules simply provide a framework
for the ethical practice of law.26
The Preamble to the Model Rules provides in part:
Many of a lawyer's professional responsibilities are prescribed in the
Rules of Professional Conduct, as well as substantive and procedural law.
However, a lawyer is also guided by personal conscience and the
approbation of professional peers. A lawyer should strive to attain the
highest level of skill, to improve the law and the legal profession and to
exemplify the legal profession's ideals ofpublic service. ... Within the
framework ofthese Rules many difficult issues of professional discretion
can arise. Such issues must be resolved through the exercise of sensitive
professional and moraljudgment guided bythe basic principles underlying
the Rules. 2'
The Preamble to the Model Rules includes several statements about the higher
ideals of the profession, including the following:
As a public citizen, a lawyer should seek improvement of the law, the
administration ofjustice and the quality of service rendered by the legal
profession. As a member of a learned profession, a lawyer should
cultivate knowledge of the law beyond its use for clients, employ that
knowledge in reform of the law and work to strengthen legal education.
A lawyer should be mindful ofdeficiencies in the administration ofjustice
and of the fact that the poor, and sometimes persons who are not poor,
cannot afford adequate legal assistance, and should therefore devote
professional time and civic influence in their behalf. A lawyer should aid
the legal profession in pursuing these objectives and should help the bar
regulate itself in the public interest.u 7

265. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Scope.
266. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Preamble. Many ofthe "basic principles" referred to
in the Preamble are set forth in comments to the Rules.
267. Id.
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A couple of the rules themselves should also be mentioned. Model Rule 2.1,
which is about giving advice to clients, permits (but does not require) a lawyer who
is giving legal advice to a client to refer to "other considerations such as moral,
economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client's
26 Model Rule
situation.""
6.1 encourages lawyers to provide pro bono publico
service.
The Model Rules thus say a few things about the relationship oflegal ethics to
ethics in general, and about the higher ideal ofthe legal profession, but they do not
say as much about these things as the earlier American Bar Association codes.
Because ofthe omission of the ABA's prefatory materials, the Louisiana Rules of
Professional Conduct say even less. Even more than the ABA's model, the
Louisiana Rules ofProfessional Conduct focus on what a lawyer must do, or not do,
to avoid discipline.
The problem with this is in what the code teaches, or in what it does not teach.
Ethics codes are teachers. If the code articulates a concept of legal ethics that is
basically limited to things lawyers must do, or not do, to avoid discipline, then that
may be what lawyers learn about legal ethics. Such a code will not teach that legal
ethics has an aspirational dimension or that it is a subset ofethics in general. Such
a code will not teach that legal ethics is tied in with fundamental moral issues of
'right and wrong, and that lawyers should pay attention to those fundamental issues
as they negotiate their way through the difficulties that come up in the practice of
law.269

These are not merely academic concerns. A number of recent books,27
articles, " ' and bar association reports2" have concluded that there are serious
problems with the American legal profession. The conventional wisdom is that
there has been a decline in professionalism."

268. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 2.1 (1983).
269. Professor Tanina Rostain has argued that "[b]y eliding central normative issues and focusing
exclusively on controlling 'bad' lawyers ...regulatory legal ethics creates the danger that it will be
mistaken for the whole oflegal ethics. This may be why the popular impression is growing that lawyers
are simply 'bad men' in disguise." See Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current
Approaches to Lawyei Regulation, 71 S.Cal. L.Rev. 1273, 1326 (1998).
270. See, e.g., Mary Ann Glendon, A Nation Under Lawyers: How the Crisis in the Legal
Profession is Transforming American Society (1994); Anthony T. Kronman, The Lost Lawyer: Failing
Ideals of the Legal Profession (1993); Sol M. Linowitz &Martin Mayer, The Betrayed Profession:
Lawyering at the End of the Twentieth Century (1994).
271. See, e.g., Carl T. Bogus, The Death ofan HonorableProfession,71 Ind. LJ. 911 (1996);
John C.Buchanan, The DemiseofLegalProfessionalism:AcceptingResponsibility andImplementing
Change,28 Val. U. L Rev. 563 (1994); Warren E. Burger, The Declineof Professionalism,61 Tenn.
L Rev. 1(1993); Edward D. Re, The CausesofPopularDissatisfactionwith theLegal Profession,68
St. John's L. Rev. 85 (1994).
272. See, e.g., American Bar Association Section ofLegal Education and Admissions to the Bar,
Teaching and Learning Professionalism, Report ofthe Professionalism Committee (1996); "... In the
Spirit of Public Service": A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, Report of the
Commission on Professionalism, reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243 (1987).
273. Butsee, Timothy P. Terrell & James H.Wildman, Rethinking "Professionalism."41 Emory
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Although the causes and the symptoms of the decline. have been variously
expressed, some common themes that have been identified are a loss of
understanding of law practice as a "calling," economic changes that have
"converted law practice from a profession to a business," a "loss of civility," and
274
a "loss of a sense ofthe ultimate purpose of lawyers." Another way to express
this might be that too many lawyers have strayed from the path of professional
virtue. It might be helpful ifthe path were more clearly marked.
The current emphasis on'"professionalism" is a response to this state ofaffairs.
In Louisiana, the results, so far, include the generation of a couple of codes of
professionalism and the issuance of a court order that requires Louisiana lawyers
to take one hour of professionalism as part of their annual continuing legal
education curriculum.2" These, and similar initiatives will probably do some good,
but it is doubtful that professionalism will provide all ofthe answers. Indeed, ifthe
Louisiana Supreme Court's order about continuing legal education and
professionalism is an indicator, the emphasis on professionalism could cause some
harm.
The 1997 order on continuing legal education made it clear that the required
hour of "professionalism" was to be in addition to, and different from, the existing
mandatory hour of "legal ethics." The court sought to distinguish the two terms.
In defining "professionalism," the court said: "Professionalism concerns the
knowledge and skill of the law faithfully employed in the service of client and
public good ....

It includes courses on the duties of attorneys to the judicial

system, courts, public, clients, and other attorneys; attorney competency; and pro
bono obligations."2' 6 Indefining legal ethics, the court said: "Legal ethics concerns
the standard of professional conduct and responsibility required of a lawyer. It
includes courses on professional responsibility and malpractice.... Legal ethics
sets forth the standards of conduct required of a lawyer; professionalism includes
what is more broadly expected." "
Unfortunately, the court's order on continuing legal education serves up a
version oflegal ethics that is limited to legal malpractice and required standards of
L.J. 403,432 (1992) ("[Tlhe truth of thematter is that lawyers today accept and honor the basic values
of professionalism as much as they ever have.").
Most ofthe illustrations that are offered to show departures from professionalism feature instances
of incivility, abusive conduct in litigation, and questionable advertisements by lawyers. See Roger C.
Cramton, On GivingMeaningto "Professionalism," Symposium Proceedings, Teaching and Learning
Professionalism 9 (ABA 1997).
274. American Bar Association Section of Legal Education and Admissions to the Bar, Teaching
and Learning Professionalism, 3-4 (1996).
275. See Code of Professionalism in the Courts, General Administrative Rules, R. La. Sup. Ct.,
Part G, § II (adopted by order of the Louisiana Supreme Court on Aug. 5, 1997); Louisiana Code of
Professionalism (voluntary code; text reproduced at 43 La.B.J. 370 (1995)); Rules forContinuing Legal
Education, La. Sup. Ct. Rule 30 (2000) (The CLE rules were amended on May 23, 1997 to incorporate
professionalism requirements.). The CLE rule on professionalism is discussed in N.Gregory Smith,
Ethics v. Professionalismand the Louisiana Supreme Court, 58 La. L. Rev. 539 (1998).
276. Rules for Continuing Legal Education, La. Sup. Ct. Rule 30 CLE Rule 3(c) (2000).
277. Id.
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behavior. The message-is that legal ethics is what lawyers must do, or not do, to
avoid liability or sanctions. It does not include ideals ofbehavior that reach beyond
those minimums. It is not part of the larger realm ofethics in general. In contrast,
"professionalism" does have a broader reach. But "professionalism" itself is a
rather elusive concept with uncertain meaning.27 Moreover, there is nothing in the
Louisiana Supreme Court's order to connect professionalism with ethics, as broadly
defined.
This is too bad, and it is too bad that the Louisiana version of the Rules of
Professional Conduct does not offer much in the way of a moral context for the
practice of law. If the profession is in trouble, and if lawyers are misbehaving, it
might be useful to remind lawyers, through whatever teaching methods that are
reasonably available, that law practice ought to be conducted against a background
of moral values. A modest opportunity to teach that lesson was missed when the
Louisiana Supreme Court omitted the ABA's Preamble fromits version ofthe Rules
of Professional Conduct.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Louisiana Supreme Court's 1986 decision to adopt only the black-letter
provisions of the Model Rules resulted in some missed opportunities. The
preliminary sections and the connents to the ABA's Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, all of which were omitted from Louisiana's version of the.
rule, offer much that is good. The omitted materials include helpful information
about the meaning and application of the black-letter rules. They contain some
useful substantive rules on lawyer conduct. They articulate some important
professional values. And they include statements about the moral framework for
the practice of law. Codes are teachers, and the lessons taught by the Louisiana
code might have been better ifLouisiana lawyers had been provided with teachings
that are more elevated than those set forth in the black-letter provisions of the
Model Rules.

278. In a 1986 report, the American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism observed
that "[p]rofessionalism' is an elastic concept the meaning and application of which are hard to pin
down." American Bar Association Commission on Professionalism, ". . . In the Spirit of Public
Service": A Blueprint for the Rekindling of Lawyer Professionalism, reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243,261
(1986). Professor Roger Cramton has said:
[Allthough everyone talks about professionalism as an icon or goal of lawyering, no one has
been able t6 define it in ways that others could accept. The result is that bar
pronouncements rely on abstractions of immense generality--concepts so vague and
uncertain that they lack the power to guide lawyer conduct in particular situations or to
motivate commitment by a would-be believer....
[I]n today's world of moral relativism, deconstruction and denial of foundational truth it is
not enough to be for 'justice" and "the public good" because they lack agreed-upon content.
Cramton, supranote 273, at 8, 13.
I discuss the problems with the Louisiana Supreme Court's CLE rule on professionalism in greater
detail in Smith, supra note 275.
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A few court decisions have acknowledged the value of some of the omitted
materials in interpreting the black-letter rules, but these isolated judicial statements
ofapproval are no substitute for incorporation ofthe omitted materials into the code
itself. Nor do the judicial statements support application of the several substantive
rules that are hidden in the omitted materials. In any event, Louisiana practitioners
do not have ready access to the omitted materials. Many of them are probably
unaware of their existence.
Not all of the omitted materials should be included in the Louisiana Rules.
Some parts of the omitted materials are not a good fit for Louisiana black-letter
rules that depart from the ABA model. Some parts ofthe omitted materials have
been beneficially amended by the ABA House of Delegates since 1983. Other
parts, like the statement about personal morality and criminal offenses in the
comment to Model Rule 8.4, should probably be kept out on the merits. If
Louisiana were disposed to adopt any or all of the omitted materials, it would be
well to consider how they have been amended over time.
The publication ofthe new RestatementoftheLaw GoverningLawyers and the

newly-issued report ofthe Ethics 2000 Commission, should provide the Louisiana
Supreme Court, and interested members ofthe bar, with a good opportunity to take
another look at the rules that govern lawyer conduct in Louisiana. It is an
opportunity that ought not to be missed. The Restatement reflects years of
thoughtful work about rules governing the conduct oflawyers, and the Ethics 2000
Commission has offered some valuable insights. With some thoughtful work,
Louisiana should be able to take advantage ofthese more recent developments, and
should be able, as well, to recover some of what was lost in the 1986 adoption of
the Rules of Professional Conduct.
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APPENDIX
A FEw OBSERVATIONS ABOUT AMENDMENTS TO THE MODEL RuLEs

Because the focus ofthis article has been on opportunities that were missed in
connection with Louisiana's adoption of the Rules ofProfessional Conduct in1986,
I have not said much about the amendments to the Model Rules that have been
generated since that time. Perhaps a few things should be said at this point. If, as
I hope, the Louisiana Supreme Court and the Louisiana State Bar Association could
be persuaded to take another look at the materials from the Model Rules that were
omitted when Louisiana adopted its own version. of the Rules of Professional
Conduct, the focus would most likely, and most sensibly, be on the most current
version ofthe ABA's model. What I would like to do, then, in this appendix, is to
highlight the more significant amendments that have been made to the ABA's
comments to the Model Rules.
A. Rules 1.9 and 1.10
I have previously discussed the interplay between Model Rule 1.9, which is
about former clients, and Model Rule 1.10, which is about imputed disqualification.
The rules and their associated comments were not all that easy to understand in the
1983 version of the Model Rules. Both of these rules and the comments to them
were amended in 1989. Unfortunately, the amendments did not improve the clarity
of the rules.
At the February 1989 Mid-Year Meeting, the House of Delegates approved an
amendment that moved the pre-existing text ofModel Rule 1.10(b) to Model Rule
1.9(b), renumbered the former Model Rule 1.9(b) as 1.9(c), and renumbered the
former Model Rule 1.10(c) as 1.10(b). In addition, a few words were added to new
Model Rule 1.9(c). The House also moved a few paragraphs of the comment to
Model Rule 1.10 over to the comment to 1.9, with some minor modifications in
279
language.
These amendments did not involve the introduction of shocking new

substantive rules. The new language that was added to Model Rule 1.9(c) merely

confirmed the confidentiality of information about former clients." 0 However, the
major change-movement ofparts ofthe black-letter text and comments from Rule
1.10 to 1.9-invites confusion.

279. See Gillers &Simon, supra note 82, at 115-22, 124-28.
280. The new language states that a "lawyer who had formerly represented a client in a matter or
whose present or former firm has formerly represented aclient in a matter shall not thereafter... reveal
information relating to the representation except as Rule 1.6 or Rule 3.3 would permit or require with
respect to a client. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9(cX2) (2000). The change seems
to do nothing more than confirm the existence of a confidentiality obligation already set forth in Rule
1.6 itself.
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According to Professors Hazard and Hodes:
[t]he idea animating the revision was that the most common and most
important imputed disqualification scenarios arise when lawyers move
from firm to firm, after they or their firms have represented particular
clients in particular matters; since those scenarios present questions of
loyalty to former clients, they should be treated in Rule 1.9 rather than
Rule 1.10.2'
But these authors also note that the revision "may have been ill advised."" Even
after the 1989 change there is nothing in the black-letter provisions of Rule 1.9 that
deals expressly with imputed disqualification-that matter continues to be dealt
with in the text ofRule 1.10. As a result, even though Model Rule 1.9 now includes
a provision dealing with migratory lawyers, the imputed disqualification analysis
related to migratory lawyers still requires reference to Model Rule 1.10.
However, that is not the only problem with the 1989 amendment. There is also
a problem with the comments to amended Rule 1.9, the "former client" rule. As
mentioned above, the House of Delegates approved a relocation of some of the
comments to Model Rule 1.10 to Model Rule 1.9. Some of those comments are
So we have a situation where some of the
about imputed disqualification."
comments to Model Rule 1.9 deal with a concept that is addressed in the blackletter text of Model Rule 1.10.
At least fromthe standpoint of migratory lawyers and imputed disqualification,
the rules were better before the 1989 change.
B. Rule 1.14
At the 1997 Mid-Year Meeting, the ABA's House of Delegates approved a
significant change to the comment to Model Rule 1.14, which is about disabled
clients. The change was the addition of two new paragraphs that tell what a lawyer
should do when an emergency threatens the interests ofa disabled person who is not
yet a client. The basic thrust ofthe change is discernible from the first sentence of
the added language:
In an emergency where the health, safety, or a financial interest of aperson
under disability is threatened with imminent and irreparable harm, a
lawyer may take legal action on behalf of such a person even though the
person is unable to establish a client-lawyer relationship or to make or
express considered judgments about the matter, when the disabled person
acting in good faith on that person's behalf has consulted the
or another
284
lawyer.

281.
282.
283.
284.

See I Hazard & Hodes, supra note 148, at § 1.9:102.
See id.
See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.9 crmt. (2000).
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.14 cnt. (2000).
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The balance of the new language deals with limitations on the scope ofthis sort of
representation, confidentiality considerations, and other matters pertinent to the
protection ofdisabled individuals."'

In effect, the 1997 change invites lawyers to provide legal services on behalf
ofa limited class ofnonclients. Because Rule 1.14 itself is about representation of
"clients" under disability, the new language ofthe comment adds a new substantive
rule of legal ethics. Because the new rule is also permissive, rather than mandatory,
it offers potential comfort to a lawyer who encounters the type of emergency the
comment describes.
C. Rule 1.17 (andRules 5.4 & 7.2)
Rule 1.17 is about the sale of a law practice. It was added to the Model Rules
at the ABA's February 1990 Mid-Year Meeting. The rule permits the sale ofa law
practice, including good will, so long as several conditions are satisfied. The most
significant ofthese conditions are that the seller must cease to engage in private law
practice in the place' where the practice had been conducted, the practice must be
sold as an entirety, and written notice ofthe change must be provided to the seller's
clients." 7 At the time Model Rule 1.17 was adopted, the ABA also made a modest
conforming amendment to Model Rule 5.4, which deals with the professional
independence of the lawyer,"' and Model Rule 7.2, which is about lawyer
advertising. 2 9
An extensive comment elaborates on the matters referenced in the black-letter
text of Rule 1.17.'2" The comment also includes at least one substantive rule
relative to the sale of a law practice. Although the black-letter text of the rule
requires the seller to cease to engage in practice in the area where the practice has
been conducted, the comment to the Model Rule says that "a return to private
practice as a result ofan unanticipated change in circumstances" does not amount
to a rule violation.29' Neither the rule, nor its associated comment, have been
adopted in Louisiana. If the Louisiana Supreme Court were disposed to consider

285. See id.
286. The ABA model offers two options with respect to place. Part (a) ofthe rule provides: 'The
seller ceases to engage in the private practice of law [in the geographic area] [in the jurisdiction] (a
jurisdiction may elect either version) in which the practice has been conducted." Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 1.17(a) (1998).
287. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.17 (2000).
288. The House rewrote (aX2) ofModel Rule 1.17 to implicate the provisions ofModel Rule 1.17
when a lawyer purchases the practice of a deceased, disabled, or missing lawyer. See Model Rules of
Professional Conduct Rule 5.4(aX2) (2000).
289. The House added subparagraph 7.2(cX3), and added some language to the comment to Model
Rule 7.2, to confirm that a lawyer may pay for a law practice pursuant to Model Rule 1.17 without
violating the Model Rule 7.2's proscription against giving value to persons for recommending the
lawyer's services. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.2(c)(3) & cmt. (2000).

290.

See id.cmt.

291.

See Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 1.17 cmt. (2000).
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other changes in the Rules of Professional Conduct, it would be worthwhile to
consider inclusion ofthese provisions on sale of a law practice.
D. Rule 3.6 (andRule 3.8)
The ABA House of Delegates substantially amended Model Rule 3.6, on trial
publicity, at the August 1994 Annual Meeting. The amendments came about after
the United States Supreme Court decided Gentilev. NevadaState Bar,2' a decision
that raised questions about the constitutionality of parts ofpre-existing Model Rule
3.6.293 The comment to the rule was amended as well, and conforming changes
were made in Model Rule 3.8, which deals with the special responsibilities of
prosecutors.
The changes to Model Rule 3.6, and its accompanying comment, set forth a
revised listing of the types of information that a lawyer may disclose outside ofthe
courtroom, notwithstanding the general ban against extrajudicial statements that
might materially prejudice courtproceedings. They also establish anew safe harbor
for extrajudicial statements by lawyers that are made to protect clients against the
prejudicial effect of recent adverse publicity.'"
Louisiana has not yet made post-Gentilechanges to its version of Rule 3.6, but
it ought to do so. The 1994 amendments to Model Rule 3.6 and its accompanying
comment are helpful resources for potential change.
E. Rule 4.2
Rule 4.2, the "no contact" rule, prohibits lawyers from communicating
about the subject matter of the representation with individuals who are
represented by other lawyers. Before 1995, the Model Rule prohibited such
communications with "a party" represented by other counsel. However, at
the 1995 Annual Meeting, the ABA House of Delegates amended Model
Rule 4.2 by changing the word "party" to "person" in the black-letter text
and by substantially altering the comment to the rule. The change was
sponsored by the ABA Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional
Responsibility. In a report that was issued in support of the change, the Standing
Committee said:
[I]t seems clear to the Committee that the appropriate operative term is
"person," and not "party," for neither the need to protect uncounselled
persons against being taken advantage of by opposing counsel nor the
importance ofpreserving the client-attorney relationship is limited to those

292.

501 U.S. 1030, 111 S. Ct. 2720(1991).

293. The Gentilecase concerned a First Amendment challenge to the Nevada version ofRule 3.6.
The Court's decision rejected a facial challenge to the Nevada rule,but it concluded that parts ofthe
rule were too vague to satisfy First Amendrent standards in their application. See id.
294. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.6 & cmt. (2000).
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circumstances where the represented person is a party to an adjudicative
or other formal proceeding.295
The revised comment to the Model Rule makes it clear that the "no contact"
rule is a broad one. It says, in part, that the rule "applies to communications with
any person, whether ornot a party to a formal adjudicative proceeding, contract or
negotiation, who is represented by counsel concerning the matter to which the
communication relates." 2
The changes to the rule were overwhelmingly approved by the ABA House of
Delegates."' Comparable changes should be made in Louisiana.
F. Rule S.7
Model Rule 5.7 and its accompanying comment are about providing lawrelated services. The history of Model Rule .5.7 is rather unusual. In 1991, by a
very close vote, the House ofDelegates adopted a version of Rule 5.7 that permitted
law firms to provide ancillary business services.29 But in 1992, again on a close
vote, the House of Delegates voted to delete the rule. 29 The current version ofRule
5.7 resulted from a 237-183 vote of the House of Delegates at the February 1994
Mid-Year Meeting. 3"
Model Rule 5.7, as it currently stands, provides that a lawyer who provides
"law-related services" is subject to the Rules ofProfessional Conduct with respect
to the provision of those services in two situations. The first is a situation in which
the law-related services are provided in circumstances that "are not distinct" from
the lawyer's provision of normal legal services. The second is a situation in which
the law-related services are provided by a separate entity controlled by the lawyer,
or others, if the lawyer does not take "reasonable measures to assure that a person
obtaining the law-related services knows that the services of the separate entity are
not legal services and that the protections of the client-lawyer relationship do not
exist." '' In the terminology of the rule, "law-related services" are, basically,
services that are in substance related to legal services but are, nonetheless, services
that can be carried out by non-lawyers without running afoul of the restrictions
against unauthorized practice of law.3 2 In short, Rule 5.7 permits lawyers to act as
non-lawyers in the provision of law-related services, but it makes those services
subject to the Rules of Professional Conduct in circumstances in which recipients
might be confused about whether the lawyer is acting as a lawyer or not.

295. See ABA Report Explaining 1995 Amendment, excerpt reprintedinGillers & Simon, supra
note 82, at 273-74.
296. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 4.2 cmt. (2000).
297. See Gillers &Simon, supranote 82, at 273.
298. Seeld. at315-16.
at 316-17.
299. See id.
300. See id.at317.
301. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 5.7 (2000).
Rule 5.7(b).
302. See id.
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The comment to Rule 5.7 indicates the reason for the rule. It also offers
significant information about the rule's application:
When a lawyer performs law-related services or controls an organization
that does so, there exists the potential for ethical problems. Principal
among these is the possibility that the person for whom the law-related
services are performed fails to understand that the services may not carry
with them the protections normally afforded as part of the client-lawyer

relationship. The recipient of the law-related services may expect, for
example, that the protection of client confidences, prohibition against
representation ofpersons with conflicting interests, and obligations ofa
lawyer to maintain professional independence apply to the provision of
law-related services when that maynot be the case. Rule 5.7 applies to the
provision of law-related services by a lawyer even when the lawyer does
not provide any legal services to the person for whom the law-related
services are performed. 3
The comment thus stresses two important things about the rule: the rule applies
when a client might misunderstand the nature of the services that the lawyer is
providing, and the rule may apply even when the lawyer is not providing legal
services to a client.
There is no counterpart to Model Rule 5.7 in the Louisiana Rules of
Professional Conduct. The rule and its accompanying comment should be
considered in connection with any initiative to revise the Louisiana rules.
G. Rule 6.1
Model Rule 6.1, which deals with pro bono publico services, was
substantially amended in 1993. One of the amendments to the text of the rule
converted what had been a general exhortation about providing pro bono
services into a specific urging that the lawyer provide at least 50 hours of
pro bono publico services each year. The 1993 changes also set up a hierarchy of
approved pro bono services. Although the rule identified a number of ways in
which a lawyer could meet the pro bono goal, it provided that a substantial
majority of the 50 hours of service should be allocated either to persons of
limited means or to organizations in matters "designed primarily to address the
needs of persons of limited means."'33" The pre-existing version of the rule had
permitted lawyers to satisfy their pro bono "obligations" through financial
contributions. In 1993, the rule was changed to indicate that while financial support
for legal services organizations is a good thing, it is not.a substitute for pro bono
services themselves.

303. See id.cmt. The comment gives some examples of these services, including title insurance,
accounting, financial planning, trust services, legislative lobbying, economic analysis, social work, and
different types ofcounseling. See id.
304. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.6(a) (2000).
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The comment to Model Rule 6.1 was entirely rewritten in 1993.3°5 The
comment, more thanthe text ofthe rule itself, indicates how seriously the American
Bar Association views lawyer pro bono obligations. Thus, the first sentence of the
comment says that "[e]very lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or
professional work load, has aresponsibility to provide legal services to those unable
to pay."'"The comment also offers some particulars about qualified beneficiaries.
It describes them as "those who qualify for participation in programs funded by the
Legal Services Corporation and those whose incomes and financial resources are
slightly above the guidelines utilized by such programs but, nevertheless, cannot
afford counsel."3 7 But the comment also confirms the voluntary nature ofthe pro
bono obligation. It says that the "responsibility set forth in this Rule is not intended
to be enforced through disciplinary process."3 '
Notwithstanding the voluntary nature of the rule, the 1993 amendments
were very controversial. They passed the House of Delegates on a vote of
228-215.'0 9 The 1993 changes to the Model Rule have not been adopted in
Louisiana. It is doubtful that they could be adopted without considerable
which may not be worth incurring for a rule that is entirely
controversy,
3 10
voluntary.

H. Rules 7.2, 7.3, and 7.4
There have been several amendmenti to the Model Rules on advertising and
information about legal services. Most of the changes were made to conform rules
7.2, 7.3, and 7.4, and their respective comments, to decisions ofthe United States
Supreme Court on lawyer free speech"' As a result of the amendments, the Model

305. See Gillers & Simon, supra note 82, at 319, 323.
306. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 6.1 cmt. (2000).
307. See id.
308. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 6.1 cmt. (2000).
309. See Gillers &Simon, supranote 82, at 323.
310. The more significant issue with respect to pro bono publico service is whether it ought to be
mandatory. Mandatory pro bono is an even more controversial issue than the 1993 amendments to
Model Rule 6.1. Of course, a proposal's controversy is not necessarily a good reason to reject it, but
there are some good arguments on both sides of this issue. See, e.g., Hazard, supranote 210, at 104548.
311. For example, in 1989 the House of Delegates amended Model Rules 7.2 and 7.3, to take into
account the United States Supreme Court's decision in Shaperov. KentuckyBarAssociation, 486 U.S.
466, 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988). That decision held that a blanket prohibition against targeted mail
solicitation was unconstitutional. The original version of Model Rule 7.3 did not permit targeted mail
solicitation either, but the House of Delegates approved amendments to both the black-letter rule and
its accompanying comment to reflect the new constitutional wisdom. The House also approved some
minor conforming changes to the text ofModel Rule 7.3. Comparable changes were notrequired in the
black-letter text of the Louisiana rules, because the constitutional issue had already been addressed
when Louisiana adopted its version of the Rules of Professional Conduct in 1986. See the discussion
supraPart II(BX3) of this article. Since then, Louisiana has made further changes in its rules on
advertising and solicitation.
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Rules are fairly forgiving about lawyer advertisements of speciality practice areas
and they permit targeted direct mail solicitation ofpotential clients.
Louisiana has made significant changes to its rules in this area as well, but
many ofthe changes have not been based on corresponding ABA models. Because
of the differences in the rules, it would not be possible for Louisiana to adopt, in
their entirety, the comments to the corresponding ABA Model Rules.
There is something about Model Rule 7.4 that warrants discussion. This rule
concerns communications regarding fields of practice-identifying oneself as a
specialist, and so on. The ABA House of Delegates has amended the rule on three
occasions. The first amendment to Model Rule 7.4 came in 1989 when the House
acted to delete some language from the comment to the rule that prohibited a lawyer
from stating that his or her practice was "limited to" or "concentrated in" particular
fields of law practice. An ABA committee report that supported the change
indicated that it had been precipitated by attorney free speech decisions of the
United States Supreme Court.31"
The second amendment to Rule 7.4, in 1992, changed both the black-letter text
ofthe rule and the comment to conform them to the Supreme Court's decision in
Peelv. AttorneyRegistrationandDisciplinaryCommission.1 3 That case had held
that states may not ban truthful communications in which lawyers indicate that they
are certified as specialists by bona fide private certifying organizations.3t 4
The third amendment, which came in 1994, added a sentence to both the blackletter text of the rule and to its comment. The amendment removed a disclaimer
requirement, with respect to certification procedures, when the certification in
question is by an organization accredited by the American Bar Association.
As a result of these amendments, Model Rule 7.4 is considerably more
elaborate than Louisiana Rule 7.4. The Louisiana rule states in its entirety.
A lawyer shall not state or imply that the lawyer is certified, or is a
specialist or an expert, in aparticular area of law, unless such certification,
specialization or expertise has been recognized or approved in accordance
with the rules and procedures established by the Louisiana Board of Legal
Specialization."'5
The ABA Model is also more generous than the Louisiana rule concerning what a
*lawyer may advertise about his or her areas of practice. Thus, the comment to the
ABA rule states in part:

312. See ABA Committee Report Explaining 1989 Amendment to Rule 7.4, partiallyreprinted
inGillers & Simon, supra note 82, at 375-76. The committee report referred to In re R.M.J., 455 U.S.
191, 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982) and Zauderer v. Ofice ofDisciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 105 S. Ct.
2265 (1985), which it said "made clear that astate may notprohibit truthful descriptions of a lawyer's
practice merely because the terms raise an inference for a reader that the lawyer has some expertise in
the designated fields ofpractice." See id.
313. 496U.S.91,IOS.Ct.2281 (1990).
314. See id.; see also Gillers & Simon, supra note 82, at 376-77.
315. See Louisiana Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 7.4 (2000).
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This Rule permits a lawyer to indicate areas of practice in
communications about the lawyer's services. If a lawyer practices only in
certain fields, the lawyer is permitted to so indicate. A lawyer is generally
permitted to state that the lawyer is a "specialist," practices a "specialty,"
or "specializes in" particular fields, but such communications are subject
to the "false and misleading" standard applied in Rule 7.1 to
communications concerning a lawyer's services.
However, a lawyer may not communicate that the lawyer has been
recognized or certified as a specialist in a particular field of law, except as
provided by this Rule"'
The ABA's comment draws a distinction between an advertisement that
describes the lawyer as a "specialist" and one that describes the lawyer as "certified
as a specialist." The Louisiana rule conflates the two and, as a result, limits the
ability of a lawyer to identify himself as a specialist.
There is a constitutional issue here. In the case ofIn reR.M.J.,31 the Supreme
Court considered the appropriateness of discipline for a lawyer who had advertised
the areas ofhis practice using practice descriptions that deviated froman approved
list contained in an ethics rule.Is Reversing a disciplinary decision ofthe Missouri
Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court proclaimed that because the nonconforming practice descriptions used by the lawyer had not been shown to be
misleading, and because no substantial interest appeared to support the rule's
narrow restrictions, the Constitution permitted the lawyer to describe his practice
as he did.
In Peel v. Attorney Registrationand Disciplinary Commission,319 the Court
held that the State of Illinois had violated the First Amendment by absolutely
prohibiting a lawyer from advertising his certification as a trial specialist by a
private professional organization. 20 Justice Marshall, who provided the fifth vote
in a concurring opinion, agreed with the plurality that a state could not impose a
total ban against advertisements that listed speciality certifications by private
certifying organizations. But he was ofthe view that a state could impose lesser
requirements such as disclaimers, or explanatory supplements, to assure that the

316. Model Rules ofProfessional Conduct Rule 7.4 cmt. (2000).
317. 455 U.S. 191, 102 S. Ct. 929 (1982).
318. Among other things, the lawyer's advertisement listed "personal injury" and "real estate" as
practice areas, instead of "tort law" and "property law," as the rule required. It also identified several
practice areas that had no analogues at all under the relevant ethics rule. See 455 U.S. at 197, 102 S.
Ct. at 934.
319. 496U.S.91,IIOS.Ct.2281 (1990).
320. The applicable ethics rule permitted a lawyer to designate areas of the law in which he
concentrates or limits his practice, but it prohibited the lawyer from holding himself out as certified or
as a specialist except in patent, trademark or admiralty law. Peel's professional letterhead contained
a truthful statement that he had been designated as a "Certified Civil Trial Specialist" by the National
Board of Trial Advocacy. See id. at 96-97, 110 S. Ct. at 2285-86.
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consumer is not misled. 2'
A complete analysis of the constitutional issues concerning lawyer
representations ofspecialization is beyond the scope ofthis article. At the threshold
level of analysis, however, it is clear that the comment to ABA Model Rule 7.4 is
more permissive than the text ofthe Louisiana rule. Moreover, there appears to be
some tension between the text ofthe Louisiana rule and some statements in the two
Supreme Court cases referenced above. For example, the Louisiana rule, as
currently configured, is prohibitory in nature; it is not a rule that incorporates the
sort of disclaimer or supplemental information requirements referred to by Justice
Marshall in his concurring opinion inPeel. In any event, as things stand now, there
are parts of the amended comment to Model Rule 7.4 that could not be adopted in
Louisiana. If the comment articulates the correct constitutional standard," the
Louisiana rule is on shaky ground.
I. Rule 7.6

In February of2000, the ABA's House ofDelegates approved the addition of
new Rule 7.6 to the Rules ofProfessional Conduct." The new rule deals with "pay
to play" activities by lawyers. "Pay to play" refers to the practice of making (or
soliciting) campaign contributions in order to obtain favorable consideration from
government officials in the allocation of government legal work.
The new rule states:
A lawyer or law firm shall not accept a government legal engagement or
an appointment by a judge if the lawyer or law firm makes a political
contribution or solicits political contributions for the purpose ofobtaining
or being considered for that type oflegal engagement or appointment.3"
The comment to the rule acknowledges that lawyers have the right to participate
"fully" in the political process. However, it also says that "the integrity.of the
profession is undermined" when the public can legitimately question whether
lawyers who are engaged to perform government legal work "are selected on the
3 25
basis of competence and merit.
Opponents ofthe new rule contended that it would unconstitutionally infringe
on the right of lawyers to participate in the electoral process.326 But proponents
argued that the rule does not prohibit political contributions; instead, it prohibits
lawyers from accepting legal engagements that are inappropriately connected to

321. Seed. at 116, 110 S. Ct. at 2296.
322. The comment may be more permissive than the Supreme Court cases, but, as is often true
with respect to constitutional law issues, the boundaries of the pertinent legal rules are not fully
established.
323. See James Podgers, A New Ethics No-No, A.B.A.J. Apr. 2000, at 96.
324. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.6 (2000).
325. Id. cmt.
326. See Podgers, supra note 323, at 96.
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their campaign contributions. 3"
The comment to the new rule expresses several significant limitations on its
scope. For example, the comment says that the expression "political contribution"
does not include "uncompensated service. 32 s It would seem, then, that a lawyer
could serve as a volunteer campaign worker without running afoul of the rule. The
comment also provides that political contributions in "initiative and referendum
elections" are not covered by the rule. " 9 And it further indicates that the rule does
not reach (1) "engagemeits or appointments made on the basis of experience,
expertise, professional qualifications and cost following a request for proposal or
other process that is free from influence based upon political contributions"; or (2)
"engagements or appointments made on a rotational basis from a list compiled
without regard to political contributions."33
The comment contains other useful statements.3 3 ' If the Louisiana Supreme
Court were inclined to adopt the new rule, it should give serious consideration to
the language of the comment as well.
J Rule 8.4
There has been a recent amendment to the comment to Model Rule 8.4, which
is the basic misconduct rule. The text of Model Rule 8.4(d) provides that it is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to "engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the
administration of'justice. ''3 In 1998, the ABA made a change in the comment to
the rule that appears to incorporate a substantive element:
A lawyer who, in the course ofrepresenting a client, knowingly manifests
by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion,
national origin, disability, age, sexual orientation or socioeconomic status,
violates paragraph (d) when such actions are prejudicial to the
administration ofjustice. Legitimate advocacy respecting the foregoing
factors does not violate paragraph (d). A trial judge's finding that
peremptory challenges were exercised on a discriminatory basis does not
alone establish a violation ofthis rule.333
Previous proposals to include similar language in the comment had come under
fire on First Amendment grounds. 34 One can anticipate that a lawyer who is faced
with discipline based on this language might assert that itsuffers from problems of
327.

See id.

328.

See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 7.6 cmt. (2000).

329.

See id.

330. See id.
331. One ofthe usual provisions of the comment is a discussion ofhow objective circumstances
could support an inference that a political contribution was made for the purpose of obtaining a
government legal engagement. See Id.
332. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(d) (2000).
333. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4 cmt. (2000).
334. See Legal News, U.S.L.W., Dec. 9, 1997, at 2343.
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vagueness and overbreadth.
Putting constitutional questions aside, on the merits it is hard to argue with the
general proposition that lawyers ought not to manifest bias or prejudice, as those
terms are conventionally understood, when doing so is prejudicial to the
administration ofjustice. There are significant problems with such manifestations
in our society, and they have no legitimate place in our legal system. But there is
some potential for abuse associated with this kind ofrule. A witness, opponent, or
other individual who is offended by a lawyer's conduct might perceive
impermissible bias orprejudice in conduct that was not intended to manifest it. The
"manifestation" in question might be altogether misunderstood, or it might be a
manifestation of permissible dislike ofpersonality.
The adverb "knowingly" offers some defensive help to the innocent lawyer in
these situations, but maybe not much help. Presumably the standard for rule
violation would be objective, rather than entirely subjective, or the rule would never
get much traction. Indeed, the Terminology section of the Model Rules indicates,
with respect to the word "knowingly," that "[a] person's knowledge may be inferred
from circumstances." 3 ' What the lawyer actually intends in connection with
particular words or conduct may not prove to be as critical as what is perceived by
others.
Other defensive help might come from the limiting phrase "when such actions
are prejudicial to the administration ofjustice," but this help may be limited as well.
Prejudice to the administration of justice is not likely to be found in the words or
conduct of the lawyer alone; it will probably arise, at least in part, because of the
reactions of others to the words or conduct. If a person perceives a manifestation
of bias or prejudice in the lawyer's words or conduct, and ifthat person's reaction
is a volatile one, sufficient prejudice to the administration ofjustice might be found.
In some instances, the volatility of the reaction might derive more from the
unreasonable reaction ofthe perceiving person than from what the lawyer actually
said or did. It would be unfortunate if the new language ofthe comment resulted
in the discipline ofinnocent attorneys.
It should be noted that there is a somewhat similar anti-bias provision in the
ABA Model Code of Judicial Conduct. Canon 3(B)(6) enjoins judges to require
lawyers who appear before them to "refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct,
bias or prejudice based upon race, sex, religion, national origin, disability, age,
sexual orientation, or socioeconomic status, against parties, witnesses, counsel, or
others.""
The Canon, like the comment to Rule 8.4, includes a provision
permitting "legitimate advocacy" with respect to the listed factors. 3
Louisiana has patterned its Code of Judicial Conduct on the ABA code, but the
Louisiana version is not entirely faithful to the ABA model. In particular, the antibias provision ofthe Louisiana Code ofJudicial Conduct simply enjoins judges to
"require lawyers in proceedings before the judge to refrain from manifesting, by

335.
336.
337.

Model Rules of Professional Conduct Terminology (2000).
See Model Code ofJudicial Conduct Canon 3(B)(G) (1990).
Id.
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33
words or conduct, bias or prejudice against parties, witnesses, counsel or others."
If the Louisiana Supreme Court were to approve, in concept, the idea of adopting
comments to the Rules of Professional Conduct, and if the court were willing to
include an anti-bias paragraph in the comment to Rule 8.4, it would not be
surprising if the court were to depart from the ABA's model in favor of a more
general statement, as it did in the adoption of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

K.Rule 8.5
The ABA House of Delegates approved some changes in Model Rule 8.5, and
339
Model Rule 8.5, as
its comment, during the August 1993 Annual Meeting.
amended, deals with the jurisdiction of disciplinary authorities and choice-of-law
considerations for the application ofdisciplinary rules. The general rule, ofcourse,
is that a lawyer is subject to discipline in the jurisdiction in which he or she is
licensed to practice.' But choice-of-law issues can arise, and the amended rule
offers guidance as to the appropriate disciplinary rules to apply when a lawyer is
licensed to practice in more than one jurisdiction or if the conduct in question
occurs in a court sitting in a jurisdiction other than that in which the lawyer is
licensed. By way ofjustification for the choice o&f law provisions, the amended
comment to Model Rule 8.5 observes that "[iln the past, decisions have not
3' 4
developed clear or consistent guidance as to which rules to apply." ' The comment
also explains how the rule works.
If the Louisiana Supreme Court should decide to adopt the amended text of
Model Rule 8.5, it would also be a good idea to adopt the helpful comment to the
rule. A change would be appropriate. The current Louisiana rule contains no
choice-of-law provisions at all. It is limited to a simple statement that lawyers who
are admitted to practice in "this jurisdiction" are subject to the jurisdiction's
disciplinary authority.342

338. Louisiana Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(AX5). The Louisiana Supreme Court has
issued no explanation for the departure. However, it may be worth pointing out that the language in the
Louisiana Code ofJudicial Conduct avoids the need to give express approval to each ofthe separately
listed grounds ofbias and prejudice that are identified in the ABA's code. Inparticular, the Louisiana
version avoids the potentially controversial issue of adopting an express provision regarding bias and
prejudice based on "sexual orientation."
339. See Gillers &Simon, supranote 82, at 414-18.
340. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.5(a) (2000).
341. See id.
342. See Louisiana Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.5 (2000).

